tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-34905337869105945682024-03-12T21:11:32.711-07:00ELMER AT RANDOMAnything
from mundane
to ethereal;
from puerile
to polemical.Elmer Brabantehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17569454269621923153noreply@blogger.comBlogger93125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3490533786910594568.post-72358990929861582322011-05-27T23:32:00.000-07:002011-05-27T23:53:10.956-07:00CIVIL PROCEDURE REVIEWER Part 2<strong>V. PARTIES IN CIVIL ACTION (Rule 3)</strong><br /><br /><strong>Real parties in interest; indispensable parties; representatives as parties; necessary parties; indigent parties; alternative defendants</strong><br /><br />(1) Real Party-in-Interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit (Sec. 2, Rule 3). The interest must be real, which is a present substantial interest as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent subordinate or consequential interest (Fortich vs. Corona, 289 SCRA 624). It is an interest that is material and direct, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in question (Samaniego vs. Aguila, 334 SCRA 438). While ordinarily one who is not a privy to a contract may not bring an action to enforce it, there are recognized exceptions this rule:<br />(a) Contracts containing stipulations pour atrui or stipulations expressly conferring benefits to a non-party may sue under the contract provided such benefits have been accepted by the beneficiary prior to its revocation by the contracting parties (Art. 1311, Civil Code).<br />(b) Those who are not principally or subsidiarily obligated in the contract, in which they had no intervention, may show their detriment that could result from it. For instance, Art. 1313, CC, provides that “creditors are protected in cases of contracts intended to defrauded them.” Further, Art. 1318, CC, provides that contracts entered into in fraud of creditors may be rescinded when the creditors cannot in any manner collect the claims due them. Thus, a creditor who is not a party to a contract can sue to rescind the contract to redress the fraud committed upon him.<br />(2) Indispensable Party is a real party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action (Sec. 7, Rule 3). Without the presence of his party the judgment of a court cannot attain real finality (De Castro vs. CA, 384 SCRA 607). The presence of indispensable parties is a condition for the exercise of juridical power and when an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed. The absence of indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only to the absent parties but even as to those present. Two essential tests of an indispensable party: (a) Can a relief be afforded to the plaintiff without the presence of the other party; and (b) Can the case be decided on its merits without prejudicing the rights of the other party?<br />(a) A person is not an IP if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a person is not an IP if his presence would merely permit complete relief between him and those already parties to the action, or if he has no interest in the subject matter of the action. <br />(b) Although normally a joinder of action is permissive (Sec. 6, Rule 3), the joinder of a party becomes compulsory when the one involved is an indispensable party. Clearly, the rule directs a compulsory joinder of IP (Sec. 7, Rule 3).<br />(3) Necessary Party is one who is not indispensable but ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, of for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. But a necessary party ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties (Sec. 8, Rule 3). The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding in the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party (Sec. 9, Rule 3).<br />(4) Indigent party is one who is allowed by the court to litigate his claim, action or defense upon ex parte application and hearing, when the court is satisfied that such party has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter, basic necessities for himself and his family (Sec. 21, Rule 3). If one is authorized to litigate as an indigent, such authority shall include an exemption from the payment of docket fee, and of transcripts of stenographic notes, which the court may order to e furnished by him. However, the amount of the docket and other fees, which the indigent was exempt from paying, shall be lien on the judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent. A lien on the judgment shall or arise if the court provides otherwise (Sec. 21, Rule 3).<br />(5) Representatives as parties pertains to the parties allowed by the court as substitute parties to an action whereby the original parties become incapacitated of incompetent (Sec. 18, Rule 3). The substitution of a party depends on the nature of the action. If the action is personal, and a party dies pendent lite, such action does not survive, and such party cannot be substituted. If the action is real, death of the defendant survives the action, and the heirs will substitute the dead. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein may be enforced against the estate of the deceased defendant (Sec. 1, Rule 87).<br />(a) In case a party becomes incapacitated or incompetent during the pendency of the action, the court, upon motion, may allow the action to be continued by or against the incapacitated or incompetent party with the assistance of his legal guardian or guardian ad litem (Sec. 18, Rule 20).<br />(b) In case of transfer, the action may be continued by or against the original party, unless the court upon motion directs the person to whom the interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with the original party Sec. 19, Rule 3).<br />(6) Alternative defendants are those who may be joined as such in the alternative by the plaintiff who is uncertain from whom among them he is entitled to a relief, regardless of whether or not a right to a relief against one is inconsistent with that against the other. Where the plaintiff cannot definitely identify who among two or more persons should be impleaded as a defendant, he may join all of them as defendants in the alternative. Under Sec. 13, Rule 3, “where the plaintiff is uncertain against who of several persons he is entitled to relief, he may join any or all of them as defendants in the alternative, although a right to relief against one may be inconsistent with a right of relief against the other.” Just as the rule allows a suit against defendants in the alternative, the rule also allows alternative causes of action (Sec. 2, Rule 8) and alternative defenses (Sec. 5[b], Rule 6).<br /><br /><strong>Compulsory and permissive joinder of parties</strong><br /><br />(1) Joinder of parties is compulsory if there are parties without whom no final determination can be had of an action (Sec. 7, Rule 3).<br />(2) Joinder of parties is permissive when there is a right or relief in favor of or against the parties joined in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions, and there is a question of law or fact common to the parties joined in the action (Sec. 6, Rule 3).<br /><br /><strong>Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties</strong><br /><br />(1) A party is misjoined when he is made a party to the action although he should not be impleaded. A party is not joined when he is supposed to be joined but is not impleaded in the action. <br />(2) Under the rules, neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just (Sec. 11, Rule 3). Misjoinder of parties does not involve questions of jurisdiction and not a ground for dismissal (Republic vs. Herbieto, 459 SCRA 183).<br />(3) Even if neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for dismissal of the action, the failure to obey the order of the court to drop or add a party is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint under Sec. 3, Rule 17.<br />(4) The rule does not comprehend whimsical and irrational dropping or adding of parties in a complaint. What it really contemplates is erroneous or mistaken non-joinder and misjoinder of parties. No one is free to join anybody in a complaint in court only to drop him unceremoniously later at the option of the plaintiff. The rule presupposes that the original inclusion had been made in the honest conviction that it was proper and the subsequent dropping is requested because it has turned out that such inclusion was a mistake. And this is the reason why the rule ordains that the dropping is “on such terms as are just” (Lim Tan Hu vs. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425).<br /><br /><strong>Class suit</strong><br /><br />(1) A class suit is an action where one or more may sue for the benefit of all if the requisites for said action are complied with.<br />(2) An action does not become a class suit merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings. Whether the suit is or is not a class suit depends upon the attendant facts. A class suit does not require commonality of interest in the questions involved in the suit. What is required by the Rules is a common or general interest in the subject matter of the litigation. The subject matter of the action means the physical, the things real or personal, the money, lands, chattels, and the like, in relation to the suit which is prosecuted and not the direct or wrong committed by the defendant. It is not also a common question of law that sustains a class suit but a common interest in the subject matter of the controversy. (Mathay vs. Consolidated Ban & Trust Co., 58 SCRA 559). There is no class suit when interests are conflicting.<br />(3) For a class suit to prosper, the following requisites must concur:<br />(a) The subject matter of the controversy must be of common or general interest to may persons;<br />(b) The persons are so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties;<br />(c) The parties actually before the court are sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned; and<br />(d) The representatives sue or defend for the benefit of all (Sec.12, Rule 3).<br /><br />Suits against entities without juridical personality<br /><br />(1) A corporation being an entity separate and distinct from its members has no interest in the individual property of its members unless transferred to the corporation. Absent any showing of interests, a corporation has no personality to bring an action for the purpose of recovering the property, which belongs to the members in their personal capacities. <br />(2) An entity without juridical personality may be sued under a common name by which it is commonly known when it represents to the plaintiff under a common name, and the latter relies on such representation (Lapanday vs. Estita, 449 SCRA 240).<br /><br />Effect of death of party litigant<br /><br />(1) The death of the client extinguishes the attorney-client relationship and divests a counsel of his authority to represent the client. Accordingly, a dead client has no personality and cannot be represented by and attorney (Laviña vs. CA, 171 SCRA 691). Neither does he become the counsel of the heirs of the deceased unless his services are engaged by said heirs (Lawas vs. CA, 146 SCRA 173).<br />(2) Upon the receipt of the notice of death, the court shall order the legal representative or representatives of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased within thirty (30) days from notice (Sec. 16, Rule 3). The substitution of the deceased would not be ordered by the court in cases where the death of the party would extinguish the action because substitution is proper only when the action survives (Aguas vs. Llamas, 5 SCRA 959).<br />(3) Where the deceased has no heirs, the court shall require the appointment of an executor or administrator. This appointment is not required where the deceased left an heir because the heir under the new rule, may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased. If there is an heir but the heir is a minor, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for said minor heir (Sec. 13, Rule 3).<br />(4) The court may appoint an executor or administrator when: <br />(a) the counsel for the deceased does not name a legal representative; or<br />(b) there is a representative named but he failed to appear within the specified period (Sec. 16, Rule 3).<br /><br /><br />VI. VENUE (Rule 4)<br /><br />(1) Venue is the place or the geographical area where an action is to be filed and tried. In civil cases, it relates only to the place of the suit and not to the jurisdiction of the court (Manila Railroad Company vs. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523).<br /><br />Venue versus Jurisdiction<br /><br />(1) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the place where the case is to be heard or tried;<br />(2) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue of procedural law;<br />(3) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent; <br />(4) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties; and<br />(5) Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is a ground for a motu propio dismissal; venue is not a ground for a motu propio dismissal except in cases subject to summary procedure.<br /><br />Venue of real actions<br /><br />(1) Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved or a portion thereof is situated. Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal trial court of the municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated (Sec. 1, Rule 4).<br /><br />Venue or personal actions<br /><br />(1) All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, all at the option of the plaintiff (Sec. 2, Rule 4). <br /><br /><strong>Venue of actions against non-residents</strong><br /><br />(1) If any of the defendants does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff, or any property of said defendant located in the Philippines, the action may be commenced and tried in the court of the place where the plaintiff resides, or where the property or any portion thereof is situated or found (Sec. 3, Rule 4), or at the place where the defendant may be found, at the option of the plaintiff (Sec. 2).<br /><br /><strong>When the Rules on Venue do not apply</strong><br /><br />(1) The Rules do not apply (a) in those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or (b) where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof (Sec. 4, Rule 4).<br /><br /><strong>Effects of stipulations on venue</strong><br /><br />(1) The parties may stipulate on the venue as long as the agreement is (a) in writing, (b) made before the filing of the action, and (3) exclusive as to the venue (Sec. 4[b], Rule 4).<br />(2) The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue is that while they are considered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words. They should be considered merely as an agreement or additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive by rather permissive. If the intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there must be accompanying language clearly and categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions between them be litigated only at the place named by them.<br />(3) In interpreting stipulations as to venue, there is a need to inquire as to whether or not the agreement is restrictive or not. If the stipulation is restrictive, the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon by the parties. It must be reiterated and made clear that under Rule 4, the general rules on venue of actions shall not apply where the parties, before the filing of the action, have validly agreed in writing on an exclusive venue. The mere stipulation on the venue of an action, however, is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place (Spouses Lantin vs. Lantin, GR 160053, August 28, 2006).<br /><br /><br /><strong>VII. PLEADINGS (Rules 6 - 13)</strong><br /><br />(1) Pleadings are written statements of the respective claims and defenses of the parties submitted to the court for appropriate judgment (Sec. 1, Rule 6). Pleadings aim to define the issues and foundation of proof to be submitted during the trial, and to apprise the court of the rival claims of the parties.<br /><br /><strong>Kinds of Pleadings (Rule 6)<br /><br />Complaint </strong><br /><br />(1) Complaint is the pleading alleging the plaintiff’s cause or causes of action, stating therein the names and residences of the plaintiff and defendant (Sec. 3, Rule 6).<br /><br /><strong>Answer </strong><br /><br />(1) An answer is a pleading in which a defending party sets forth his defenses (Sec. 3, Rule 6). It may allege legal provisions relied upon for defense (Sec. 1, Rule 8).<br /><br /><strong>Negative Defenses</strong> <br /><br />(1) Negative defenses are the specific denials of the material fact or facts alleged in the pleading of the claimant essential to his cause or causes of action (Sec. 5[a], Rule 6).<br />(2) When the answer sets forth negative defenses, the burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff, and when the answer alleges affirmative defenses, the burden of proof devolves upon the defendant.<br /><br /><strong>Negative Pregnant </strong><br /><br />(1) Negative pregnant is an admission in avoidance which does not qualify as a specific denial. <br />(2) It is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 1512154, July 15, 2003).<br /><br /><strong>Affirmative Defenses</strong> <br /><br />(1) Negative defenses are allegations of new matters which, while hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the pleading of the claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by him. Affirmative defenses include:<br />(a) Fraud<br />(b) Statute of limitations<br />(c) Release<br />(d) Payment<br />(e) Illegality<br />(f) Statute of frauds<br />(g) Estoppel<br />(h) Former recovery<br />(i) Discharge in bankruptcy<br />(j) Any other matter by way of confession and avoidance (Sec. 5[b], Rule 6)<br /><br /><strong>Counterclaim</strong><br /><br />(1) A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party (Sec. 6, Rule 6). It is in itself a claim or cause of action interposed in an answer. It is either compulsory or permissive.<br /><br /><strong>Compulsory Counterclaim</strong><br /><br />(1) A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication, the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the court, both as to the amount and the nature thereof, except that in an original action before the RTC, the counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount (Sec. 7, Rule 6).<br />(2) It is compulsory where:<br />(a) It arises out of, or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim;<br />(b) It does not require jurisdiction; and<br />(c) The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim.<br />(3) The tests to determine whether or not a counterclaim is compulsory are:<br />(a) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim counterclaim largely the same?<br />(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?<br />(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as the defendant’s counterclaim? and<br />(d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? (Financial Building Corp. vs. Forbes Park Assn. Inc., 338 SCRA 811).<br /><br /><strong>Permissive Counterclaim</strong><br /><br />(1) Permissive counterclaim is a counterclaim which does not arise out of nor is it necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim. It is not barred even if not set up in the action. <br />(2) The requirements of a permissive counterclaim are:<br />(a) It does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction;<br />(b) It must be within the jurisdiction of the court wherein the case is pending and is cognizable by the regular courts of justice; and <br />(c) It does not arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions subject of the complaint.<br /><br /><strong>Effect on the Counterclaim when the complaint is dismissed</strong><br /><br />(1) If a counterclaim has already been pleaded by the defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, and the court grants the said motion to dismiss, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint (Sec. 2, Rule 17). The dismissal upon motion of plaintiff shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute the counterclaim. The defendant if he so desires may prosecute his counterclaim either in a separate action or in the same action. Should he choose to have his counterclaim resolved in the same action, he must notify the court of his preference within 15 days from notice of the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss. Should he opt to prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action, the court should render the corresponding order granting and reserving his right to prosecute his claim in a separate complaint. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court.<br />(2) The dismissal of the complaint under Sec. 3 (due to fault of plaintiff) is without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same action or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court. The dismissal of the main action does not carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim (Sec. 6, Rule 16).<br /><br /><strong>Cross-claims</strong><br /><br />(1) A cross-claim is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein. Such cross-claim may include a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all of part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant (Sec. 8, Rule 6).<br /><br /><strong>Third (fourth, etc.) party complaints</strong><br /><br />(1) It is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action, called the third (fourth, etc.)–party defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim.<br /><br /><strong>Complaint-in-intervention</strong><br /><br />(1) Complaint-in-intervention is a pleading whereby a third party asserts a claim against either or all of the original parties. If the pleading seeks to unite with the defending party in resisting a claim against the latter, he shall file an answer-in-intervention.<br />(2) If at any time before judgment, a person not a party to the action believes that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation in a case in which he is not a party, he may, with leave of court, file a complaint-in-intervention in the action if he asserts a claim against one or all of the parties. <br /><br /><strong>Reply</strong><br /><br />(1) Replay is a pleading, the office or function of which is to deny, or allege facts in denial or avoidance of new matters alleged by way of defense in the answer and thereby join or make issue as to such matters. It a party does not file such reply, all the new matters alleged in the answer are deemed controverted (Sec. 10, Rule 6).<br /><br /><strong>Pleadings allowed in small claim cases and cases covered by the rules on summary procedure</strong><br /><br />(1) The only pleadings allowed under the Rules on Summary Procedure are complaint, compulsory counterclaim, cross-claim, pleaded in the answer, and answers thereto (Sec. 3[A]). These pleadings must be verified (Sec. 3[B]).<br />(2) The only pleadings allowed under small claim cases are:<br /><br /><br /><strong>Parts of a Pleading (Rule 7)</strong><br /><br />(1) The parts of a pleading under Rule 7 are: the caption (Sec. 1), the text or the body (Sec. 2), the signature and address (Sec. 3), the verification (Sec. 4), and the certification against forum shopping (Sec. 5).<br /><br /><strong>Caption</strong><br /><br />(1) The caption must set forth the name of the court, the title of the action, and the docket number if assigned. The title of the action indicates the names of the parties. They shall all e named in the original complaint or petition; but in subsequent pleadings, it shall be sufficient if the name of the first party on each side be stated with an appropriate indication when there are other parties. Their respective participation in the case shall be indicated. <br /><br /><strong>Signature and address</strong><br /><br />(1) Every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in either case his address which should not be a post office box.<br />(2) The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.<br />(3) An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of the Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails to promptly report to the court a change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action.<br />(4) In every pleading, counsel has to indicate his professional tax receipt (PTR) and IBP receipt, the purpose of which is to see to it that he pays his tax and membership due regularly<br /><br /><strong>Verification</strong><br /><br />(1) A verification of a pleading is an affirmation under oath by the party making the pleading that he is prepared to establish the truthfulness of the facts which he has pleaded based on his own personal knowledge.<br />(2) The general rule under, Sec. 4. Rule 7 is that, pleading need not be under oath. This means that a pleading need not be verified. A pleading will be verified only when a verification is required by a law or by a rule. <br />(3) A pleading is verified by and affidavit, which declares that: (a) the affiant has read the pleading, and (b) the allegations therein are true and correct to his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.<br />(4) The verification requirement is significant, as it is intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in a pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The absence of proper verification is cause to treat the pleading as unsigned and dismissable. <br />(5) It is, however, been held that the absence of a verification or the non-compliance with the verification requirement does not necessarily render the pleading defective. It is only a formal and not a jurisdictional requirement. The requirement is a condition affecting only the form of the pleading (Sarmeinto vs. Zaratan, GR 167471, Feb. 5, 2007). The absence of a verification may be corrected by requiring an oath. The rule is in keeping with the principle that rules of procedure are established to secure substantial justice and that technical requirements may be dispensed with in meritorious cases (Pampanga Development Sugar Co. vs. NLRC, 272 SCRA 737). The court may order the correction of the pleading or act on an unverified pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance would not fully serve substantial justice, which after all, is the basic aim for the rules of procedure (Robert Development Corp. vs. Quitain, 315 SCRA 150). <br /><br /><strong>Certification against forum-shopping</strong><br /><br />(1) The certification against forum shopping is a sworn statement certifying to the following matters:<br />(a) That the party has not commenced or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending;<br />(b) That if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and<br />(c) That if he should therefore learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. <br />(2) The certification is mandatory under Sec. 5, Rule 7, but nor jurisdictional (Robert Development Corp. vs. Quitain, 315 SCRA 150). <br />(3) There is forum shopping when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion, other than by appeal or certiorari in another. There can also be forum shopping when a party institutes two or more suits in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition or increase a party’s chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action (Huibonhoa vs. Concepcion, GR 153785, Aug. 3, 2006). It is an act of malpractice, as the litigants trifle with the courts and abuse their processes. It is improper conduct and degrades the administration of justice. If the act of the party or its counsel clearly constitutes willful and deliberate forum-shopping, the same shall constitute direct contempt, and a cause for administrative sanctions, as well as a ground for the summary dismissal of the case with prejudice (Montes vs. CA, GR 143797, May 4, 2006). Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. <br />(4) It is the plaintiff or principal party who executes the certification under oath, and not the attorney. It must be signed by the party himself and cannot be signed by his counsels. As a general and prevailing rule, a certification signed by counsel is a defective certification and is a valid cause for dismissal (Far Eastern Shipping Co. vs. CA, 297 SCRA 30).<br />(5) This certification is not necessary when what is filed is a mere motion for extension, or in criminal cases and distinct causes of action.<br /> <br /><strong>Requirements of a corporation executing the verification/certification on non-forum shopping</strong><br /><br />(1) A juridical entity, unlike a natural person, can only perform physical acts through properly delegated individuals. The certification against forum shopping where the plaintiff or a principal party is a juridical entity like a corporation may be executed by properly authorized persons. This person may be the lawyer of a corporation. As long as he is duly authorized by the corporation and has personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in the certification against forum shopping, the certification may be signed by the authorized lawyer (National Steel Corp. vs. CA, 388 SCRA 85). <br /><br /><strong>Effect of the signature of counsel in a pleading</strong><br /><br />(1) A certification signed by a counsel is a defective certification and is a valid cause for dismissal (Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. CA, 297 SCRA 30). This is the general and prevailing rule. A certification by counsel and not by the principal party himself is no certification at all. The reason for requiring that it must be signed by the principal party himself is that he has actual knowledge, or knows better than anyone else, whether he has initiated similar action/s in other courts, agencies or tribunals. Their lawyer’s explanation that they were out of town at the time their petition was filed with the CA is bereft of basis. That explanation is an afterthought as it was not alleged by counsel in her certification against forum shopping (Go vs. Rico, GR 140682, April 25, 2006).<br /><br /><strong>Allegations in a pleading</strong><br /><br />(1) Every pleading shall contain in a mathematical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party relies for his claim and defense, as the case may be, containing the statement of mere evidenciary facts (Sec. 1, Rule 8).<br /><br /><strong>Manner of making allegations (Rule 8)<br /><br />Condition precedent</strong><br /><br />(1) Conditions precedent are matters which must be complied with before a cause of action arises. When a claim is subject to a condition precedent, the compliance of the same must be alleged in the pleading.<br />(2) Failure to comply with a condition precedent is an independent ground for a motion to dismiss: that a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied (Sec. 1[j], Rule 16).<br /><br /><strong>Fraud, mistake, malice, intent, knowledge and other condition of the mind, judgments, official documents or acts</strong><br /><br />(1) When making averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting such fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity (Sec. 5, Rule 8). It is not enough therefore, for the complaint to allege that he was defrauded by the defendant. Under this provision, the complaint must state with particularity the fraudulent acts of the adverse party. These particulars would necessarily include the time, place and specific acts of fraud committed against him.<br />(2) Malice, intent, knowledge or other conditions of the mind of a person may be averred generally (Sec. 5, Rule 8). Unlike in fraud or mistake, they need not be stated with particularity. The rule is borne out of human experience. It is difficult to state the particulars constituting these matters. Hence, a general averment is sufficient.<br /><br /><strong>Pleading an actionable document</strong><br /><br />(1) An actionable document is a document relied upon by either the plaintiff or the defendant. A substantial number of complaints reaching the courts shows that the plaintiff’s cause of action of the defendant’s defense is based upon a written instrument or a document.<br />(2) Whenever an actionable document is the basis of a pleading, the rule specifically direct the pleader to set forth in the pleading the substance of the instrument or the document, (a) and to attach the original or the copy of the document to the pleading as an exhibit and to be part of the pleading; or (b) with like effect, to set forth in the pleading said copy of the instrument or document (Sec. 7, Rule 8). This manner of pleading a document applies only to one which is the basis of action or a defense. Hence, if the document does not have the character of an actionable document, as when it is merely evidentiary, it need not be pleaded strictly in the manner prescribed by Sec. 7, Rule 8. <br /><br /><strong>Specific denials</strong><br /><br />(1) There are three modes of specific denial which are contemplated by the Rules, namely: <br />(a) By specifying each material allegation of the fact in the complaint, the truth of which the defendant does not admit, and whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the matter which he will rely upon to support his denial;<br />(b) By specifying so much of the averment in the complaint as is true and material and denying only the remainder;<br />(c) By stating that the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment in the complaint, which has the effect of denial (Gaza vs Lim, GR 126863, Jan. 16, 2003)<br />(2) The purpose of requiring the defendant to make a specific denial is to make him disclose the matters alleged in the complaint which he succinctly intends to disprove at the trial, together with the matter which he relied upon to support the denial. The parties are compelled to lay their cards on the table (Aquintey vs. Tibong, GR 166704, Dec. 20, 2006).<br /><br /><strong>Effect of failure to make specific denials</strong><br /> <br />(1) If there are material averments in the complaint other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages, these shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied (Sec. 11, Rule 8).<br />(2) Material allegations, except unliquidated damages, not specifically denied are deemed admitted. If the allegations are deemed admitted, there is no more triable issue between the parties and if the admissions appear in the answer of the defendant, the plaintiff may file a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 34.<br />(3) An admission in a pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such admission because the admission is conclusive as to him. All proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored whether an objection is interposed by a party or not (Republic vs. Sarabia, GR 157847, Aug. 25, 2005). Said admission is a judicial admission, having been made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, and does not require proof. A party who desires to contradict his own judicial admission may do so only be either of two ways: (a) by showing that the admission was made through palpable mistake; or (b) that no such admission was made (Sec. 4, Rule 129).<br />(4) The following are not deemed admitted by the failure to make a specific denial:<br />(a) The amount of unliquidated damages;<br />(b) Conclusions in a pleading which do not have to be denied at all because only ultimate facts need be alleged in a pleading;<br />(c) Non-material allegations, because only material allegations need be denied.<br /><br /><strong>When a specific denial requires an oath</strong><br /><br />(1) Specific denials which must be under oath to be sufficient are:<br />(a) A denial of an actionable document (Sec. 8, Rule 8);<br />(b) A denial of allegations of usury in a complaint to recover usurious interest (Sec. 11, Rule 8).<br /><br /><strong>Effect of failure to plead (Rule 9)<br /><br />Failure to plead defenses and objections</strong><br /><br />(1) Defenses or objections no pleaded in either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, they are deemed waived. Except:<br />(a) When it appears from the pleading or the pieces of evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter;<br />(b) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;<br />(c) That the action is barred by the statute of limitations (same as Sec. 8, Rule 117);<br />(d) Res judicata. In all these cases, the court shall dismiss the claim (Sec. 1, Rule 9).<br /><br /><strong>Failure to plead a compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim</strong><br /><br />(1) A compulsory counterclaim or a cross-claim not set up shall be barred (Sec. 2, Rule 9).<br /><br /><strong>Default</strong><br /><br />(1) Default is a procedural concept that occurs when the defending party fails to file his answer within the reglementary period. It does not occur from the failure of the defendant to attend either the pre-trial or the trial. <br /><br /><strong>When a declaration of default is proper</strong><br /><br />(1) If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default (Sec. 3, Rule 9). <br /><br /><strong>Effect of an order of default</strong><br /><br />(1) A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but not to take part in the trial (Sec. 3[a], Rule 9).<br /><br /><strong>Relief from an order of default</strong><br /><br />(1) Remedy after notice of order and before judgment:<br />(a) Motion to set aside order of default, showing that (a) the failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, and (b) the defendant has a meritorious defense—there must be an affidavit of merit (Sec. 3[b], Rule 9).<br />(2) Remedy after judgment but before finality:<br />(b) Motion for new trial under Rule 37; or<br />(c) Appeal from the judgment as being contrary to the evidence or the law;<br />(3) Remedy after judgment becomes final and executor:<br />(d) Petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38;<br />(e) Action for nullity of judgment under Rule 47.<br />(4) If the order of default is valid, Certiorari is not available. If the default order was improvidently issued, that is, the defendant was declared in default, without a motion, or without having served with summons before the expiration of the reglementary period to answer, Certiorari is available as a remedy (Matute vs. CS, 26 SCRA 798; Akut vs. CA, 116 SCRA 216).<br /><br /><strong>Effect of a partial default</strong><br /><br />(1) When a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of action against several defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented (Sec. 33[c], Rule 9).<br /><br /><strong>Extent of relief</strong><br /><br />(1) A judgment rendered against a party in default may not exceed the amount or be different from that prayed for nor include unliquidated damages which are not awarded (Sec. 3[c], Rule 9). In fact, there can be no automatic grant of relief as the court has to weigh the evidence. Furthermore, there can be no award of unliquidated damages (Gajudo vs. Traders Royal Bank, GR 151098, March 31, 2006).<br /><br /><strong>Actions where default is not allowed</strong><br /><br />(1) Annulment of marriage;<br />(2) Declaration of nullity of marriage; and<br />(3) Legal separation<br /><br />The court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated (Sec. 3[e], Rule 9).<br /><br /><br /><strong>Filing and Service of pleadings (Rule 13)</strong><br /><br /><strong>Payment of docket fees</strong><br /><br />(1) On acquisition of jurisdiction. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading but the payments of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action (Proton Pilipinas Corp. vs. Banque National de Paris, 460 SCRA 260). In connection with the payment of docket fees, the court requires that all complaints, petitions, answers and similar pleadings must specify the amount of damages being prayed for both in the body of the pleading and in prayer therein and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees; otherwise such pleading shall not be accepted for filing or shall be expunged from the record. Any defect in the original pleading resulting in underpayment of the docket fee cannot be cured by amendment, such as by the reduction of the claim as, for all legal purposes, there is no original complaint over which the court has acquired jurisdiction (Manchester Development Corp. vs. CA, GR 75919, May 7, 1987).<br />(2) The rule on payment of docket fee has, in some instances, been subject to the rule on liberal interpretation. Thus, in a case, it was held that while the payment of the required docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its nonpayment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period (PGCOR vs. Lopez, 474 SCRA 76; Sun Insurance Office vs. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 272). Also, if the amount of docket fees is insufficient considering the amount of the claim, the party filing the case will be required to pay the deficiency, but jurisdiction is not automatically lost (Rivera vs. Del Rosario, GR 144934, Jan. 15, 2004).<br />(3) On appeal. The Rules now requires that appellate docket and other lawful fees must be paid within the same period for taking an appeal. This is clear from the opening sentence of Sec. 4, Rule 41 of the same rules that, “Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees.”<br />(4) The Supreme Court has consistently held that payment of docket fee within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executor (Regalado vs. Go, GR 167988, Feb. 6, 2007). Hence, nonpayment is a valid ground for the dismissal of an appeal (MA Santander Construction vs. Villanueva, GR 136477, Nov. 10, 2004). However, delay in the payment of the docket fees confers upon the court a discretionary, not a mandatory power to dismiss an appeal (Villamor vs. CA, GR 136858, Jan. 21, 2004).<br /><br /><strong>Filing versus service of pleadings</strong><br /><br />(1) Filing is the act of presenting the pleading or other paper to the clerk of court;<br />(2) Service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or paper concerned (Sec. 2, Rule 13).<br /><br /><strong>Periods of filing of pleadings</strong><br /><br />(1) The date of the mailing of motions, pleadings, or any other papers or payments or deposits, as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt, shall be considered as the date of their filing, payment, or deposit in court. The envelope shall be attached to the record of the case (Sec. 3, Rule 13)<br /><br /><strong>Manner of filing</strong><br /><br />(1) By personal service or by registered mail. The filing of pleadings, appearances, motions, notices, orders, judgments and all other papers shall be made by presenting the original copies thereof, plainly indicated as such, personally to the clerk of court or by sending them by registered mail. In the first case, the clerk of court shall endorse on the pleading the date and hour of filing. In the second case, the date of the mailing of motions, pleadings, or any other papers or payments or deposits, as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt, shall be considered as the date of their filing, payment, or deposit in court. The envelope shall be attached to the record of the case (Sec. 3, Rule 13). <br /><br /><strong>Modes of service</strong><br /><br />(1) There are two modes of service of pleadings, judgments, motions, notices, orders, judgments and other papers: (a) personally, or (b) by mail. However, if personal service and serviced by mail cannot be made, service shall be done by ‘substituted service’.<br />(2) Personal service is the preferred mode of service. If another mode of service is used other than personal service, the service must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service of filing was not done personally. Exempt from this explanation are papers emanating from the court. A violation of this explanation requirement may be a cause for the paper to be considered as not having been filed (Sec. 11, Rule 13).<br />(3) Personal service is made by: (a) delivering a copy of the papers served personally to the party or his counsel, or (b) by leaving the papers in his office with his clerk or a person having charge thereof. If no person is found in the office, or his office is not known or he has no office, then by leaving a copy of the papers at the party’s or counsel’s residence, if known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion residing therein between eight in the morning and six in the evening (Sec. 6, Rule 13).<br /><br /><strong>Service by mail</strong><br /><br />(1) The preferred service by mail is by registered mail. Service by ordinary mail may be done only if no registry service is available in the locality of either the sender or the addressee (Sec. 7, Rule 13). It shall be done by depositing the copy in the post office, in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party or his counsel at his office, if known, or otherwise at his residence, if known, with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if not delivered.<br /><br /><strong>Substituted service</strong><br /><br />(1) This mode is availed of only when there is failure to effect service personally or by mail. This failure occurs when the office and residence of the party or counsel is unknown. Substituted service is effected by delivering the copy to the clerk of court, with proof of failure of both personal service and service by mail (Sec. 8, Rule 13). Substituted service is complete at the time of delivery of the copy to the clerk of court. <br /><br /><strong>Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions</strong><br /><br />(1) Final orders or judgments shall be served either personally or by registered mail. When a party summoned by publication has failed to appear in the action, final orders or judgments against him shall be served upon him also by publication at the expense of the prevailing party (Sec. 9).<br /><br /><strong>Priorities in modes of service and filing</strong><br /><br />(1) Personal service is the preferred mode of service.<br />(2) The preferred service by mail is by registered mail.<br />(3) The following papers are required to be filed in court and served upon the parties affected:<br />(a) Judgments<br />(b) Resolutions<br />(c) Orders<br />(d) Pleadings subsequent to the complaint<br />(e) Written motions<br />(f) Notices<br />(g) Appearances<br />(h) Demands<br />(i) Offers of judgment<br />(j) Similar papers (Sec. 4, Rule 13).<br /><br /><strong>When service is deemed complete</strong><br /><br />(1) Personal service is deemed complete upon the actual delivery following the above procedure (Sec. 10, Rule 13).<br />(2) Service by ordinary mail is deemed complete upon the expiration of ten (10) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise provides. On the other hand, service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or after five (5) days from the date he received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever is earlier (Sec. 8, Rule 13).<br />(3) Substituted service is complete at the time of delivery of the copy to the clerk of court. <br /><br /><strong>Proof of filing and service</strong><br /><br />(1) The filing of a pleading or paper shall be proved by its existence in the record of the case, if it is not in the record, but is claimed to have been filed personally, the filing shall be proved by the written or stamped acknowledgment of its filing by the clerk of court in a copy of the same (Sec. 12, Rule 13).<br />(2) If the filing or paper is filed by registered mail, proof of filing is by the registry receipt and by the affidavit of the person who did the mailing, containing a full statement of the date and place of depositing the mail in the post office in a sealed envelope addressed to the court, with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if not delivered (Sec. 12, Rule 13).<br />(3) Proof of personal service shall consist of the written admission of the party served. It may also be proven by the official return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing full information of the date, place and manner of service (Sec. 13, Rule 13). If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of the affidavit of the person mailing of the facts showing compliance with Sec. 7, Rule 13. If the service is by registered mail, the proof shall consist of such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card is to be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the addressee (Sec. 13, Rule 13).<br /><br /><strong>Amendment (Rule 10)</strong><br /><br /><strong>Amendment as a matter of right</strong><br /><br />(1) A plaintiff has the right to amend his complaint once at any time before a responsive pleading is served by the other party or in case of a reply to which there is no responsive pleading, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served (Sec. 2, Rule 10). Thus, before an answer is served on the plaintiff, the latter may amend his complaint as a matter of right. The defendant may also amend his answer, also as a matter of right, before a reply is served upon him. Sec. 2 refers to an amendment made before the trial court, not to amendments before the CA. the CA is vested with jurisdiction to admit or deny amended petitions filed before it (Navarro Vda. De Taroma, 478 SCRA 336). Hence, even if no responsive pleading has yet been served, if the amendment is subsequent to a previous amendment made as a matter of right, the subsequent amendment must be with leave of court.<br /><br /><strong>Amendments by leave of court</strong><br /><br />(1) Leave of court is required for substantial amendment made after service of a responsive pleading (Sec. 3, Rule 10). The plaintiff, for example, cannot amend his complaint by changing his cause of action or adding a new one without leave of court (Calo and San Jose vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445; Buenaventura vs. Buenaventura, 94 Phil. 193).<br />(2) After a responsive pleading is filed, an amendment to the complaint may be substantial and will correspondingly require a substantial alteration in the defenses of the adverse party. The amendment of the complaint is not only unfair to the defendant but will cause unnecessary delay in the proceedings. Leave of court is thus, required. On the other hand, where no responsive pleading has yet been served, no defenses would be altered. The amendment of the pleading will not then require leave of court (Siasoco vs.CA, 303 SCRA 186).<br /><br /><strong>Formal amendment</strong><br /><br />(1) A defect in the designation of the parties and other clearly clerical or typographical errors may be summarily corrected by the court at any stage of the action, at its initiative or on motion, provided no prejudice is caused thereby to the adverse party (Sec. 4, Rule 10).<br /><br /><strong>Amendments to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence</strong><br /><br />(1) When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the amendment to be made (Sec. 5, Rule 10).<br /><br /><strong>Different from supplemental pleadings</strong><br /><br />(1) A supplemental pleading is one which sets forth transactions, occurrences, or events which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. The filing of supplemental pleadings requires leave of court. The court may allow the pleading only upon such terms as are just. This leave is sought by the filing of a motion with notice to all parties (Sec. 6, Rule 10).<br />(2) A supplemental pleading does not extinguish the existence of the original pleading, while an amended pleading takes the place of the original pleading. A supplemental pleading exists side with the original; it does not replace that which it supplements’ it does not supersede the original but assumes that the original pleading remain as the issues to be tried in the action. A supplemental pleading supplies the deficiencies in aid of an original pleading, not to entirely substitute the latter (Sps. Caoili vs. CA, GR 128325, Sept. 14, 1999).<br /><br /><strong>Effect of amended pleading</strong><br /><br />(1) An amended pleading supersedes the original one which it amends (Sec. 8, Rule 10). The original pleading loses its status as a pleading, is deemed withdrawn and disappears from the record. It has been held that the original complaint is deemed superseded and abandoned by the amendatory complaint only if the latter introduces a new or different cause of action (Versoza vs. CA, 299 SCRA 100).<br />(2) The original pleading is superseded or disappears from the records. The defenses in the original pleadings not reproduced in the amended pleadings are waived (Magaspi vs. Remolete, 115 SCRA 193).Elmer Brabantehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17569454269621923153noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3490533786910594568.post-60284475895557167022011-05-27T23:12:00.000-07:002011-05-27T23:23:41.853-07:00CIVIL PROCEDURE REVIEWER Part 1<strong>PART I.<br />CIVIL PROCEDURE<br />Rules 1 - 71</strong><br /><br /><strong>I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES</strong><br /><br /><strong>Concept of Remedial Law</strong><br /><br />Remedial Law is that branch of law which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion.<br /><br /><strong>Substantive Law as Distinguished from Remedial Law</strong><br /><br />Substantive law creates, defines and regulates rights and duties regarding life, liberty or property which when violated gives rise to a cause of action (Bustos v. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640).<br /><br />Remedial law prescribes the methods of enforcing those rights and obligations created by substantive law by providing a procedural system for obtaining redress for the invasion of rights and violations of duties and by prescribing rules as to how suits are filed, tried and decided by the courts. <br /><br />As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from remedial law which provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished.<br /><br /><strong>Rule-Making Power of the Supreme Court</strong><br /><br />Section 5 (5), Art. VIII of the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speed disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.<br /><br /><strong>Limitations of the Rule-making Power of the Supreme Court</strong><br /><br />(1) The rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases<br />(2) They shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade<br />(3) They shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights (Sec. 5[5], Art. VIII, Constitution).<br />(4) The power to admit attorneys to the Bar is not an arbitrary and despotic one, to be exercised at the pleasure of the court, or from passion, prejudice or personal hostility, but is the duty of the court to exercise and regulate it by a sound and judicial discretion. (Andres vs. Cabrera, 127 SCRA 802)<br /><br /><strong>Power of the Supreme Court to amend and suspend procedural rules</strong><br /><br />(1) When compelling reasons so warrant or when the purpose of justice requires it. What constitutes and good and sufficient cause that would merit suspension of the rules is discretionary upon courts. (CIR v. Migrant Pagbilao Corp., GR 159593, Oct. 12, 2006). Reasons that would warrant the suspension of the Rules: (a) the existence of special or compelling circumstances (b) merits of the case (c) cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of rules (d) a lack of ay showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory (e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby (Sarmiento v. Zaratan, GR 167471, Feb. 5, 2007)<br />(2) To relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure and the mere invocation of substantial justice is not a magical incantation that will automatically compel the Court to suspend procedural rules. (Cu-Unjieng v. CA, 479 SCRA 594)<br />(3) Where substantial and important issues await resolution. (Pagbilao, supra)<br />(4) When transcendental matters of life, liberty or state security are involved. (Mindanao Savings Loan Asso. V. Vicenta Vda. De Flores, 469 SCRA 416).<br />(5) The constitutional power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of practice and procedure necessarily carries with it the power to overturn judicial precedents on points of remedial law through the amendment of the Rules of Court (Pinga vs. Heirs of Santiago, GR 170354, June 30, 2006).<br /><br /><strong>Nature of Philippine Courts</strong><br /><br />Philippine courts are both courts of law and equity. Hence, both legal and equitable jurisdiction is dispensed with in the same tribunal. (US v. Tamparong, 31 Phil. 321)<br /><br /><strong>What is a Court </strong><br /><br />(1) It is an organ of government belonging to the judicial department the function of which is the application of the laws to the controversies brought before it as well as the public administration of justice.<br />(2) It is a governmental body officially assembled under authority of law at the appropriate time and place for the administration of justice through which the State enforces its sovereign rights and powers (21 CJS 16).<br />(3) It is a board or tribunal which decides a litigation or contest (Hidalgo v. Manglapus, 64 OG 3189).<br /><br /><strong>Court distinguished from Judge</strong><br /><br />(1) A court is a tribunal officially assembled under authority of law; a judge is simply an officer of such tribunal;<br />(2) A court is an organ of the government with a personality separate and distinct from the person or judge who sits on it;<br />(3) A court is a being in imagination comparable to a corporation, whereas a judge is a physical person ;<br />(4) A court may be considered an office; a judge is a public officer; and<br />(5) The circumstances of the court are not affected by the circumstances that would affect the judge.<br /><br /><strong>Classification of Philippine Courts</strong><br /><br />(1) Regular courts engaged in the administration of justice are organized into four (4) levels:<br /><br />(a) First Level (MTCs, MeTCs, MCTCs) – which try and decide (1) criminal actions involving violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction and offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, and (2) civil actions including ejectment, recovery of personal property with a value of not more than P300,000 outside MM or does not exceed P400,000 in MM;<br />(b) Second Level (RTCs, Family Courts) – courts of general jurisdiction; among the civil actions assigned to them by law are those in which the subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, or involving title to or possession of real property where the assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000 outside MM or exceeds P50,000 in MM, except actions for ejectment (forcible entry and unlawful detainer), or where the demand exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and cost, or the value of the personal property or controversy exceeds P300,000 outside MM or exceeds P400,000 in MM. RTCs also exercise appellate jurisdiction, to review cases appealed from courts of the first level;<br />(c) Third Level (Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan) – CA is an appellate court, reviewing cases appealed to it from the RTC, on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. Appeals to it decided by the RTC in the exercise of original jurisdiction are a matter of right; appeals with respect to cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction are a matter of discretion. Occasionally, CA may act as a trial court, as in actions praying for the annulment of final and executor judgments of RTCs on the ground of extrinsic fraud subsequently discovered, against which no other remedies lies.<br />Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over all criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices act, and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees including those in GOCCs in relation to their office. It also has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions, or orders of RTCs whether in the exercise of their own original or appellate jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases committed by public officers or employees including those in GOCCs in relation to their office.<br />(d) Fourth Level (Supreme Court)<br /><br /><strong>Courts of Original and Appellate Jurisdiction</strong><br /><br />(1) A court is one with original jurisdiction when actions or proceedings are originally filed with it. A court is one with appellate jurisdiction when it has the power of review over the decisions or orders of a lower court<br />(2) MeTCs, MCTCs and MTCs are courts of original jurisdiction without appellate jurisdiction. RTC is likewise a court of original jurisdiction with respect to cases originally filed with it; and appellate court with respect to cases decided by MTCs within its territorial jurisdiction. (Sec. 22, BP 129)<br />(3) CA is primarily a court of appellate jurisdiction with competence to review judgments of the RTCs and specified quasi-judicial agencies (Sec. 9[3], BP 129). It is also a court of original jurisdiction with respect to cases filed before it involving issuance of writs of certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and prohibition. CA is a court of original and exclusive jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of RTCs (Sec. 9 [1],[2], BP 129).<br />(4) The SC is fundamentally a court of appellate jurisdiction but it may also be a court of original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, public ministers and consuls, and in cases involving petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus (Sec. 5[1], Art. VIII, Constitution). The Supreme Court en banc is not an appellate court to which decisions or resolutions of a division of the Supreme Court may be appealed.<br /><br /><strong>Courts of General and Special Jurisdiction</strong><br /><br />(1) Courts of general jurisdiction are those with competence to decide on their own jurisdiction and to take cognizance of all cases, civil and criminal, of a particular nature. Courts of special (limited) jurisdiction are those which have only a special jurisdiction for a particular purpose or are clothed with special powers for the performance of specified duties beyond which they have no authority of any kind.<br />(2) A court may also be considered ‘general’ if it has the competence to exercise jurisdiction over cases not falling within the jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. It is in the context that the RTC is considered a court of general jurisdiction.<br /><br /><strong>Constitutional and Statutory Courts</strong><br /><br />(1) A constitutional court is one created by a direct Constitutional provision. Example of this court is the SC, which owes its creation from the Constitution itself. Only the SC is a Constitutional court.<br />(2) A statutory court is one created by law other than the Constitution. All courts except the SC are statutory courts. SB was not directly created by the Constitution but by law pursuant to a constitutional mandate. <br /><br /><strong>Principle of Judicial Hierarchy</strong><br /><br />(1) This is an ordained sequence of recourse to courts vested with concurrent jurisdiction, beginning from the lowest, on to the next highest, and ultimately to the highest. This hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and is likewise determinative of the proper forum for petitions for extraordinary writs. This is an established policy necessary to avoid inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to preclude the further clogging of the Court’s docket (Sec. 9[1], BP 129; Sec. 5[1], Art. VIII, Constitution of the Philippines).<br />(2) A higher court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts. The SC is a court of last resort. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of deciding cases in the first instances. Its jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist. <br />(3) Petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed with the RTC and those against the latter with the CA. a direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only where there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.<br />(4) The doctrine of hierarchy of courts may be disregarded if warranted by the nature and importance of the issues raised in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations, or in cases of national interest and of serious implications. Under the principle of liberal interpretations, for example, it may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari directly filed before it. <br /><br /><strong>Doctrine of Non-interference or Doctrine of Judicial Stability</strong><br /><br />(1) Courts of equal and coordinate jurisdiction cannot interfere with each other’s orders. Thus, the RTC has no power to nullify or enjoin the enforcement of a writ of possession issued by another RTC. The principle also bars a court from reviewing or interfering with the judgment of a co-equal court over which it has no appellate jurisdiction or power of review.<br />(2) This doctrine applies with equal force to administrative bodies. When the law provides for an appeal from the decision of an administrative body to the SC or CA, it means that such body is co-equal with the RTC in terms of rand and stature, and logically beyond the control of the latter.<br /><br /><strong>II. JURISDICTION</strong><br /><br />Jurisdiction – the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case.<br /><br /><strong>Jurisdiction over the Parties</strong><br /><br />(1) The manner by which the court acquires jurisdiction over the parties depends on whether the party is the plaintiff or the defendant<br />(2) Jurisdiction over the plaintiff is acquired by his filing of the complaint or petition. By doing so, he submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court.<br />(3) Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is obtained either by a valid service of summons upon him or by his voluntary submission to the court’s authority.<br />(4) The mode of acquisition of jurisdiction over the plaintiff and the defendant applies to both ordinary and special civil actions like mandamus or unlawful detainer cases.<br /><br /><strong>How jurisdiction over plaintiff is acquired</strong><br /><br />(1) Acquired when the action is commenced by the filing of the complaint. This presupposes payment of the docket fees<br /><br /><strong>How jurisdiction over defendant is acquired</strong><br /><br />Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is required only in an action in personam; it is not a prerequisite in an action in rem and quasi in rem. In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case, while in a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided the latter has jurisdiction over the res.<br /><br />(1) By voluntary appearance of the defendant, without service of summons or despite a defective service of summons. The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons.<br />(2) Instances when appearance of defendant is not tantamount to voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court: (a) when defendant files the necessary pleading; (b) when defendant files motion for reconsideration of the judgment by default; (c) when defendant files a petition to set aside the judgment of default; (d) when the parties jointly submit a compromise agreement for approval of the court; (e) when defendant files an answer to the contempt charge; (f) when defendant files a petition for certiorari without questioning the court’s jurisdiction over his person.<br /><br /><strong>Jurisdiction over the subject matter</strong><br /><br />(1) It is the power to deal with the general subject involved in the action, and means not simply jurisdiction of the particular case then occupying the attention of the court but jurisdiction of the class of cases to which the particular case belongs. It is the power or authority to hear and determine cases to which the proceeding is question belongs.<br />(2) When a complaint is filed in court, the basic questions that ipso facto are to be immediately resolved by the court on its own: (a) What is the subject matter of their complaint filed before the court? (b) Does the court have jurisdiction over the said subject matter of the complaint before it? Answering these questions inevitably requires looking into the applicable laws conferring jurisdiction. <br /><br /><strong>Jurisdiction versus exercise of jurisdiction</strong><br /><br />(1) Jurisdiction if the power or authority of the court. The exercise of this power or authority is the exercise of jurisdiction.<br /><br /><strong>Error of jurisdiction vs. error of judgment</strong><br /><br />(1) An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction. It occurs when the court exercises a jurisdiction not conferred upon it by law, or when the court or tribunal although with jurisdiction, acts in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or jurisdiction.<br />(2) An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment. Errors of judgment include errors of procedure or mistakes in the court’s findings.<br />(3) Errors of judgment are correctible by appeal; errors of jurisdiction are correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Any judgment rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal; the only exception is when the party raising the issue is barred by estoppel.<br />(4) When a court, tribunal, or officer has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the dispute, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is an exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of said jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment. Under prevailing procedural rules and jurisprudence, errors of judgment are not proper subjects of a special civil action for certiorari.<br /><br /><strong>How jurisdiction is conferred and determined</strong><br /><br />(1) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law because it is conferred by law. This jurisdiction which is a matter of substantive law should be construed to refer only to jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction over the parties, the issues and the res are matters of procedure. The test of jurisdiction is whether the court has the power to enter into the inquiry and not whether the decision is right or wrong. <br />(2) It is the duty of the court to consider the question of jurisdiction before it looks at other matters involved in the case. If the court finds that it has jurisdiction, it is the duty of the court to exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon it by law and to render a decision in a case properly submitted to it. It cannot decline to exercise its jurisdiction. Failure to do so may be enforced by way of mandamus proceeding. <br /><br /><strong>Doctrine of primary jurisdiction</strong><br /><br />(1) Courts will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.<br />(2) The objective is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court (Omictin vs. CA, GR 148004, January 22, 2007). <br /><br /><strong>Doctrine of adherence of jurisdiction / continuity of jurisdiction</strong><br /><br />(1) In view of the principle that once a court has acquired jurisdiction, that jurisdiction continues until the court has done all that it can do in the exercise of that jurisdiction. This principle also means that once jurisdiction has attached, it cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. The court, once jurisdiction has been acquired, retains that jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case.<br />(2) Even the finality of the judgment does not totally deprive the court of jurisdiction over the case. What the court loses is the power to amend, modify or alter the judgment. Even after the judgment has become final, the court retains jurisdiction to enforce and execute it (Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, 301 SCRA 96).<br /><br /><strong>Objection to jurisdiction over the subject matter</strong><br /><br />(1) When it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the same. (Sec. 1, Rule 9). The court may on its own initiative object to an erroneous jurisdiction and may ex mero motu take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case and has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction.<br />(2) Jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal. When the court dismisses the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, it is common reason that the court cannot remand the case to another court with the proper jurisdiction. Its only power is to dismiss and not to make any other order.<br />(3) Under the omnibus motion rule, a motion attacking a pleading like a motion to dismiss shall include all grounds then available and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived. The defense of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is however, a defense not barred by the failure to invoke the same in a motion to dismiss already filed. Even if a motion to dismiss was filed and the issue of jurisdiction was not raised therein, a party may, when he files an answer, raise the lack of jurisdiction as an affirmative defense because this defense is not barred under te omnibus motion rule. <br /><br /><strong>Effect of estoppel on objection to jurisdiction</strong><br /><br />(1) The active participation of a party in a case is tantamount to recognition of that court’s jurisdiction and will bar a party from impugning the court’s jurisdiction. Jurisprudence however, did not intend this statement to lay down the general rule. (Lapanday Agricultural & Development Corp. v. Estita, 449 SCRA 240; Mangaiag v. Catubig-Pastoral, 474 SCRA 153). The Sibonghanoy applies only to exceptional circumstances. The general rule remains: a court’s lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings even on appeal (Francel Realty Corp. v. Sycip, 469 SCRA 424; Concepcion v. Regalado, GR 167988, Feb. 6, 2007).<br />(2) The doctrine of estoppels by laches in relation to objections to jurisdiction first appeared in the landmark case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, where the SC barred a belated objection to jurisdiction that was raised only after an adverse decision was rendered by the court against the party raising the issue of jurisdiction and after seeking affirmative relief from the court and after participating in all stages of the proceedings. This doctrine is based upon grounds of public policy and is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.<br />(3) The SC frowns upon the undesirable practice of submitting one’s case for decision, and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction if it is not (BPI v. ALS Mgt. & Devt. Corp., 427 SCRA 564).<br /><br /><strong>Jurisdiction over the issues</strong><br /><br />(1) It is the power of the court to try and decide issues raised in the pleadings of the parties.<br />(2) An issue is a disputed point or question to which parties to an action have narrowed down their several allegations and upon which they are desirous of obtaining a decision. Where there is no disputed point, there is no issue.<br />(3) Generally, jurisdiction over the issues is conferred and determined by the pleadings of the parties. The pleadings present the issues to be tried and determine whether or not the issues are of fact or law. <br />(4) Jurisdiction over the issues may also be determined and conferred by stipulation of the parties as when in the pre-trial, the parties enter into stipulations of facts and documents or enter into agreement simplifying the issues of the case.<br />(5) It may also be conferred by waiver or failure to object to the presentation of evidence on a matter not raised in the pleadings. Here the parties try with their express or implied consent issues not raised by the pleadings. The issues tried shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.<br /><br /><strong>Jurisdiction over the res or property in litigation</strong><br /><br />(1) Jurisdiction over the res refers to the court’s jurisdiction over the thing or the property which is the subject of the action. Jurisdiction over the res may be acquired by the court by placing the property of thing under its custody (custodia legis). Example: attachment of property. It may also be acquired by the court through statutory authority conferring upon it the power to deal with the property or thing within the court’s territorial jurisdiction. Example: suits involving the status of the parties or suits involving the property in the Philippines of non-resident defendants. <br />(2) Jurisdiction over the res is acquired by the seizure of the thing under legal process whereby it is brought into actual custody of law, or it may result from the institution of a legal proceeding wherein the power of the court over the thing is recognized and made effective (Banco Español Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 291).<br /><br /><strong>Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court</strong><br /><br />(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction in petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the CA, COMELEC, COA, CTA, Sandiganbayan, NLRC<br />(2) Concurrent original jurisdiction <br />(a) With Court of Appeals in petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the RTC, CSC, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Quasi-judicial agencies, and writ of kalikasan, all subject to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.<br />(b) With the CA and RTC in petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against lower courts and bodies and in petitions for quo warranto, and writs of habeas corpus, all subject to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.<br />(c) With CA, RTC and Sandiganbayan for petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data<br />(d) Concurrent original jurisdiction with the RTC in cases affecting ambassadors, public ministers and consuls.<br />(3) Appellate jurisdiction by way of petition for review on certiorari (appeal by certiorari under Rule 45) against CA, Sandiganbayan, RTC on pure questions of law; and in cases involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance or regulation, legality of a tax, impost, assessment, toll or penalty, jurisdiction of a lower court; and CTA in its decisions rendered en banc. <br />(4) Exceptions in which factual issues may be resolved by the Supreme Court:<br />(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;<br />(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;<br />(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;<br />(d) When the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts;<br />(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;<br />(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;<br />(g) When the findings are contrary to the trial court;<br />(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;<br />(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;<br />(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; ad<br />(k) When the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, could justify a different conclusion.<br /><br /><strong>Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals</strong><br /><br />(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction in actions for the annulment of the judgments of the RTC.<br />(2) Concurrent original jurisdiction <br />(a) With SC to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the RTC, CSC, CBAA, other quasi-judicial agencies mentioned in Rule 43, and the NLRC, and writ of kalikasan.<br />(b) With the SC and RTC to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against lower courts and bodies and writs of quo warranto, habeas corpus, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, and writ of continuing mandamus on environmental cases. <br />(c) With SC, RTC and Sandiganbayan for petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data<br />(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction <br />(a) by way of ordinary appeal from the RTC and the Family Courts.<br />(b) by way of petition for review from the RTC rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.<br />(c) by way of petition for review from the decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of the CSC, CBAA and other bodies mentioned in Rule 43 and of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases.<br />(d) over decisions of MTCs in cadastral or land registration cases pursuant to its delegated jurisdiction; this is because decisions of MTCs in these cases are appealable in the same manner as decisions of RTCs.<br /><br /><strong>Jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (under RA 9282 and Rule 5, AM 05-11-07-CTA)</strong><br /><br />(1) Exclusive original or appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal <br />(a) Decisions of CIR in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the NIRC or other laws administered by BIR;<br />(b) Inaction by CIR in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of IR taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the NIRC or other laws administered by BIR, where the NIRC or other applicable law provides a specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed an implied denial;<br />(c) Decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local taxes originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction;<br />(d) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs (1) in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other charges, seizure, detention or release of property affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties in relation thereto, or (2) other matters arising under the Customs law or other laws, part of laws or special laws administered by BOC;<br />(e) Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment appeals;<br />(f) Decision of the secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to him automatically for review from decisions of the Commissioner of Customs which are adverse to the government under Sec. 2315 of the Tariff and Customs Code;<br />(g) Decisions of Secretary of Trade and Industry in the case of non-agricultural product, commodity or article, and the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of agricultural product, commodity or article, involving dumping duties and counterveiling duties under Secs. 301 and 302, respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code, and safeguard measures under RA 8800, where either party may appeal the decision to impose or not to impose said duties.<br />(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction<br />(a) Over all criminal cases arising from violation of the NIRC of the TCC and other laws, part of laws, or special laws administered by the BIR or the BOC where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties claimed is less that P1M or where there is no specified amount claimed (the offenses or penalties shall be tried by the regular courts and the jurisdiction of the CTA shall be appellate);<br />(b) In tax collection cases involving final and executory assessments for taxes, fees, charges and penalties where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties claimed is less than P1M tried by the proper MTC, MeTC and RTC.<br />(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction<br />(a) In criminal offenses (1) over appeals from the judgment, resolutions or orders of the RTC in tax cases originally decided by them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction, and (2) over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the RTC in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally decided by the MeTCs, MTCs, and MCTCs in their respective jurisdiction;<br />(b) In tax collection cases (1) over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the RTC in tax collection cases originally decided by them in their respective territorial jurisdiction; and (2) over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the RTC in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally decided by the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs in their respective jurisdiction.<br /><br /><strong>Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan</strong><br /><br />(1) Original jurisdiction in all cases involving<br />(a) Violations of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)<br />(b) Violations of RA 1379 (Anti-Ill-Gotten Wealth Act)<br />(c) Bribery (Chapter II, Sec. 2, Title VII, Book II, RPC) where one or more of the principal accused are occupying the following positions in the government, whether in permanent, acting or interim capacity at the time of the commission of the offense<br />1. Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (RA 6758)<br />2. Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as G-27 and up under RA 6758<br />3. Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution<br />4. Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution<br />5. All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under RA 6758<br />(d) Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Sec. 4(a) of RA 7975 as amended by RA 8249 in relation to their office<br />(e) Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with EO Nos. 1, 2, 14-A (Sec. 4, RA 8249)<br />(2) Concurrent original jurisdiction with SC, CA and RTC for petitions for writs of habeas data and amparo<br /><br /><strong>Jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts</strong><br /><br />(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction <br />(a) matters incapable of pecuniary estimation, such as rescission of contract<br />(b) title to, possession of, or interest in, real property with assessed value exceeding P20,000 (outside Metro Manila), or exceeds P50,000 in Metro Manila<br />(c) probate proceedings where the gross value of the estate exceeds P300,000 outside MM or exceeds P400,000 in MM<br />(d) admiralty or maritime cases where the demand or claim exceeds P300,000 outside MM or exceeds P400,000 in MM<br />(e) other actions involving property valued at more than P300,000 outside MM or more than P400,000 in MM<br />(f) criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan<br />(2) Original exclusive jurisdiction over cases not falling within the jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions<br />(3) Original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide intra-corporate controversies:<br />(a) Cases involving devises or schemes employed by or any acts, of the board of directors, business associates, its officers or partnership, amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the stockholders, partners, members of associations or organizations registered with the SEC<br />(b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such corporation , partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity<br />(c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers or managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations<br />(d) Petitions of corporations, partnerships or associations to be declared in the state of suspension of payments in cases where the corporation, partnership of association possesses sufficient property to cover all its debts but foresees the impossibility of meeting them when they respectively fall due or in cases where the corporation, partnership of association has no sufficient assets to cover its liabilities, but is under the management of a Rehabilitation Receiver or Management Committee.<br />(4) Concurrent and original jurisdiction <br />(a) with the Supreme Court in actions affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls<br />(b) with the SC and CA in petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against lower courts and bodies in petitions for quo warranto, habeas corpus, and writ of continuing mandamus on environmental cases<br />(c) with the SC, CA and Sandigabayan in petitions for writs of habeas data and amparo<br />(5) Appellate jurisdiction over cases decided by lower courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions<br />(6) Special jurisdiction over JDRC, agrarian and urban land reform cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of quasi-judicial agencies when so designated by the SC.<br /><br /><strong>Jurisdiction of Family Courts</strong><br /><br />Under RA 8369, shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over the following cases:<br />(1) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children and habeas corpus involving children<br />(2) Petitions for adoption of children and the revocation thereof<br />(3) Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage and those relating to status and property relations of husband and wife or those living together under different status and agreements, and petitions for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains<br />(4) Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment<br />(5) Summary judicial proceedings brought under the provisions of EO 209 (Family Code)<br />(6) Petitions for declaration of status of children as abandoned, dependent or neglected children, petitions for voluntary or involuntary commitment of children, the suspension, termination or restoration of parental authority and other cases cognizable under PD 603, EO 56 (1986) and other related laws<br />(7) Petitions for the constitution of the family home<br />(8) In areas where there are no Family Courts, the above-enumerated cases shall be adjudicated by the RTC (RA 8369)<br /><br /><strong>Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trail Courts/Municipal Trial Courts</strong><br /><br />(1) <strong>Criminal cases</strong><br />(a) <strong>Exclusive original jurisdiction </strong><br />1. Summary proceedings for violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction, including traffic laws<br />2. offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of the kind, nature, value or amount thereof; provided however, that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof (Sec. 2, RA 7691).<br />(2) <strong>Civil actions</strong><br />(a) <strong>Exclusive original jurisdiction </strong><br />1. civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal property, estate, or amount the demand does not exceed P200,000 outside MM or does not exceed P400,000 in MM, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs.<br />2. Summary proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, violation of rental law<br />3. title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed P20,000 outside MM or does not exceed P50,000 in MM<br />(3) Special jurisdiction over petition for writ of habeas corpus and application for bail if the RTC Judge in area is not available<br />(4) Delegated jurisdiction to hear and decide cadastral and land registration cases where there is no controversy provided the value of the lad to be ascertained by the claimant does not exceed P100,000<br /><br /><strong>Jurisdiction over small claims</strong><br /><br />(1) MTCs, MeTCs and MCTCs shall have jurisdiction over actions for payment of money where the value of the claim does not exceed P100,000 exclusive of interest and costs (Sec. 2, AM 08-8-7-SC, Oct. 27, 2009).<br />(2) Actions covered are (a) purely civil in nature where the claim or relief prayed for by the plaintiff is soley for payment or reimbursement of sum of money, and (b) the civil aspect of criminal actions, either filed before the institution of the criminal action, or reserved upon the filing of the criminal action in court, pursuant to Rule 111 (Sec. 4, AM 08-8-7-SC). These claims may be:<br />(a) For money owed under the contracts of lease, loan, services, sale, or mortgage;<br />(b) For damages arising from fault or negligence, quasi-contract, or contract; and<br />(c) The enforcement of a barangay amicable settlement or an arbitration award involving a money claim pursuant to Sec. 417 of RA 7160 (LGC).<br /><br /><strong>Cases covered by Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 1, RSP)</strong><br /><br />(1) Civil Cases<br />(a) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered. Where attorney’s fees are awarded, the same shall not exceed P20,000;<br />(b) All other cases, except probate proceedings where the total amount of the plaintiff’s claim does not exceed P100,000 (outside MM) or P200,000 (in MM), exclusive of interest and costs.<br />(2) Criminal Cases<br />(a) Violations of traffic law, rules and regulations;<br />(b) Violation of the rental law;<br />(c) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed is imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or fine not exceedint P1,000, or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom, provided, that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, RSP shall govern where the imposable fine does not exceed P10,000.<br />(3) SRP does not apply to a civil case where the plaintiff’s cause of action is pleaded in the same complaint with another cause of action subject to the ordinary procedure; nor to a criminal case where the offense charged is necessarily related to another criminal case subject to the ordinary procedure.<br /><br /><strong>Cases covered by the Rules on Barangay Conciliation</strong><br /><br />(1) The Lupon of each barangay shall have the authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same municipality or city for amicable settlement of all disputes except:<br />(a) Where one party is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof<br />(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his official functions<br />(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding P5,000<br />(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party<br />(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon<br />(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon<br />(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice<br />(h) Any complaint by or against corporations, partnerships, or juridical entities. The reason is that only individuals shall be parties to barangay conciliation proceedings either as complainants or respondents<br />(i) Disputes where urgent legal action is necessary to prevent injustice from being committed or further continued, specifically:<br />1. A criminal case where the accused is under police custody or detention<br />2. A petition for habeas corpus by a person illegally detained or deprived of his liberty or one acting in his behalf<br />3. Actions coupled with provisional remedies, such as preliminary injunction, attachment, replevin and support pendente lite<br />4. Where the action may be barred by statute of limitations<br />(j) Labor disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relationship<br />(k) Where the dispute arises from the CARL<br />(l) Actions to annul judgment upon a compromise which can be directly filed in court.<br /><br /><strong>Totality Rule</strong><br /><br />(1) Where there are several claims or causes of actions between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the claims of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions (Sec. 33[1], BP 129).<br /><br /><br /><strong>III. ACTIONS</strong><br /><br />Action (synonymous with “suit”) is the legal and formal demand of one’s right from another person made and insisted upon in a court of justice (Bouvier’s Law Dictionary). The kinds of actions are ordinary and special, civil and criminal, ex contractu and ex delicto, penal and remedial, real, personal, and mixed action, action in personam, in rem, and quasi in rem, <br /><br /><strong>Ordinary Civil Actions, Special Civil Actions, Criminal Actions</strong><br /><br />(1) Ordinary civil action is one by which one party sues another, based on a cause of action, to enforce or protect a right, or to prevent or redress a wrong, whereby the defendant has performed an act or omitted to do an act in violation of the rights of the plaintiff. (Sec. 3a) The purpose is primarily compensatory. <br />(2) Special civil action is also one by which one party sues another to enforce or protect a right, or to prevent or redress a wrong.<br />(3) A criminal action is one by which the State prosecutes a person for an act or omission punishable by law (Sec. 3[b], Rule 1). The purpose is primarily punishment.<br /><br /><strong><br />Civil Actions versus Special Proceedings</strong><br />(1) The purpose of an action is either to protect a right or prevent or redress a wrong. The purpose of special proceeding is to establish a status, a right or a particular fact.<br /><br /><strong>Personal Actions and Real Actions</strong><br /><br />(1) An action is real when it affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein. All other actions are personal actions.<br />(2) An action is real when it is founded upon the privity of real estate, which means that the realty or an interest therein is the subject matter of the action. The issues involved in real actions are title to, ownership, possession, partition, foreclosure of mortgage or condemnation of real property.<br />(3) Not every action involving real property is a real action because the realty may only be incidental to the subject matter of the suit. Example is an action for damages to real property, while involving realty is a personal action because although it involves real property, it does not involve any of the issues mentioned. <br />(4) Real actions are based on the privity of real estates; while personal actions are based on privity of contracts or for the recovery of sums of money.<br />(5) The distinction between real action and personal action is important for the purpose of determining the venue of the action. A real action is “local”, which means that its venue depends upon the location of the property involved in the litigation. A personal action is “transitory”, which means that its venue depends upon the residence of the plaintiff or the defendant at the option of the plaintiff. <br /><br /><strong>Local and Transitory Actions</strong><br /><br />(1) A local action is one founded on privity of estates only and there is no privity of contracts. A real action is a local action, its venue depends upon the location of the property involved in litigation. “Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof is situated” (Sec. 1, Rule 4).<br />(2) Transitory action is one founded on privity of contracts between the parties. A personal action is transitory, its venue depends upon the residence of the plaintiff or the defendant at the option of the plaintiff. A personal action “may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of non-resident defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff” (Sec. 2, Rule 4).<br /><br /><strong>Actions in rem, in personam and quasi in rem</strong><br /><br />(1) An action in rem, one instituted and enforced against the whole world. <br />(2) An action in personam is one filed against a definite defendant. It is intended to subject the interest of defendant on a property to an obligation or lien. Jurisdiction over the person (defendant) is required. It is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person, and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose is to impose through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. No other than the defendant is liable, not the whole world, as in an action for a sum of money or an action for damages.<br />(3) An action quasi in rem, also brought against the whole world, is one brought against persons seeking to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. An individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. It deals with status, ownership or liability or a particular property but which are intended to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. Examples of actions quasi in rem are action for partition, action for accounting, attachment, foreclosure of mortgage.<br />(4) An action in personam is not necessarily a personal action. Nor is a real action necessarily an action in rem. An in personam or an in rem action is a classification of actions according to foundation. For instance, an action to recover, title to or possession of real property is a real action, but it is an action in personam, not brought against the whole world but against the person upon whom the claim is made.<br />(5) The distinction is important to determine whether or not jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is required and consequently to determine the type of summons to be employed. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide a case against said defendant where the action is one in personam but not where the action is in rem or quasi in rem.<br />(6) SC sums up the basic rules in Biaco vs. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank, GR 161417, February 8, 2007: <br /><br />The question of whether the trial court has jurisdiction depends on the nature of the action – whether the action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem. The rules on service of summons under Rule 14 likewise apply according to the nature of the action.<br /><br />An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability. And action in rem is an action against the thing itself instead of against the person. An action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property.<br /><br />In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (2) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective.<br /><br />Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process requirements.<br /><br /><br /><strong>IV. CAUSE OF ACTION (Rule 2)</strong><br /><br /><strong>Meaning of Cause of Action</strong><br /><br />(1) A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party (defendant) violates the rights of another (plaintiff). <br />(2) It is the delict or wrong by which the defendant violates the right or rights of the plaintiff (Ma-ao Sugar Central v. Barrios, 76 Phil. 666).<br />(3) The elements are:<br />(a) A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;<br />(b) An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and<br />(c) Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.<br /><br /><strong>Right of Action versus Cause of Action</strong><br /><br />(1) A cause of action refers to the delict or wrong committed by the defendants, whereas right of action refers to the right of the plaintiff to institute the action;<br />(2) A cause of action is determined by the pleadings; whereas a right of action is determined by the substantive law;<br />(3) A right of action may be taken away by the running of the statute of limitations, by estoppels or other circumstances which do not at all affect the cause of action (Marquez v. Varela, 92 Phil. 373).<br /><br /><strong>Failure to State Cause of Action</strong><br /><br />(1) The mere existence of a cause of action is not sufficient for a complaint to prosper. Even if in reality the plaintiff has a cause of action against the defendant, the complaint may be dismissed if the complaint or the pleading asserting the claim “states no cause of action”. This means that the cause of action must unmistakably be stated or alleged in the complaint or that all the elements of the cause of action required by substantive law must clearly appear from the mere reading of the complaint. To avoid an early dismissal of the complaint, the simple dictum to be followed is: “If you have a cause of action, then by all means, state it!” Where there is a defect or an insufficiency in the statement of the cause of action, a complaint may be dismissed not because of an absence or a lack of cause of action by because the complaint states no cause of action. The dismissal will therefore, be anchored on a “failure to state a cause of action”.<br />(2) It doesn’t mean that the plaintiff has no cause of action. It only means that the plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient for the court to know that the rights of the plaintiff were violated by the defendant. Thus, even if indeed the plaintiff suffered injury, if the same is not set forth in the complaint, the pleading will state no cause of action even if in reality the plaintiff has a cause of action against the defendant.<br /><br /><strong>Test of the Sufficiency of a Cause of Action</strong><br /><br />(1) The test is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of the complaint (Misamis Occidental II Cooperative, Inc. vs. David, 468 SCRA 63; Santos v. de Leon, 470 SCRA 455).<br />(2) To be taken into account are only the material allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or other matter aliunde are not considered but the court may consider in addition to the complaint the appended annexes or documents, other pleadings of the plaintiff, or admissions in the records (Zepeda v. China Banking Corp., GR 172175, Oct. 9, 2006).<br />(3) In determining whether or not a cause of action is sufficiently stated in the complaint, the statements in the complaint may be properly considered. It is error for the court to take cognizance of external facts or to hold preliminary hearings to determine its existence (Diaz v. Diaz, 331 SCRA 302). The sufficiency of the statement of the COA must appear on the face of the complaint and its existence may be determined only by the allegations of the complaint, consideration of other facts being proscribed and any attempt to prove extraneous circumstances not being allowed (Viewmaster Construction Corp. v. Roxas, 335 SCRA 540).<br /><br /><strong>Splitting a Single Cause of Action and Its Effects</strong><br /><br />(1) It is the act of instituting two or more suits for the same cause of action (Sec. 4, Rule 2). It is the practice of dividing one cause of action into different parts and making each part the subject of a separate complaint (Bachrach vs. Icaringal, 68 SCRA 287). In splitting a cause of action, the pleader divides a single cause of action, claim or demand into two or more parts, brings a suit for one of such parts with the intent to reserve the rest for another separate action (Quadra vs. CA, GR 147593, July 31, 2006). This practice is not allowed by the Rules because it breeds multiplicity of suits, clogs the court dockets, leads to vexatious litigation, operates as an instrument of harassment, and generates unnecessary expenses to the parties.<br />(2) The filing of the first may be pleaded in abatement of the other or others and a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a bar to, or a ground for dismissal of, the others (Sec. 4, Rule 2; Bacolod City vs. San Miguel, Inc., L-2513, Oct. 30, 1969). The remedy of the defendant is to file a motion to dismiss. Hence, if the first action is pending when the second action is filed, the latter may be dismissed based on litis pendencia, there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause. If a final judgment had been rendered in the first action when the second action is filed, the latter may be dismissed based on res judicata, that the cause of action is barred by prior judgment. As to which action should be dismissed would depend upon judicial discretion and the prevailing circumstances of the case.<br /><br /><strong>Joinder and Misjoinder of Causes of Actions (Secs. 5 and 6, Rule 2)</strong><br /><br />(1) Joinder of causes of action is the assertion of as many causes of action as a party may have against another in one pleading alone (Sec. 5, Rule 2). It is the process of uniting two or more demands or rights of action in one action, subject to the following conditions:<br />(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of parties;<br />(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by special rules;<br />(c) Where the cause of action are between the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the RTC provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and<br />(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction (totality rule).<br />(2) Restrictions on joinder of causes of action are: jurisdiction, venue, and joinder of parties. The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special rules. <br />(3) When there is a misjoinder of causes of action, the erroneously joined cause of action can be severed or separated from the other cause of action upon motion by a party or upon the court’s own initiative. Misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for the dismissal of the case.Elmer Brabantehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17569454269621923153noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3490533786910594568.post-65399020880125816152010-01-28T00:06:00.000-08:002010-01-28T00:08:07.573-08:00FRANCISCO vs. NLRCANGELINA FRANCISCO vs. NLRC, KASEI CORPORATION, et al.<br />G.R. No. 170087 <br />August 31, 2006<br /><br /><br />FACTS:<br /><br />In 1995, petitioner Angelina Francisco was hired by Kasei Corporation (Kasei) during its incorporation stage. She was designated as Accountant, Corporate Secretary and Liaison Officer of the company. In 1996, Francisco was designated Acting Manager to handle recruitment of all employees and perform management administration functions, represent the company in all dealings with government agencies, and to administer all other matters pertaining to the operation of Kasei Restaurant which is owned and operated by Kasei. <br /><br />For five years, petitioner performed the duties of Acting Manager. As of December 31, 2000 her salary was P27,500.00 plus P3,000.00 housing allowance and a 10% share in the profit of Kasei Corporation. <br /><br />In January 2001, Francisco was replaced as Manager. She alleged that she was required to sign a prepared resolution for her replacement but she was assured that she would still be connected with Kasei. The Treasurer convened a meeting of all employees and announced that Francisco was still connected with Kasei Corporation as Technical Assistant to Seiji Kamura and in charge of all BIR matters. <br /><br />Thereafter, Kasei reduced her salary by P2,500.00 a month beginning January up to September 2001 for a total reduction of P22,500.00 as of September 2001. She was not paid her mid-year bonus allegedly because the company was not earning well. In October 2001, she did not receive her salary from the company, made repeated follow-ups with the cashier but was advised that the company was not earning well. On October 15, 2001, she asked for her salary, but she was informed that she is no longer connected with the company. <br /><br />Since she was no longer paid her salary, petitioner did not report for work and filed an action for constructive dismissal before the labor arbiter. <br /><br />Kasei Corporation claimed that Francisco was not their employee, having been designated as technical consultant who performed work at her own discretion without the control and supervision of the Corporation, and that her consultancy may be terminated any time considering that her services were only temporary in nature and dependent on the needs of the corporation. <br /><br />To prove that petitioner was not an employee of the corporation, private respondents submitted a list of employees for the years 1999 and 2000 duly received by the BIR showing that petitioner was not among the employees reported to the BIR, as well as a list of payees subject to expanded withholding tax which included petitioner. SSS records were also submitted showing that petitioner’s latest employer was Seiji Corporation. <br /><br />ISSUES: <br /><br />Whether or not there was an employer-employee relationship between Francisco and Kasei Corporation; and whether Francisco was illegally dismissed.<br /><br />HELD:<br /><br />Generally, courts have relied on the so-called right of control test where the person for whom the services are performed reserves a right to control not only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end. In addition to the standard of right-of-control, the existing economic conditions prevailing between the parties, like the inclusion of the employee in the payrolls, can help in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship.<br /><br />However, in certain cases the control test is not sufficient to give a complete picture of the relationship between the parties, owing to the complexity of such a relationship where several positions have been held by the worker. There are instances when, aside from the employer’s power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished, economic realities of the employment relations help provide a comprehensive analysis of the true classification of the individual, whether as employee, independent contractor, corporate officer or some other capacity.<br /><br />The better approach would therefore be to adopt a two-tiered test involving: (1) the putative employer’s power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished; and (2) the underlying economic realities of the activity or relationship. <br /><br />This two-tiered test would provide us with a framework of analysis, which would take into consideration the totality of circumstances surrounding the true nature of the relationship between the parties. This is especially appropriate in this case where there is no written agreement or terms of reference to base the relationship on; and due to the complexity of the relationship based on the various positions and responsibilities given to the worker over the period of the latter’s employment.<br />Thus, the determination of the relationship between employer and employee depends upon the circumstances of the whole economic activity, such as: (1) the extent to which the services performed are an integral part of the employer’s business; (2) the extent of the worker’s investment in equipment and facilities; (3) the nature and degree of control exercised by the employer; (4) the worker’s opportunity for profit and loss; (5) the amount of initiative, skill, judgment or foresight required for the success of the claimed independent enterprise; (6) the permanency and duration of the relationship between the worker and the employer; and (7) the degree of dependency of the worker upon the employer for his continued employment in that line of business. <br /><br />By applying the control test, there is no doubt that petitioner is an employee of Kasei Corporation because she was under the direct control and supervision of Seiji Kamura, the corporation’s Technical Consultant. She reported for work regularly and served in various capacities as Accountant, Liaison Officer, Technical Consultant, Acting Manager and Corporate Secretary, with substantially the same job functions, that is, rendering accounting and tax services to the company and performing <br />functions necessary and desirable for the proper operation of the corporation such as securing business permits and other licenses over an indefinite period of engagement. <br />Under the broader economic reality test, the petitioner can likewise be said to be an employee of respondent corporation because she had served the company for six years before her dismissal, receiving check vouchers indicating her salaries/wages, benefits, 13th month pay, bonuses and allowances, as well as deductions and Social Security contributions from August 1, 1999 to December 18, 2000. When petitioner was designated General Manager, respondent corporation made a report to the SSS signed by Irene Ballesteros. Petitioner’s membership in the SSS as manifested by a copy of the SSS specimen signature card which was signed by the President of Kasei Corporation and the inclusion of her name in the on-line inquiry system of the SSS evinces the existence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent corporation. <br /><br />It is therefore apparent that petitioner is economically dependent on respondent corporation for her continued employment in the latter’s line of business.<br />The corporation constructively dismissed petitioner when it reduced her salary by P2,500 a month from January to September 2001. This amounts to an illegal termination of employment, where the petitioner is entitled to full backwages. Since the position of petitioner as accountant is one of trust and confidence, and under the principle of strained relations, petitioner is further entitled to separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement. <br /><br />A diminution of pay is prejudicial to the employee and amounts to constructive dismissal. Constructive dismissal is an involuntary resignation resulting in cessation of work resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to an employee. <br /><br />In affording full protection to labor, this Court must ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed. Even as we, in every case, attempt to carefully balance the fragile relationship between employees and employers, we are mindful of the fact that the policy of the law is to apply the Labor Code to a greater number of employees. This would enable employees to avail of the benefits accorded to them by law, in line with the constitutional mandate giving maximum aid and protection to labor, promoting their welfare and reaffirming it as a primary social economic force in furtherance of social justice and national development.Elmer Brabantehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17569454269621923153noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3490533786910594568.post-60026685575421099222010-01-28T00:04:00.000-08:002010-01-28T00:05:19.001-08:00DEALCO FARMS vs. NLRCDEALCO FARMS, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (5th DIVISION), CHIQUITO BASTIDA, and ALBERT CABAN<br />GR No. 153192<br />January 30, 2009<br /><br /><br />FACTS:<br /><br />Petitioner Dealco Farms is a corporation engaged in the business of importation, production, fattening and distribution of live cattle for sale to meat dealers, meat traders, meat processors, canned good manufacturers and other dealers in Mindanao and in Metro Manila. Petitioner imports cattle by the boatload from Australia into the ports of General Santos City, Subic, Batangas, or Manila. In turn, these imported cattle are transported to, and housed in, petitioner’s farms in Polomolok, South Cotabato, or in Magalang, Pampanga, for fattening until the cattle individually reach the market weight of 430 to 450 kilograms.<br /><br />Respondents Albert Caban and Chiquito Bastida were hired by petitioner on June 25, 1993 and October 29, 1994, respectively, as escorts or "comboys" for the transit of live cattle from General Santos City to Manila. Respondents’ work entailed tending to the cattle during transportation. It included feeding and frequently showering the cattle to prevent dehydration and to develop heat resistance. On the whole, respondents ensured that the cattle would be safe from harm or death caused by a cattle fight or any such similar incident. <br /><br />Upon arrival in Manila, the cattle are turned over to and received by the duly acknowledged buyers or customers of petitioner, at which point, respondents’ work ceases. For every round trip travel which lasted an average of 12 days, respondents were each paid P1,500.00. The 12-day period is occasionally extended when petitioner’s customers are delayed in receiving the cattle. In a month, respondents usually made two trips. <br /><br />On August 19, 1999, respondents were told by Dealco’s hepe de viaje that their replacement had been effected immediately, but no reason was given for their replacement. Respondents attempted to meet with petitioner but failed. <br />Petitioner denies the existence of an employer-employee relationship with respondents, claiming that: (a) respondents are independent contractors who offer "comboy" services to various shippers and traders of cattle, not only to petitioner; (b) in the performance of work on board the ship, respondents are free from the control and supervision of the cattle owner since the latter is interested only in the result thereof; (c) in the alternative, respondents can only be considered as casual employees performing work not necessary and desirable to the usual business or trade of petitioner, i.e., cattle fattening to market weight and production; and (d) respondents likewise failed to complete the one-year service period, whether continuous or broken, set forth in Article 280 of the Labor Code, as petitioner’s shipments were substantially reduced in 1998-1999, thereby limiting the escort or "comboy" activity for which respondents were employed.<br /><br />ISSUE:<br /><br />Whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner and respondents and therefore the latter’s termination was illegal.<br /><br />HELD:<br /><br />Complainant’s task of escorting the livestock shipped to Manila, taking care of the livestock in transit, is an activity which is necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of respondent. It is of judicial notice that the bulk of the market for livestock of big livestock raisers such as respondent is in Manila. Hogs do not swim, they are shipped. The caretaker is a component of the business, a part of the scheme of the operation. <br /><br />More, it also appears that respondents had rendered service for more than one year doing the same task repeatedly, thus, even assuming they were casual employees they may be considered regular employees with respect to the activity in which they were employed and their employment shall continue while such activity exists (last par. of Art. 280). <br /><br />In the case at bench, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC were one in their conclusion that respondents were not independent contractors, but employees of petitioner. In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC examined and weighed the circumstances against the four-fold test which has the following elements: (1) the power to hire, (2) the payment of wages, (3) the power to dismiss, and (4) the power to control the employees’ conduct, or the so-called "control test." Of the four, the power of control is the most important element. More importantly, the control test merely calls for the existence of the right to control, and not necessarily the exercise thereof. <br /><br />The presence of the four (4) elements in the determination of an employer-employee relationship has been clearly established by the facts and evidence on record, starting with the admissions of petitioner who acknowledged the engagement of respondents as escorts of their cattles shipped from General Santos to Manila, and the compensation of the latter at a fee of P1,500.00 per trip. <br /><br />The element of control, jurisprudentially considered the most essential element of the four, has not been demolished by any evidence to the contrary. The branch has noticed that the preparation of the shipment of cattle, manning and feeding them while in transit, and making a report upon their return to General Santos that the cattle shipped and which reached Manila actually tallied were all indicators of instructions, supervision and control by [petitioner] on [respondents’] performance of work as escorts for which they were hired. This we agree on all fours. The livestock shipment would cost thousands of pesos and the certainty of it reaching its destination would be the only thing any operator would consider at all time and under all circumstances. It is illogical for [petitioner] to argue that the shipment was not necessary or desirable to their business, as their business was mainly livestock production, because they were undeniably the owners of the cattle escorted by respondents. Should losses of a shipment occur due to respondents’ neglect these would still be petitioners’ loss, and nobody else’s.<br /><br />Considering that we have sustained the Labor Arbiter’s and the NLRC’s finding of an employer-employee relationship between the parties, we likewise sustain the administrative bodies’ finding of respondents’ illegal dismissal. Accordingly, we are not wont to disturb the award of separation pay, claims for COLA and union service fees fixed at 10% of the total monetary award, as these were based on the finding that respondents were dismissed without just or authorized cause.Elmer Brabantehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17569454269621923153noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3490533786910594568.post-75680732185106417242010-01-28T00:01:00.000-08:002010-01-28T00:02:38.229-08:00BRENT SCHOOL vs. ZAMORABRENT SCHOOL, INC.DIMACHE vs. RONALDO ZAMORA and DOROTEO R. ALEGRE<br />G.R. No. L-48494 February 5, 1990 en banc<br /><br />FACTS:<br /><br />Private respondent Doroteo R. Alegre was engaged as athletic director by petitioner Brent School, Inc. at a yearly compensation of P20,000.00. The contract fixed a specific term for its existence, five (5) years, i.e., from July 18, 1971, the date of execution of the agreement, to July 17, 1976. Subsequent subsidiary agreements dated March 15, 1973, August 28, 1973, and September 14, 1974 reiterated the same terms and conditions, including the expiry date, as those contained in the original contract of July 18, 1971. <br /><br />On April 20,1976, Alegre was given a copy of the report filed by Brent School with the Department of Labor advising of the termination of his services effective on July 16, 1976. The stated ground for the termination was "completion of contract, expiration of the definite period of employment." Although protesting the announced termination stating that his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer, and his employment lasted for 5 years - therefore he had acquired the status of regular employee - Alegre accepted the amount of P3,177.71, and signed a receipt therefor containing the phrase, "in full payment of services for the period May 16, to July 17, 1976 as full payment of contract."<br /><br />The Regional Director considered Brent School's report as an application for clearance to terminate employment (not a report of termination), and accepting the recommendation of the Labor Conciliator, refused to give such clearance and instead required the reinstatement of Alegre, as a "permanent employee," to his former position without loss of seniority rights and with full back wages. <br /><br />ISSUE: <br /><br />Whether or not the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended, have anathematized "fixed period employment" or employment for a term.<br /><br />RULING:<br /><br />Respondent Alegre's contract of employment with Brent School having lawfully terminated with and by reason of the expiration of the agreed term of period thereof, he is declared not entitled to reinstatement.<br /><br />The employment contract between Brent School and Alegre was executed on July 18, 1971, at a time when the Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. 442) had not yet been promulgated. At that time, the validity of term employment was impliedly recognized by the Termination Pay Law, R.A. 1052, as amended by R.A. 1787. Prior, thereto, it was the Code of Commerce (Article 302) which governed employment without a fixed period, and also implicitly acknowledged the propriety of employment with a fixed period. The Civil Code of the Philippines, which was approved on June 18, 1949 and became effective on August 30,1950, itself deals with obligations with a period. No prohibition against term-or fixed-period employment is contained in any of its articles or is otherwise deducible therefrom.<br /><br />It is plain then that when the employment contract was signed between Brent School and Alegre, it was perfectly legitimate for them to include in it a stipulation fixing the duration thereof Stipulations for a term were explicitly recognized as valid by this Court. <br /><br />The status of legitimacy continued to be enjoyed by fixed-period employment contracts under the Labor Code (PD 442), which went into effect on November 1, 1974. The Code contained explicit references to fixed period employment, or employment with a fixed or definite period. Nevertheless, obscuration of the principle of licitness of term employment began to take place at about this time.<br /><br />Article 320 originally stated that the "termination of employment of probationary employees and those employed WITH A FIXED PERIOD shall be subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe." Article 321 prescribed the just causes for which an employer could terminate "an employment without a definite period." And Article 319 undertook to define "employment without a fixed period" in the following manner: …where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.<br /><br />Subsequently, the foregoing articles regarding employment with "a definite period" and "regular" employment were amended by Presidential Decree No. 850, effective December 16, 1975.<br /><br />Article 320, dealing with "Probationary and fixed period employment," was altered by eliminating the reference to persons "employed with a fixed period," and was renumbered (becoming Article 271). <br /><br />As it is evident that Article 280 of the Labor Code, under a narrow and literal interpretation, not only fails to exhaust the gamut of employment contracts to which the lack of a fixed period would be an anomaly, but would also appear to restrict, without reasonable distinctions, the right of an employee to freely stipulate with his employer the duration of his engagement, it logically follows that such a literal interpretation should be eschewed or avoided. The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application. Outlawing the whole concept of term employment and subverting to boot the principle of freedom of contract to remedy the evil of employer's using it as a means to prevent their employees from obtaining security of tenure is like cutting off the nose to spite the face or, more relevantly, curing a headache by lopping off the head.<br /><br />Such interpretation puts the seal on Bibiso upon the effect of the expiry of an agreed period of employment as still good rule—a rule reaffirmed in the recent case of Escudero vs. Office of the President (G.R. No. 57822, April 26, 1989) where, in the fairly analogous case of a teacher being served by her school a notice of termination following the expiration of the last of three successive fixed-term employment contracts, the Court held:<br />Reyes (the teacher's) argument is not persuasive. It loses sight of the fact that her employment was probationary, contractual in nature, and one with a definitive period. At the expiration of the period stipulated in the contract, her appointment was deemed terminated and the letter informing her of the non-renewal of her contract is not a condition sine qua non before Reyes may be deemed to have ceased in the employ of petitioner UST. The notice is a mere reminder that Reyes' contract of employment was due to expire and that the contract would no longer be renewed. It is not a letter of termination. <br /><br />Paraphrasing Escudero, respondent Alegre's employment was terminated upon the <br />expiration of his last contract with Brent School on July 16, 1976 without the necessity of any notice. The advance written advice given the Department of Labor with copy to said petitioner was a mere reminder of the impending expiration of his contract, not a letter of termination, nor an application for clearance to terminate which needed the approval of the Department of Labor to make the termination of his services effective. In any case, such clearance should properly have been given, not denied.Elmer Brabantehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17569454269621923153noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3490533786910594568.post-13860334764275833922010-01-27T23:58:00.000-08:002010-01-28T00:00:16.789-08:00MAYON HOTEL & RESTAURANT vs. ADANAMAYON HOTEL & RESTAURANT, PACITA O. PO vs. ROLANDO ADANA, et al.<br />G.R. No. 157634<br />May 16, 2005<br /><br />FACTS: <br /><br />Petitioner Mayon Hotel & Restaurant (MHR) hired herein 16 respondents as employees in its business in Legaspi City. Its operation was suspended on March 31, 1997 due to the expiration and non-renewal of the lease contract for the space it rented. While waiting for the completion of the construction of its new site, MHR continued its operation in another site with 9 of the 16 employees. When the new site constructed and MHR resumed its business operation, none of the 16 employees was recalled to work.<br /><br />MHR alleged business losses as the reason for not reinstating the respondents. On various dates, respondents filed complaints for underpayment of wages, money claims and illegal dismissal.<br /><br />ISSUES:<br /><br />1. Whether or not respondents were illegally dismissed by petitioner;<br />2. Whether or not respondents are entitled to their money claims due to underpayment of wages, and nonpayment of holiday pay, rest day premium, SILP, COLA, overtime pay, and night shift differential pay.<br /><br />HELD:<br /><br />1. Illegal Dismissal: claim for separation pay<br /><br />Since April 1997 until the time the Labor Arbiter rendered its decision in July 2000, or more than three (3) years after the supposed “temporary” lay-off, the employment of all the respondents with petitioner had ceased, notwithstanding that the new premises had been completed and the same resumed its operation. This is clearly dismissal – or the permanent severance or complete separation of the worker from the service on the initiative of the employer regardless of the reasons therefor.<br />Article 286 of the Labor Code is clear — there is termination of employment when an otherwise bona fide suspension of work exceeds six (6) months. The cessation of employment for more than six months was patent and the employer has the burden of proving that the termination was for a just or authorized cause. <br /><br />While we recognize the right of the employer to terminate the services of an employee for a just or authorized cause, the dismissal of employees must be made within the parameters of law and pursuant to the tenets of fair play. And in termination disputes, the burden of proof is always on the employer to prove that the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause. Where there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for termination of employment, the law considers the case a matter of illegal dismissal. <br /><br />If doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter — the employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause. It is a time-honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements and writing should be resolved in the former's favor. The policy is to extend the doctrine to a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection of labor. <br /><br />2. Money claims<br /><br />The Supreme Court reinstated the award of monetary claims granted by the Labor Arbiter.<br /><br />The cost of meals and snacks purportedly provided to respondents cannot be deducted as part of respondents' minimum wage. As stated in the Labor Arbiter's decision.<br />Even granting that meals and snacks were provided and indeed constituted facilities, such facilities could not be deducted without compliance with certain legal requirements. As stated in Mabeza v. NLRC, the employer simply cannot deduct the value from the employee's wages without satisfying the following: (a) proof that such facilities are customarily furnished by the trade; (b) the provision of deductible facilities is voluntarily accepted in writing by the employee; and (c) the facilities are charged at fair and reasonable value. The law is clear that mere availment is not sufficient to allow deductions from employees' wages.<br /><br />As for petitioners repeated invocation of serious business losses, suffice to say that this is not a defense to payment of labor standard benefits. The employer cannot exempt himself from liability to pay minimum wages because of poor financial condition of the company. The payment of minimum wages is not dependent on the employer's ability to pay.Elmer Brabantehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17569454269621923153noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3490533786910594568.post-62846438753165661692010-01-27T23:54:00.001-08:002010-01-27T23:56:08.914-08:00CHINA BANKING vs. ORTEGACHINA BANKING CORPORATION and TAN KIM LIONG vs. HON. WENCESLAO ORTEGA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VIII, and VICENTE G. ACABAN<br />G.R. No. L-34964 January 31, 1973<br />En banc<br /><br />FACTS: <br /><br />On December 17, 1968 Vicente Acaban filed a complaint in the court a quo against Bautista Logging Co., Inc., B & B Forest Development Corporation and Marino Bautista for the collection of a sum of money. Upon motion of the plaintiff the trial court declared the defendants in default for failure to answer within the reglementary period, and authorized the Branch Clerk of Court and/or Deputy Clerk to receive the plaintiff's evidence. On January 20, 1970 judgment by default was rendered against the defendants.<br /><br />To satisfy the judgment, the plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of the defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation with the China Banking Corporation. Accordingly, a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial court and served on said bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. In reply, the bank' cashier invited the attention of the Deputy Sheriff to the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 which, it was alleged, prohibit the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits. Thereupon the plaintiff filed a motion to cite Tan Kim Liong for contempt of court.<br /><br />In an order dated March 4, 1972 the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion. However, Tan Kim Liong was ordered "to inform the Court within five days from receipt of this order whether or not there is a deposit in the China Banking Corporation of defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation, and if there is any deposit, to hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order from this Court." Tan Kim Liong moved to reconsider but was turned down by order of March 27, 1972. In the same order he was directed "to comply with the order of this Court dated March 4, 1972 within ten (10) days from the receipt of copy of this order, otherwise his arrest and confinement will be ordered by the Court." Resisting the two orders, the China Banking Corporation and Tan Kim Liong instituted the instant petition.<br /><br />The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 relied upon by the petitioners reads:<br />Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.<br />Sec 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking institution to disclose to any person other than those mentioned in Section two hereof any information concerning said deposits.<br />Sec. 5. Any violation of this law will subject offender upon conviction, to an imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos or both, in the discretion of the court.<br /><br />The petitioners argue that the disclosure of the information required by the court does not fall within any of the four (4) exceptions enumerated in Section 2, and that if the questioned orders are complied with Tan Kim Liong may be criminally liable under Section 5 and the bank exposed to a possible damage suit by B & B Forest Development Corporation. Specifically referring to this case, the position of the petitioners is that the bank deposit of judgment debtor B & B Forest Development Corporation cannot be subject to garnishment to satisfy a final judgment against it in view of the aforequoted provisions of law.<br /><br />ISSUE: <br /><br />Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405. <br /><br />HELD: <br /><br />We do not view the situation in that light. The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order. It will be noted from the discussion of the conference committee report on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977, which later became Republic Act 1405, that it was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment. <br /><br />Thus:<br />Mr. MARCOS. Now, for purposes of the record, I should like the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means to clarify this further. Suppose an individual has a tax case. He is being held liable by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for, say, P1,000.00 worth of tax liability, and because of this the deposit of this individual is attached by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.<br /><br />Mr. RAMOS. The attachment will only apply after the court has pronounced sentence declaring the liability of such person. But where the primary aim is to determine whether he has a bank deposit in order to bring about a proper assessment by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, such inquiry is not authorized by this proposed law.<br /><br />Mr. MARCOS. But under our rules of procedure and under the Civil Code, the attachment or garnishment of money deposited is allowed. Let us assume, for instance, that there is a preliminary attachment which is for garnishment or for holding liable all moneys deposited belonging to a certain individual, but such attachment or garnishment will bring out into the open the value of such deposit. Is that prohibited by this amendment or by this law?<br /><br />Mr. RAMOS. It is only prohibited to the extent that the inquiry is limited, or rather, the inquiry is made only for the purpose of satisfying a tax liability already declared for the protection of the right in favor of the government; but when the object is merely to inquire whether he has a deposit or not for purposes of taxation, then this is fully covered by the law.<br /><br />Mr. MARCOS. And it protects the depositor, does it not?<br /><br />Mr. RAMOS. Yes, it protects the depositor.<br /><br />Mr. MARCOS. The law prohibits a mere investigation into the existence and the amount of the deposit.<br /><br />Mr. RAMOS. Into the very nature of such deposit.<br /><br />Mr. MARCOS. So I come to my original question. Therefore, preliminary garnishment or attachment of the deposit is not allowed?<br /><br />Mr. RAMOS. No, without judicial authorization.<br /><br />Mr. MARCOS. I am glad that is clarified. So that the established rule of procedure as well as the substantive law on the matter is amended?<br /><br />Mr. RAMOS. Yes. That is the effect.<br /><br />Mr. MARCOS. I see. Suppose there has been a decision, definitely establishing the liability of an individual for taxation purposes and this judgment is sought to be executed ... in the execution of that judgment, does this bill, or this proposed law, if approved, allow the investigation or scrutiny of the bank deposit in order to execute the judgment?<br /><br />Mr. RAMOS. To satisfy a judgment which has become executory.<br /><br />Mr. MARCOS. Yes, but, as I said before, suppose the tax liability is P1,000,000 and the deposit is half a million, will this bill allow scrutiny into the deposit in order that the judgment may be executed?<br /><br />Mr. RAMOS. Merely to determine the amount of such money to satisfy that obligation to the Government, but not to determine whether a deposit has been made in evasion of taxes.<br /><br />Mr. MACAPAGAL. But let us suppose that in an ordinary civil action for the recovery of a sum of money the plaintiff wishes to attach the properties of the defendant to insure the satisfaction of the judgment. Once the judgment is rendered, does the gentleman mean that the plaintiff cannot attach the bank deposit of the defendant?<br /><br />Mr. RAMOS. That was the question raised by the gentleman from Pangasinan to which I replied that outside the very purpose of this law it could be reached by attachment.<br /><br />Mr. MACAPAGAL. Therefore, in such ordinary civil cases it can be attached?<br /><br />Mr. RAMOS. That is so.<br />(Vol. II, Congressional Record, House of Representatives, No. 12, pp. 3839-3840, July 27, 1955).<br /><br />It is sufficiently clear from the foregoing discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no real inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. It is hard to conceive that it was ever within the intention of Congress to enable debtors to evade payment of their just debts, even if ordered by the Court, through the expedient of converting their assets into cash and depositing the same in a bank.Elmer Brabantehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17569454269621923153noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3490533786910594568.post-18753614927303368952010-01-27T23:52:00.000-08:002010-01-27T23:53:16.413-08:00PNB vs. GANCAYCOPHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and EDUARDO Z. ROMUALDEZ, vs. EMILIO A. GANCAYCO and FLORENTINO FLOR<br />G.R. No. L-18343<br />September 30, 1965<br />en banc<br /><br />FACTS:<br /><br />Defendants Emilio A. Gancayco and Florentino Flor, as special prosecutors of the Department of Justice, required the plaintiff Philippine National Bank (PNB) to produce at a hearing on February 20, 1961 the records of the bank deposits of Ernesto T. Jimenez, former administrator of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Administration, who was then under investigation for unexplained wealth. In declining to reveal its records, PNB invoked RA 1405 which provides:<br /> SEC. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.<br />On the other hand, the defendants cited the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) in support of their claim of authority and demanded anew that plaintiff Eduardo Z. Romualdez, as bank president, produce the records or he would be prosecuted for contempt. The defendants invoked Sec. 8 of Ra 3019 which states that:<br /> SEC. 8. Dismissal due to unexplained wealth. — If in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act Numbered One thousand three hundred seventy-nine, a public official has been found to have acquired during his incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be a ground for dismissal or removal. Properties in the name of the spouse and unmarried children of such public official may be taken into consideration, when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary.<br /><br /> Because of the threat of prosecution, plaintiffs filed an action for declaratory judgment in the Manila CFI. After trial, during which Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, author of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act testified, the court rendered judgment, sustaining the power of the defendants to compel the disclosure of bank accounts of ACCFA Administrator Jimenez. The court said that, by enacting Section 8 of RA 3019, Congress clearly intended to provide an additional ground for the examination of bank deposits. Without such provision, the court added prosecutors would be hampered if not altogether frustrated in the prosecution of those charged with having acquired unexplained wealth while in public office.<br /><br /> From that judgment, plaintiffs appealed to this Court. In brief, plaintiffs' position is that section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law "simply means that such bank deposits may be included or added to the assets of the Government official or employee for the purpose of computing his unexplained wealth if and when the same are discovered or revealed in the manner authorized by Section 2 of RA 1405, which are (1) upon written permission of the depositor; (2) in cases of impeachment; (3) upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; and (4) in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation."<br /><br />ISSUES:<br /><br />1. Whether or not RA 3019 which took effect on August 17, 1960 is a general law which cannot be deemed to have impliedly repealed section 2 of RA 1405 (which took effect on Sept. 9, 1955), because of the rule that repeals by implication are not favored. <br />2. Whether or not a bank can be compelled to disclose the records of accounts of a depositor who is under investigation for unexplained wealth.<br /><br />HELD:<br /><br />Contrary to their claim that their position effects a reconciliation of the provisions of the two laws, plaintiffs are actually making the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 prevail over those of the RA 3019, because even without the latter law the balance standing to the depositor's credit can be considered provided its disclosure is made in any of the cases provided in RA 1405.<br /><br />The truth is that RA 3019 and RA 1405 are so repugnant to each other than no reconciliation is possible. Thus, while RA 1405 provides that bank deposits are "absolutely confidential and therefore may not be examined, inquired or looked into, except in those cases enumerated therein, RA 3019 directs in mandatory terms that bank deposits "shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary." The only conclusion possible is that section 8 of the RA 3019 is intended to amend section 2 of RA 1405 by providing additional exception to the rule against the disclosure of bank deposits.<br /><br />Indeed, if the new law is inconsistent with or repugnant to the old law, the presumption against the intent to repeal by implication is overthrown because the inconsistency or repugnancy reveals an intent to repeal the existing law. And whether a statute, either in its entirety or in part, has been repealed by implication is ultimately a matter of legislative intent. (Crawford, The Construction of Statutes, Secs. 309-310. Cf. Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Ass'n v. Feliciano, G.R. No. L-24022, March 3, 1965).<br /><br />With regard to the claim that disclosure would be contrary to the policy making bank deposits confidential, it is enough to point out that while section 2 of RA 1405 declares bank deposits to be "absolutely confidential," it nevertheless allows such disclosure in the following instances: (1) Upon written permission of the depositor; (2) In cases of impeachment; (3) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; (4) In cases where the money deposited is the subject matter of the litigation. Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits confidential. The policy as to one cannot be different from the policy as to the other. This policy expresses the motion that a public office is a public trust and any person who enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny.Elmer Brabantehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17569454269621923153noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3490533786910594568.post-89906442821026561462010-01-27T23:48:00.000-08:002010-01-27T23:51:04.603-08:00MARQUEZ vs. DESIERTOLOURDES T. MARQUEZ vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, et al.<br />G.R. No. 135882 <br />June 27, 2001<br />En banc<br /><br />FACTS:<br /><br />In May 1998, petitioner Marquez received an Order from the Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto dated April 29, 1998, to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) Julia Vargas Branch where petitioner was the branch manager. The accounts to be inspected were involved in a case pending with the Ombudsman entitled, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v. Amado Lagdameo, et. al, for violation of RA 3019 Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI. The Order was grounded on Section 15 of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) which provides, among others, the following powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman, to wit:<br /> (8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum and take testimony in any investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and records;<br />(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein.<br />Clearly, the specific provision of R.A. 6770, a later legislation, modifies the law on the Secrecy of Bank Deposits (R.A. 1405) and places the office of the Ombudsman in the same footing as the courts of law in this regard.”<br />The basis of the Ombudsman in ordering an in camera inspection of the accounts was a trail of managers checks (MCs) purchased by one George Trivinio, a respondent in OMB-0-97-0411, pending with the office of the Ombudsman. It appeared that Trivinio purchased on May 2 and 3, 1995, 51 MCs for a total amount of P272.1 Million at Traders Royal Bank (TRB) UN Ave. Branch. Out of the 51 MCs, eleven 11 MCs in the amount of P70.6M were deposited and credited to an account maintained at the UBP.<br />On May 26, 1998, the FFIB panel met with petitioner Marquez and Atty. Fe B. Macalino at the bank’s main office in Makati City, for the purpose of allowing petitioner and Atty. Macalino to view the checks furnished by TRB. After convincing themselves of the veracity of the checks, Atty. Macalino advised Ms. Marquez to comply with the order of the Ombudsman. Petitioner agreed to an in camera inspection set on June 3, 1998. However, on June 4, 1998, Marquez wrote the Ombudsman that the accounts in question could not readily be identified since the checks were issued in cash or bearer, and asked for time to respond to the order. Marquez surmised that these accounts had long been dormant, hence were not covered by the new account number generated by the UB system, thus sought to verify from the Interbank records archives for the whereabouts of these accounts.<br /><br />The Ombudsman, responding to the request of Marquez for time to comply with the order, stated that UBP-Julia Vargas, not Interbank, was the depositary bank of the subject TRB MCs as shown at its dorsal portion and as cleared by the Philippine Clearing House. Notwithstanding the fact that the checks were payable to cash or bearer, the name of the depositor(s) could easily be identified since the account numbers where said checks were deposited were identified in the order.<br /><br />Even assuming that the accounts were already classified as dormant accounts, the bank was still required to preserve the records pertaining to the accounts within a certain period of time as required by existing banking rules and regulations.<br />On June 16, 1998, the Ombudsman issued an order directing Marquez to produce the bank documents relative to the accounts in issue, stating that her persistent refusal to comply with the order is unjustified, was merely intended to delay the investigation of the case, constitutes disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order issued by the office and is punishable as Indirect Contempt under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6770. <br />On July 10, 1998, Marquez together with UBP filed a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and injunction with the Makati RTC against the Ombudsman allegedly because the Ombudsman and other persons acting under his authority were continuously harassing her to produce the bank documents relative to the accounts in question. Moreover, on June 16, 1998, the Ombudsman issued another order stating that unless she appeared before the FFIB with the documents requested, Marquez would be charged with indirect contempt and obstruction of justice.<br /><br />The lower court denied petitioner’s prayer for a temporary restraining order stating that since petitioner failed to show prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman, no writ of injunction may be issued by the RTC to delay the investigation pursuant to Section 14 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.<br /><br />Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.<br />On August 21, 1998, petitioner received a copy of the motion to cite her for contempt. On August 31, 1998, petitioner filed with the Ombudsman an opposition to the motion to cite her in contempt on the ground that the filing thereof was premature due to the petition pending in the lower court. Petitioner likewise reiterated that she had no intention to disobey the orders of the Ombudsman. However, she wanted to be clarified as to how she would comply with the orders without her breaking any law, particularly RA 1405.<br /><br />ISSUES: <br /><br />1. Whether or not Marquez may be cited for indirect contempt for her failure to produce the documents requested by the Ombudsman. <br />2. Whether or not the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (RA 1405).<br /><br />HELD:<br /><br />An examination of the secrecy of bank deposits law (RA 1405) would reveal the following exceptions:<br />1. Where the depositor consents in writing;<br />2. Impeachment case;<br />3. By court order in bribery or dereliction of duty cases against public officials;<br />4. Deposit is subject of litigation;<br />5. Sec. 8, R. A. No. 3019, in cases of unexplained wealth as held in the case of PNB vs. Gancayco<br /><br />We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case.<br /><br />In Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, we held that “Section 2 of the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits, as amended, declares bank deposits to be “absolutely confidential” except:<br />(1) In an examination made in the course of a special or general examination of a bank that is specifically authorized by the Monetary Board after being satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that a bank fraud or serious irregularity has been or is being committed and that it is necessary to look into the deposit to establish such fraud or irregularity,<br />(2) In an examination made by an independent auditor hired by the bank to conduct its regular audit provided that the examination is for audit purposes only and the results thereof shall be for the exclusive use of the bank,<br />(3) Upon written permission of the depositor,<br />(4) In cases of impeachment,<br />(5) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or<br />(6) In cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation”<br /><br />In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What is existing is an investigation by the office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the Office of the Ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection.<br /><br />Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts for meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime of the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, and the Intellectual Property Code.<br /><br />Ombudsman is ordered to cease and desist from requiring Union Bank Manager Lourdes T. Marquez, or anyone in her place to comply with the order dated October 14, 1998, and similar orders.Elmer Brabantehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17569454269621923153noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3490533786910594568.post-60567878461312748542009-09-09T19:05:00.000-07:002009-09-10T01:33:51.309-07:00Bar Topnotchers, 1946-2008August 1946 <br />1. Gregoria Cruz, UP.................92.25<br />2. Roberto H. Benitez, UP............92.05<br />3. Aurora Marcos, UP.................91.75<br />4. Amadeo R. Neri, SC................91.50<br />5. Antonio G. Ibarra, UP.............90.90<br />6. Natividad G. Adduru, UP...........90.15<br />7. Alberto B. Villaraza, UP..........90.10<br />8. Teodoro C. Unson, FEU.............89.70<br />9. Vicente Caluag Jr., UP............89.65<br />10. Jesus P. Garcia, UST.............88.25<br /> <br /> November 1946 <br />1 Pedro L. Yap UP 91.70<br />2 Jose S. Zafra ACL 91.30<br />3 Fermin R. Mesina UP 89.40<br />4 Arturo M. del Rosario UST 89.30<br />5 Jose L. Papa UST 89.30<br />6 Jose R. Quintos FLS 89.20<br />7 Eriberto D. Ignacio UP 89.15<br />8 Alberto V. Señeris SU 88.80<br />9 Strauss S. Mendoza PLS 88.75<br />10 Emilio Centena UP 88.45<br /> <br /> 1947 <br />1 Aumerfina A. Melencio UP 93.85<br />2 Augusto G. Syjuco AU 92.90<br />3 Juan M. Hagad UP 91.75<br />3 Antonio V. Montelibano CSA 91.75<br />4 Aguedo F. Agbayani UP 91.40<br />5 Buenaventura S. dela Fuente UP 89.05<br />6 Lorna Lombos UP 88.95<br />7 Ambrosio A. Acevedo AdeMU 88.70<br />7 Jesus SJ Sayuc FEU 88.70<br />8 Elizalde P. Rodrigazo PLS 88.65<br />9 Francisco Sumulong AU 88.60<br />10 Emma Quisumbing UP 88.30<br /> <br /> 1948 <br />1 Manuel G. Montecillo FEU 95.50<br />2 Jose M. Evangelista UM 95.05<br />3 Francisco T. Papa UP 94.50<br />4 Lorenzo Miravite MLQU 94.45<br />5 Blasito E. Angeles MLQU 94.35<br />6 Fernando S. Ruiz PLS 93.85<br />7 Avelino C. Teaño Special 93.70<br />8 Kaulayao V. Faylona MLQU 93.45<br />8 Bienvenido A. Tan Jr. UP 93.45<br />9 Irene R. Cortez UP 92.95<br />10 Alberto P. San Juan UP 92.50<br /> <br /> 1949 <br />1 Anacleto C. Mañgaser PLS 95.85<br />2 Dominador Aytona UM 94.55<br />3 Ramon Encarnacion Jr. MLQU 94.10<br />4 Celso L. Magsino FEU 93.50<br />5 Jose C. Campos Jr. UP 93.10<br />5 Nicias Mendoza MLQU 93.10<br />6 Enrique M. Belo UP 92.95<br />7 Ladislao L. Reyes UP 92.90<br />8 Generoso V. Jacinto UP 92.80<br />9 Neptali A. Gonzales PLS 92.50<br />10 Robustiano Espiritu MLQU 92.15<br /> <br /> 1950 <br />1 Carolina C. Griño Special 92.05<br />2 Ramon O. Reynoso, Jr. UP 91.15<br />3 Rodolfo Ganzon ICC 91.10<br />4 Andres E. Matias FLS 90.30<br />5 Alicia V. Sempio MLQU 90.05<br />6 Mariano V. Ampil Jr. UP 89.30<br />7 Deogracias P. Lirio FEU 89.15<br />8 Gregorio S. Turiano FEU 88.85<br />9 Arturo T. de Guia UST 88.80<br />10 Miguel V. Gonzales MLQU 88.50<br />10 Ciriaco G. Lopez UP 88.50<br /> <br /> 1951 <br />1 Vicente R. Acsay UM 92.25<br />2 Andres R. Narvasa UST 91.60<br />3 Pablo P. Garcia USC 91.50<br />4 William R. Veto AdeMU 91.20<br />5 Fortunato A. Vailoces USC 90.85<br />6 Isidro C. Zarraga UP 90.55<br />7 Benildo G. Hernandez MLQU 90.45<br />8 Isagani A. Cruz MLQU 90.15<br />9 Timoteo J. Sumawang MLQU 90.10<br />10 Cesar B. Dadivas FLS 89.85<br /> <br /> 1952 <br />1 Pedro S. C. Animas UP 94.25<br />2 Gabriel C. Singson AdeMU 93.75<br />3 Marciano C. Sicat FEU 93.30<br />4 Augusto Almeda-Lopez UP 93.10<br />4 Rosalino A. Centeno FEU 93.10<br />5 Andres C. Regalado UP 92.90<br />6 Florentino P. Feliciano UP 92.90<br />7 Alfredo Marigomen UP 92.55<br />7 Roman D. Valdez FEU 92.55<br />8 Jeremias U. Montemayor AdeMU 92.50<br />9 Meynardo A. Tiro AdeMU 92.30<br />10 Godofredo F. Trajano UST 92.05<br /> <br /> 1953 <br />1 Leonardo A. Amores UM 94.05<br />2 Juan J. Diaz MLQU 93.85<br />3 Jose B. Aquino AdeMU 93.25<br />4 Jose C. Reyes AdeMU 93.10<br />5 Bernanrdo P. Fernandez SBC 92.75<br />6 Vicenzo A. Sagun SU 92.55<br />7 Leopoldo A. Francisco MLQU 92.40<br />8 Oscar M. Herrera FEU 92.25<br />9 Lauro V. Francisco MLQU 92.20<br />10 Ernesto D. Tobias UP 92.05<br /> <br /> 1954 <br />1 Florenz D. Regalado SBC 96.70<br />2 Renato L. dela Fuente SBC 95.95<br />3 Antonio R. Quintos AdeMU 95.50<br />4 Raymundo A. Armovit UP 94.30<br />5 Bienvenido V. Reyes MLQU 93.70<br />5 Jose R. Viñas MLQU 93.70<br />6 Benjamin V. Abela UP 93.50<br />6 Rodolfo J. Herman ONI 93.50<br />6 Salome A. Montoya FEU 93.50<br />7 Quirico T. Carag Jr. UP 93.45<br />8 Pacifico M. Castro UST 93.35<br />9 Rene Espina USP 93.20<br />10 Banjamin P. Paulino UE 93.00<br /> <br /> 1955 <br />1 Tomas P. Matic, Jr. FEU 90.55<br />2 Juan G. Colias, JR. UP 89.90<br />3 Emmanuel S. Tipon UP 89.55<br />4 Ricardo M. Ilarde MLQU 87.90<br />5 Valentino G. Castro MLQU 86.80<br />6 Jose S. Balajadia UP 86.30<br />6 Manuel T. Muro FEU 86.30<br />7 Artemio R. Aliva UP 86.25<br />7 Vicente V. Asuncion, Jr. AdeMU 86.25<br />7 Jovencio F. Cinco FEU 86.25<br />8 Francisco G. de Guzman MLQU 86.15<br />9 Julio T. Baldonado MLQU 86.00<br />10 Lourdes J. Fajutrao MLQU 85.95<br /> <br /> 1956 <br />1 Francisco C. Catral SBC 90.20<br />2 Nereo J. Paculdo UP 89.55<br />3 Carlos R. Imperial AdeMU 89.50<br />4 Alfonso B. Camillo UST 89.40<br />4 Juanito R. Remulla UP 89.40<br />5 Artemio R. Corpuz LP 89.15<br />5 Melencio C. Corpuz UE 89.15<br />5 Benjamin M. Grecia FEU 89.15<br />6 Raul L. Correa UP 89.10<br />7 Benigno A. Bernardo FEU 88.95<br />8 Andre L. Navato SBC 88.60<br />9 Ernesto M. Maceda AdeMU 88.55<br />10 Victor L. Sison SBC 88.50<br /> <br /> 1957 <br />1 Gregorio R. Castillo UP 89.15<br />2 Antonio F. Navarrete AdeMU 88.65<br />3 Samson S. Alcantara MLQU 88.20<br />4 Don M. Ferry UP 88.15<br />5 Sabino R. Padilla, Jr. UP 88.00<br />6 Vicente D. Millora UP 87.65<br />7 Jose E. Picazo UP 87.40<br />8 Enrique D. Perez SBC 87.05<br />9 Romeo C. dela Cruz UP 87.00<br />10 Perfecto V. Fernandez UP 86.95<br /> <br /> 1958 <br />1 Manuel G. Abello UP 89.25<br />2 Jose dlC Concepcion UP 89.10<br />3 Jose N. Nolledo FEU 88.95<br />4 Antonio J. Navas, Jr. UST 86.75<br />5 Norberto S. Gonzales MLQU 86.70<br />6 Virgilio C. Manguera UP 86.60<br />7 Sergio A. Apostol AdeMU 86.45<br />8 Raul Flores MLQU 86.30<br />9 Amado M. Santiago, Jr. AdMU 86.25<br />10 Benjamin A. Claveria UNC 85.95<br /> <br /> 1959 <br />1 Agustin O. Benitez FEU 89.20<br />2 Lorenzo G. Timbol UP 88.75<br />3 Amado A./ Bulaong, Jr. UP 88.45<br />4 Custodio O. Parlade FEU 88.40<br />5 Romulo M. Villa UP 88.05<br />6 Ismael G. Khan, Jr. UP 87.95<br />7 Nelly A. Favias UP 87.50<br />8 Efren G. Gutierrez UP 87.40<br />9 Francis M. Zosa AdeMU 87.15<br />10 Pedro G. Banzon UST 87.10<br /> <br /> 1960 <br />1 Ismael Andres MLQU 91.70<br />2 James J. Litton UP 91.65<br />3 Florencio Z. Sioson LP 91.15<br />4 Redentor A. Salonga AdeMU 90.15<br />5 David C. Naval UNC 89.85<br />6 Artemio V. Panganiban, Jr. FEU 89.55<br />7 Jose S. Brillantes AdeMU 89.20<br />8 Rolando N. Velasco SBC 88.95<br />9 Gregorio P. Molina AdeMU 88.75<br />10 Valerio Salazar USC 88.25<br /> <br /> 1961 <br />1 Avelino V. Cruz SBC 90.95<br />2 Antonio T. Lacson AdeMU 89.20<br />3 Manuel B. Zamora, Jr. UP 87.45<br />4 Victor J. Lee FEU 86.80<br />5 Eugenio S. Suarez UP 86.70<br />6 Reginaldo I. Oben UST 86.60<br />7 Filemon Fernandez USC 86.45<br />7 Isidro E. Real, Jr. LP 86.45<br />8 Eliddoro G. Ubiadas UP 86.35<br />9 Maxie S. Aguillon UST 86.00<br />10 Jovito E. Talabong LuzC 85.80<br /> <br /> 1962 <br />1 Deogracias G. Eufemio UP 90.80<br />2 Felicisimo R. Quioque SBC 89.70<br />3 Ma. Luisa A. Mendoza LP 87.10<br />4 Adolfo S. Azcuna AdeMU 86.80<br />5 Virgilio B. Jara SBC 86.35<br />6 Elizabeth R. Tan UP 86.30<br />7 Manuel R. Castro UP 86.00<br />8 Haydee B. Uorac UP 86.95<br />9 Joaquin G. Bernas AdeMU 85.10<br />10 Prospero A. Olivas BC 84.95<br /> <br /> 1963 <br />1 Cornelio C. Gison AdeMU 86.35<br />2 Hector A. Martinez UP 85.95<br />3 Wenceslao R. dela Paz USA 85.05<br />4 Teodoro a. Almazen UV 84.95<br />4 Myrna Policrpio Cruz UST 84.95<br />5 Antonio A. Picazo UP 84.90<br />6 REnato V. Saguisag SBC 84.85<br />7 Carmelo Betita UP 83.20<br />8 Honorato Y. Aquino BCF 83.05<br />8 Remeo Limpingco FEU 83.05<br />8 Roberto P. Ocampo UE 83.05<br />9 Jose P. Mendoza SBC 83.00<br />10 Antonio H. Abad, Jr. FEU 82.80<br /> <br /> 1964 <br />1 Jesus P. Castelo SBC 88.40<br />2 Demetrio G. Demetria UE 86.85<br />3 Fernando T. Chua AdeMU 86.75<br />4 Eduardo G. Berenguer AdeMU 86.15<br />5 Raymundo Dizon, Jr. AdeMU 86.10<br />6 Manuel S. Ferandos SBC 85.60<br />7 Adolfo A. Angala AdeMU 85.35<br />8 Ferdinand S. Tinio UP 85.00<br />9 Ma. Ana C. Chanco UP 84.60<br />10 Raul S. Picardo SBC 84.40<br /> <br /> 1965 <br />1 Victor S. dela Serna SBC 89.80<br />2 Mercedita V. Santiago UP 89.55<br />3 Angelito C. Imperio UP 88.70<br />4 Jose I. Castell FEU 87.45<br />5 Luisito G. Baluyot AdeMU 86.50<br />6 Trudon G. German AdeMU 85.85<br />7 Frank Y. Tan AdeMU 85.50<br />8 Pio Y. Go USC 85.30<br />9 Antonio V. Ramil UP 84.95<br />10 Roberto Palmares USC 84.85<br /> <br /> 1966 <br />1 Roberto San Jose UP 90.60<br />2 Ruben F. Balane UP 88.50<br />2 Pablo S. Trillana III SBC 88.50<br />3 Teodoro Villarmia, Jr. AdMU 88.45<br />4 Francisco D. Yap SU 87.70<br />5 Wilfredo M. Chato UP 87.00<br />6 Sonia Bautista UP 86.75<br />7 Arturo G. Cabilete AdMU 86.60<br />8 Hildegardo F. Iñigo AdeC 86.35<br />9 Ramon Aviado, Jr. AdeMU 86.25<br />10 Antonio B. Dayrit FEU 86.20<br /> <br /> 1967 <br />1 Rodolfo D. Robles SBC 89.60<br />2 Mario Guarin\ña III USA 87.80<br />3 Basilio H. Alo UE 87.15<br />4 Douglas R. Cagas UE 86.85<br />5 Sylvia Katherine F. Luczon FEU 86.05<br />5 Rolando s. Santos SBC 86.05<br />5 Thomas V. Tieng SBC 86.05<br />6 Manuel S. Quimbo AdeMU 86.00<br />7 Antonio B. Nachura SBC 85.70<br />8 Pablito V. Sanidad UP 85.50<br />9 Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. UP 84.90<br />10 Franklin M. Ebdalin AdeMU 84.80<br /> <br /> 1968 <br />1 Oscar B. Glovasa UB 87.45<br />2 Jose Mario C. Buñag AdeMU 86.85<br />3 Jacinto D. Jimenez AdeMU 86.80<br />4 Franco L. Loyola FEU 86.05<br />5 Leandro C. Pancito MLQU 86.75<br />6 Soledad M. Cagampang UP 85.52<br />7 Raul Cabrera AdeMU 85.50<br />8 Antonio B. Panopio UE 85.00<br />10 Nestor I. Madlansacay LP 84.8<br /> <br /> 1969 <br />1 Ronaldo B. Zamora UP 87.30<br />2 Nicolas B. Madrazo UE 87.25<br />3 Franklin M. Drilon UP 86.85<br />4 Arthur B. Soller AdeMU 86.05<br />5 Aniceto Y. Dideles UP 85.80<br />5 Danilo L. Protacio AdeMU 85.80<br />6 William P. Mellana AdeMU 85.60<br />6 Procopio V. Vergel de Dios, Jr. AdeMU 86.80<br />7 German a. Gineta UST 85.55<br />8 Antonio H. Dujua AdeMU 85.25<br />8 Quintin J. Garcia SBC 85.25<br />9 Oswaldo A. Esperat SU 85.15<br />10 Silvestre J. Acejas UP 84.95<br /> <br /> 1970 <br />1 Romulo D. San Juan UP 87.50<br />2 Kamar M. Boloto UE 86.75<br />2 Jesus N. Borillo, Jr. AdeMU 86.75<br />3 Arturo M. de Catro UP 86.60<br />4 Obed C. Cutaran FEU 85.40<br />5 Juan D. de Zuñiga FEU 85.25<br />6 Jose L. Baizas FEU 84.95<br />7 Lou G. Tirol SBC 84.75<br />8 Hermogenes R. Liwag LP 84.55<br />9 Marcelo T. Oñate FEU 84.50<br />10 Rodrigo I. Alano FEU 84.40<br /> <br /> 1971 <br />1 Henry R. Villarica UP 92.40<br />2 Prospero C. Nograles AdMU 90.95<br />3 Victor P. Lazatin UP 9.65<br />4 Liberador V. Villegas AdeMU 90.65<br />5 Romulo P. Atencia AdeMU 90.45<br />6 Virgilio Ma. S. del Rosario AdeMU 89.95<br />6 Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. UP 89.85<br />7 Angelito W. Chua FEU 89.60<br />8 Amando M. L. Suratos AdeMU 89.30<br />9 Eduardo N. Aguillon USA 89.25<br />10 Flavio P. Gutierrez UST 88.95<br /> <br /> 1972 <br />1 Januario B. Soller, Jr. AdeMU 87.13<br />2 Jesus M. Manalastas UP 86.43<br />3 George A. Eduvala SBC 86.08<br />3 Leo J. Palma UP 86.08<br />4 Solon R. Garcia AdeMU 85.80<br />5 Francis Y. Gaw AdeMU 85.50<br />6 Domingo C. Palarca UP 85.13<br />7 Felito S. Ramirez SBC 84.83<br />8 Corazon D. Martinez UST 84.50<br />9 Jesus F. Balicanta SBC 84.28<br />10 Felino M. Ganal UP 84.13<br /> <br /> 1973 <br />1 Vicente R. Solis AdeMU 90.30<br />2 Victoria Piñera AdeMU 89.60<br />3 Ricardo T. Chu, Jr. USA 88.60<br />4 Charles S. Anastacio SBC 87.20<br />5 Manuel L. M. Torres SBC 87.05<br />6 Ernesto R. Lim, Jr. SBC 86.90<br />7 Frumencio A. Lagustan SBC 86.80<br />8 Abraham B. Borreta UP 86.45<br />9 Lucas P. Bersamin UE 86.30<br />10 Jesus G. Dureza AdeD 86.25<br /><br /> 1974 <br />1 Arturo D. Brion AdeMU 91.65<br />2 Ferdinand T. Santos SBC 90.70<br />3 Francis H. Jardeleza UP 88.35<br />4 Rafael A. Morales UP 87.79<br />5 Francisco B. Luna FEU 87.39<br />6 Delfin M. Quijano CSJ-R 87.34<br />7 Nanette R. de Castro UP 86.90<br />8 Kenneth M. Barredo UNO-R 86.70<br />9 Marcelo J. Abibas, Jr. MLQU 86.20<br />10 Luis A. Vera Cruz, Jr. UP 85.88<br /> <br /> 1975 <br />1 Nicanor B. Padilla, Jr. UE 86.70<br />2 Natividad B. Kwan AdeMU 86.55<br />3 Emmanuel R. Pacquiao UV 86.50<br />4 Augusto G. Panlilio AdeMU 86.35<br />5 Edmundo I. Imperial AdeMU 86.25<br />6 Antonio T. Carpio UP 85.70<br />6 Roldan B. Dalman AdeMU 85.70<br />7 Edgardo A. Abinales UE 85.30<br />8 William L. Chua UNO-R 85.05<br />9 Rosmari D. Carandang UP 84.95<br />10 Vicente B. Amador UP 84.90<br />10 Josefa K. CAuton UP 84.90<br />10 Vicente Q. Roxas UP 84.90<br /> <br /> 1976 <br />1 Enrique Y. Teehankee UP 90.80<br />2 Pedro Y. Aquino FEU 89.95<br />3 Arthur E. Galace BCF 89.45<br />4 Vicente F. Ruaro AdeMU 88.50<br />5 Jose A. Curammeng, Jr. UST 88.25<br />6 Arturo C. Villamor USC 88.05<br />7 Mariano E. Sarmiento II UP 87.95<br />8 Ruben V. Abarquez AdeD 87.65<br />9 Florencio M. Martinez SBC 87.65<br />10 Federico C. Cabilao, Jr. UDC 87.50<br /> <br /> 1977 <br />1 Virgilio B. Gesmundo AdeMU 91.80<br />2 Lowell T. Yap UE 91.35<br />3 Ruben O. Purisima AdeMU 91.18<br />4 Eduardo V. Viloria UE 91.05<br />5 Richard N. Ferrer AdeMU 90.72<br />6 Pelagio T. Ricalde UP 90.45<br />7 Avelino J. Cruz, Jr. UP 90.42<br />8 Ruen M. Cleofe AdeMU 90.05<br />9 Joel M. Famador USC 89.61<br />10 Nicolas J. Gomez, Jr. AdeMU 89.48<br /> <br /> 1978 <br />1 Cosme D. Rosell UP 92.47<br />2 Domingo M. Navarro SBC 90.97<br />3 Alexander J. Poblador UP 90.95<br />4 Phillip B. King AdeMU 90.52<br />5 Edgardo A. Camello UP 90.42<br />6 Ramon C. Casano SBC 90.35<br />7 Andres S. Santos UE 90.02<br />8 Viveca L. Codamon LP 89.90<br />8 Rodolfo C. Fariñas AdeMU 89.90<br />9 Spyros L. Osorio SBC 89.87<br />10 Susan N. delos Reyes ZAEC 89.35<br /> <br /> 1979 <br />1 Gregorio M. Batiler, Jr. AdeMU 91.40<br />2 Rene B. Gorospe UST 90.60<br />3 Barbara Anne C. Migallos UP 90.30<br />4 Marius P. Corpus AdeMU 90.00<br />5 Simeon V. Marcelo UP 89.90<br />6 Mario Luza Bautista UP 89.20<br />7 Rolando V. Medalla, Jr. UP 89.05<br />8 Jaime M. Blanco, Jr. UP 88.90<br />9 Gabriel L. Villareal UP 88.80<br />10 Guillermo A. Villasor, Jr. UNO-R 88.05<br /> <br /> 1980 <br />1 Rafael L. Lagos UP 89.75<br />2 Marilyn a. Victorio UP 89.55<br />3 Jaime S. Jacob SBC 89.45<br />4 Purisimo S. Buyco UP 88.70<br />4 Reynaldo G. Salutan AdeMU 87.70<br />5 Bayani K. Tan UP 87.25<br />6 Noel G. Sanchez AdeMU 87.00<br />7 Jose F. Caoibes, Jr. UP 86.70<br />8 Epifania Q. Navarro AdeMU 86.55<br />9 Dante G. Ilaya MLQU 86.50<br />9 Joseph H. Reyes AdeMU 86.50<br />10 Giorgidi B. Aggabao AdeMU 86.45<br /> <br /> 1981 <br />1 Irene Regodon-Guevarra AdeMU 90.95<br />2 Cesar L. Vilanueva AdeMU 90.15<br />3 Arthur T. Lim USC 90.10<br />4 Edgardo M. de Vera AdeMU 88.80<br />5 Celia Librea-Leagogo UP 88.45<br />6 Virgilio s. Jacinto UP 88.25<br />6 Jose Jesus Laruel AdeMU 88.25<br />7 Victoria R. Timbancaya SU 87.95<br />8 Edgar Julio S. Asuncion UP 87.70<br />8 Jose P. Crisostomo, Jr. 87.70<br />8 Omar B. Redula USC 87.70<br />9 Soledad G. Fuentes AdeMU 87.40<br />10 Rogelio V. Quevado UP 87.30<br /> <br /> 1982 <br />1 Ray C. Espinosa AdeMU 90.95<br />2 Lily U. Valencia UNO-R 90.85<br />3 Silverio Benny J. Tan UP 90.80<br />4 Luisito V. Liban UP 90.15<br />5 Efren L. de Leon AdeMU 89.82<br />6 Edwin C. Yan FEU 89.70<br />7 Vidor A. Nosce AdeMU 89.32<br />8 Eduardo P. Lizares UP 88.55<br />9 Francisco S. de Guzman SBC 88.52<br />10 Simeon R. Raya, Jr. AdeMU 88.35<br /> <br /> 1983 <br />1 Manuel Antonio J. Teehankee UP 91.40<br />2 Salvador S. Hipolito UE 90.60<br />3 William Y. Wee AdMU 90.55<br />4 Melvyn S. Jurisprudencia UNO-R 89.75<br />5 Rocky L. Reyes UP 88.35<br />6 Agerico T. Paras AdMU 88.30<br />7 Rosendo U. Castillo, Jr. SBC 88.15<br />7 Yolanda T. Mendoza UP 88.15<br />8 Jose Arturo R. Natividad AdeMU 87.90<br />9 Reynaldo S. Nicolas UP 87.75<br />10 Gil A. Valera AdeMU 87.70<br /> <br /> 1984 <br />1 Richard M. Chiu AdeMU 92.85<br />2 Roy Joseph M. Rafols AdeMU 91.32<br />3 Dolores P. Abad USA 90.95<br />3 Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. FEU 90.85<br />4 Ernesto R. Añasco SBC 90.65<br />5 Vivencio F. Abaño AdeMU 90.30<br />5 Priscilla baltazar-Padilla LP 90.30<br />6 Manuel M. Macasaet AdeMU 90.27<br />7 Victor L. Chan AdeMU 90.05<br />8 Renato C. Pineda AdeMU 89.95<br />9 Arnold L. Barba XU 89.92<br />10 Antonio P. Bonilla AdeMU 89.75<br /> <br /> 1985 <br />1 Janette Susan L. Peña UP 89.40<br />2 Menardo I. Guevarra AdeMU 88.22<br />3 Edison F. Quintin MLQU 87.70<br />3 Lilian B. Hefti SBC 87.7<br />4 Abelardo T. Domondon AdU 87.45<br />5 Oscar Gerard C. Breva AdeMU 87.40<br />5 Ma. Victoria S. Rotor AdeMU 87.40<br />6 Buenaventura C. Go-Soco, Jr. DWU 86.65<br />7 Edward S. Serapio AdeMU 86.30<br />8 Leila M. De Lima-Bohol SBC 86.26<br />9 Fe D. Vivencio AdeMU 86.15<br />10 Ma. Elena G. Opinion USA 86.12<br />10 Mary Carolyn S. Que SBC 86.12<br /> <br /> 1986 <br />1 Laurence L. Go AdeMU 88.60<br />2 Armando S. Kho AdeMU 87.60<br />3 Solomon M. Hermosrura SBC 86.80<br />4 Jose Ismael Enrique C. Palma, Jr. AdeMU 86.60<br />5 Roberto a. Gana AdeMU 86.40<br />6 Andrea L. Si UNO-R 86.30<br />7 Bernardo V. Cabal AdeMU 86.30<br />8 Cresencio Fortunato R. Balsbas UP 86.15<br />9 Peter Donnely A. Barot UP 86.0<br />9 Andres Willhelm B. Camarista UI 86.00<br />10 Corazon G. Ferrer-Flores UST 85.75<br /> <br /> 1987 <br />1 Mario P. Victorino AdeMU 88.55<br />2 Rey D. Tancinco UP 87.65<br />3 Elmore O. Capule AdeMU 87.60<br />4 Miguel F. Gudio, Jr. SU 87.40<br />5 Mario M. Tavora AdeMU 87.35<br />6 Linus G. Abaquin AdeMU 87.15<br />7 Francisco M. Macalino AdeMU 86.80<br />8 Fernando C. Soriano AdeMU 86.60<br />9 Imelda A. Manguiat UP 86.10<br />10 Jose Ma. G. Hofileña AdeMU 86.05<br /> <br /> 1988 <br />1 Maria Yvette O. Navarro UP 88.12<br />2 Antonio M. Bernardo AdeMU 87.78<br />3 Ma. Jasmine S. Oporto UP 87.74<br />4 Ma. Valentina S. Santana UP 86.81<br />5 Hever M. Bascon, Jr. AdeMU 86.51<br />6 Ben Hur R. Olivas AdeMU 86.33<br />7 Cyril Regalado USA 86.325<br />8 Timoteo B. Aquino SBC 86.32<br />9 Rene V. Tria SBC 86.31<br />10 Silvina Q. Mamaril SLU 86.20<br /> <br /> 1989 <br />1 Gilberto Eduardo Gerardo C. Teodoro, Jr. UP 86.18<br />2 Meinrado Enrique A. Bello AdeMU 86.08<br />3 Antonio Gabriel M. La Viña UP 86.02<br />3 Ranulfo G. Mendoza SBC 86.02<br /><br />4 Persida V. Rueda UE 85.62<br />5 Thaddeus E. Venturaza AdeMU 85.53<br />6 Rowena L. Garcia SBC 85.20<br />7 Thaddeus R. Alvizo UP 85.14<br />8 Jalilo O. dela Torre USJ-R 85.10<br />9 Sinforoso R. Pagunsan AdeMU 85.09<br />10 Jefferson M. Marquez SBC 84.94<br /> <br /> 1990 <br />1 Aquilino L. Pimentel III UP 89.85<br />2 Augusto A. San Pedro, Jr. UP 89.35<br />3 Mylene Garcia-Albano AdeMU 88.95<br />4 Maximilian Joseph T. Uy UP 88.20<br />5 Marciano G. Delson SBC 87.95<br />6 Romeo Johann I. Fernandez AdeMU 87.75<br />7 Frederick G. Young AdeMU 87.60<br />8 Ruben C. Carranza UP 87.45<br />9 Fernando Y. Concepcion AdeMU 87.20<br />10 Reynaldo B. Robles FEU 87.10<br /> <br /> 1991 <br />1 Joseph P. San Pedro AdeMU 89.95<br />2 Maribeth A. Lipardo AdeMU 89.75<br />3 Joseph Ferdinand M. Dechavez SBC 87.97<br />4 Susan Pearl D. Villanueva UP 87.32<br />5 Gerardo June T. Buan SBC 87.10<br />6 Risel G. Castillo SBC 86.57<br />7 Gafar E. Lutian SBC 86.25<br />8 Angelo C. Perez AdeMU 85.97<br />9 Susan P. Cariaga UP 85.70<br />10 Antonio T. Kho, Jr. SBC 85.65<br /> <br /> 1992 <br />1 Jayme A. Sy, Jr. AdeMU 87.00<br />2 Gerard A. Mosquera AdeMU 86.30<br />3 Carina C. Laforteza UP 85.95<br />4 Joel Jude R. Mutia AdeMU 85.90<br />5 Angelique A. Santos AdeMU 85.70<br />6 Edilberto T. Castañeda UP 85.60<br />7 Michael G. Aguinaldo AdeMU 85.35<br />8 Imelda M. Abadilla SBC 84.75<br />8 Peter-Joey B. Usita SBC 84.75<br />8 Ma. Divina s. Andaya-Carandang LP 84.75<br />9 Angela P. Garia UNO-R 84.41<br />10 Priscilla B. Valer AdeMU 84.40<br /> <br /> 1993 <br />1 Anna Leah Fidelis T. Castañeda AdeMU 88.32<br />2 Crisostomo M. Akol SBC 87.30<br />3 Rosemari U. Griño AdeMU 86.82<br />4 Pablo John F. Garcia, Jr. UP 86.51<br />5 Ma. Josefina G. Se AdeMU 85.27<br />5 Patrick V. Santo UP 85.27<br />5 Nelson S. Victorino ArU 85.27<br />6 Andrew Michael s. Ong UP 85.25<br />7 Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr. UP 85.22<br />8 Rogelio J. Bondoc, Jr. AdeMU 84.90<br />9 Manuel P. Casiño SBC 84.55<br />10 Maria SocorroZ. Manguiat AdeMU 84.47<br /> <br /> 1994 <br />1 Francisco Noel R. Fernandez UP 89.20<br />2 Fernando C Sioson AdeMU 88.45<br />3 Gregorio V. Cabantac UP 87.90<br />4 Harrison M. Paltongan SBC 87.70<br />5 Marlon J. Manuel AdeMU 87.35<br />6 Caroline V. Henson AdeMU 87.25<br />7 Alan John B. Tantoco AdeMU 87.05<br />8 Joel G. Tinitigan AdeMU 86.75<br />9 Felix T. Sy, Jr. AdeMU 86.45<br />10 Arnel M. Santos AdeMU 86.10<br />10 Maria Paz Romana S. Angeles AdeMU 86.10<br /> <br /> 1995 <br />1 Leonor Y. Dicidican UP 91.20<br />2 Emmanuel Donato K. Guzman UP 89.20<br />3 Winston M. Ginez SBC 88.00<br />4 Abner C. Gener, Jr. UP 87.10<br />4 David Emmanuel B. Puyat UP 87.10<br />5 Carla E. Santamaria UST 87.05<br />6 Shennan A. Sy AdeMU 86.95<br />7 Gwen B. Grecia UP 86.75<br />8 Arnold F. de Vera UP 86.35<br />9 Maria Grace C. de Jesus UP 86.25<br />9 Jeanne Merced M. Macasaet UP 86.25<br />10 Lyssa Grace S. Pagano-Lubrica BCF 86.00<br /> <br /> 1996 <br />1 Patricia Ann T. Progalidad UP 90.60<br />2 Peter L. Pacheco AdeMU 90.50<br />3 Katherine Agnes MC Arnaldo AdeMU 90.35<br />4 Recaredo C. Borgonia, Jr. UP 89.65<br />5 Amante A. Liberato FEU 89.50<br />5 Herminigildo G. Mukarami, Jr. AdeMU 89.50<br />6 Shirley F. Alinea UP 89.45<br />7 Yasmin Suzette J. Tan UP 89.40<br />8 Rosalia S. Bartolome UP 89.30<br />9 Amor M. Datinguinoo UP 89.15<br />10 Edgar DL Bernal UP 89.00<br /> <br /> 1997 <br />1 Ma. Celia H. Fernandez UP 90.02<br />2 Mary Ann L. Villamor UP 89.40<br />3 Rhett Emmanuel C. Serfino MLQU 89.20<br />4 Ma. Trina Eliza K. Ngo AdeMU 89.15<br />5 Jose Raullito E. Paras SBC 88.82<br />6 Emmanuel S. Ypil AdeMU 88.07<br />7 Teodulfo Antonio G. San Juan UP 87.77<br />8 Philbert E. Varona AdeMU 87.55<br />9 Alleniery Allan V. Exclamador MSU 87.00<br />10 Ralph S. Sarmiento UStL 86.82<br /> <br /> 1998 <br />1 Janet B. Abuel BCF 91.80<br />2 Norma Margarita B. Patacsil UP 91.40<br />3 Maria Franchette M. Acosta UP 91.25<br />4 Benigno G. Par, Jr. UST 90.85<br />5 Andre C. Palacios UP 90.70<br />6 Kenneth L. Chua AdeMU 89.70<br />7 Aaron Philip B. Cruz AdeMU 89.65<br />8 Gregorio M. Perex\z USC 89.30<br />9 Margie P. Colinayo AdeMU 89.15<br />10 Ambrosio L. Cantada II AdeMU 89.10<br /> <br /> 1999 <br />1 Edwin R. Enrile AdeMU 88.50<br />1 Florin T. Ibay UP 88.50<br />2 Dara C. Acusar AdeMU 87.70<br />3 Francis Joseph H. Ampil AdeMU 87.20<br />4 Roel A. Refran AdeMU 86.90<br />5 Maritess B. Avila SBC 86.55<br />6 Randy T. Ceniza AdeDU 86.05<br />7 Karen B. Caparros UP 85.90<br />7 Lourdes C. Echavez-de Leon AdeMU 85.90<br />8 Riafe M. Cagas UP 85.75<br />9 Fritzie P. Tangkia UP 85.55<br />10 Grainoil U. Baysa-Pee AdeMU 85.50<br /> <br /> 2000 <br />1 Eliseo M. Zuñiga, Jr. UP 90.60<br />2 Arvin Dexter M. Lopoz AdeDU 90.55<br />3 Jean G. Pantaleon-Pallorina AdeMU 89.20<br />4 Rogelio G. Largo AdeDU 88.55<br />5 Joan D. Adci UP 88.40<br />6 Machael Felipe A. Mercado SBC 88.30<br />7 Valerie C. Feria UP 88.15<br />7 Princess Lou D. Managuelod UP 88.15<br />8 Prudence Angelita A. Kasala UST 87.85<br />9 Andrea Antonette A. Sese-Relucio AdeMU 87.80<br />10 Ma. Cristina T. Suralvo UP 87.45<br /> <br /> 2001 <br />1 Rodolfo Ma. A. Ponferrada UP 93.80<br />2 Jesus Paolo U. Protacio AdeMU 90.05<br />3 Anthony Mark A. Gutierrez AdeMU 89.85<br />4 Solomon F. Lumba UP 88.55<br />5 Katrina Diane Noelle C. Monsod AdeMU 88.50<br />6 Ma. Theresa U. Ballelos UP 88.40<br />7 Amabelle Grace G. Mascardo SU 88.35<br />8 Adonis V. Gabriel SBC 88.25<br />9 John Noah M. Red AdeMU 88.10<br />10 Dante R. Bravo SBC 87.95<br /> <br /> 2002 <br />1 Arlene M. Maneja UST 92.90<br />2 Connie G. Chu AdeMU 90.40<br />3 Eric R. Recalde SBC 90.30<br />4 Ma. Ngina Teresa V. Chan-Gonzaga AdeMU 89.80<br />4 Michelle Ann U Juan AdeMU 89.80<br />5 Dorothy A. Uy AdeMU 89.50<br />6 Maria Gracia R. GAmez UP 89.40<br />7 Joel Emerson J. Gregorio AdeMU 89.10<br />8 Rex S. Austria SBC 89.05<br />9 George O. Ortha II SBC 89.00<br />10 Joseph Lyle K. Sarmiento AdeMU 88.75<br /> <br /> 2003 <br />1 Aeneas Eli S. Diaz AdeMU 88.53<br />2 Harvey Lawrence N. Dychiao AdeMU 87.58<br />3 Saben C. Loyola SBC 87.29<br />4 Mark Oliver M. Karaan SBC 85.35<br />5 Sabrina Kate D. Paner AdeMU 85.17<br />6 Dorothy B. Dizon AdeMU 85.12<br />7 Mani Thess Q. Peña UP 85.06<br />8 Melissa Romana P. Suarez AdeDU 85.00<br />9 Henry M. Francisco SBC 84.82<br />10 Jose C. Evan BiC 84.64<br /> <br /> 2004 <br />1 January Sanchez UP 87.45<br />2 Ronald P. De Vera UP 86.95 <br />3 Charlito Martin R. Mendoza SBC 86.75 <br />4 Ma. Cristina C. Larrobis USC 86.30 <br />5 Efren Vincent M. Dizon SBC 86.10 <br />6 Michael Geronimo G. Martin AdMU 86.05 <br /> Maria Melissa G. Tan SBC 85.55 <br />7 Joseph Joemer C. Perez UP 85.45 <br />8 Neil Simon S. Silva UP 85.40 <br />9 Ma. Melissa D. Jamero USC 85.30 <br />10 Ronald P. De Vera UP 86.95 <br /> <br /> 2005 <br />1 Joan de Venecia UP <br />2 Jomini C. Nazareno AdMU 86.40 <br />3 Sheryl May B. Tanquilut AdMU 85.95 <br />4 Nyerson Dexter Tito Q. Tualla MLQU 85.45 <br />5 Tamsin Rae N. Lucila UP 85.35 <br />6 Gladys V. Gervacio UPHR 85.30 <br />7 Claudine B. Orocio-Isorena UP 85.20 <br />8 Pedro Jose F. Bernardo AdMU 85.05 <br />9 Dexter B. Calizar PLS 84.70 <br />10 Johnson A.H. Ong FEU 84.65 <br /> <br /> 2006 <br />1 Noel Neil Q. Malimban UC 87.60<br />2 Deborah S. Acosta UP 87.40<br />2 Ricardo M. Ilares III AdeMU 87.40<br />3 Erika Ana Andrea C. Jimenez AdeMU 86.60<br />4 Maria Charizza B. Carlos AdeMU 86.10<br />5 Gina Lyn R. Rubio FEU 85.75<br />6 Anjuli Larla A. Tan DVOREFI 85.70<br />7 Karen H. Gaviola USC 85.68<br />8 Al-shwaid L. Ismael UC 85.65<br />9 Timothy Joseph M. Mendoza UP 85.55<br />10 Alain Charles J. Veloso UP 85.50<br /> <br /> 2007 <br />1 Mercedita L. Ona AdeMU 83.55<br />2 Jennifer T. Ong UP 83.35<br />3 Yvanna DL. Maalat AdeMU 82.75<br />4 Jennie C. Aclan USC 82.10<br />5 John Michael S. Galauran UNC 81.60<br />6 Karen S. Canullas SSC 81.40<br />7 Sheryl Ann D. Tizon UP 81.35<br />7 Cecille L. Mejia AdeMU 81.35<br />8 Marforth T. Fua SBC 81.20<br />9 Ruby M. Luy AdeDU 81.15<br />10 Christian B. Llido UC 80.90<br />10 Vivian S. Tan UP 80.90<br /> <br /> 2008 <br />1 Judy Lardizabal SSC <br />2 Mylene Amerol Macumbal MSU 85.65<br />3 Oliver Baclay Jr. AdMU 85.50<br />4 Majesty Eve Jala AdMU 85.55<br />5 Mari Elizabeth Liceralde UP 85.40<br />6 Michael Macapagal UP 84.15<br />7 Denise Dy AdMU 84.00<br />7 April Love Regis AdMU 84.00<br />8 Christine Joy Tan AdMU 83.80<br />9 Jihan Jacob SBC 83.75<br />9 Shirley Velasquez UP 83.75<br />10 Vanessa Raymundo SBC 83.70Elmer Brabantehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17569454269621923153noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3490533786910594568.post-82700764224727704452009-09-06T23:38:00.001-07:002009-09-06T23:38:48.976-07:00Bar Exams 2009: Political and International LawPART I<br /><br />I<br /><br />TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement is false. Explain your answer in not more than two (2) sentences. (5%)<br /><br />[a] A law making “Bayan Ko” the new national anthem of the Philippines, in lieu of “Lupang Hinirang,” is constitutional.<br /><br />[b] Under the archipelago doctrine, the waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago form part of the territorial sea of the archipelagic state.<br /><br />[c] A law that makes military service for women merely voluntary is constitutional.<br /><br />[d] A law fixing the passing grade in the Bar examinations at 70%, with no grade lower than 40% in any subject, is constitutional.<br /><br />[e] An educational institution 100% foreign-owned may be validly established in the Philippines.<br /><br />II<br /><br />Despite lingering questions about his Filipino citizenship and his one-year residence in the district, Gabriel filed his certificate of candidacy for congressman before the deadline set by law. His opponent, Vito, hires you as lawyer to contest Gabriel’s candidacy.<br /><br />[a] Before election day, what action or actions will you institute against Gabriel, and before which court, commission or tribunal will you file such action/s? Reasons. (2%)<br /><br />[b] If, during the pendency of such action/s but before election day, Gabriel withdraws his certificate of candidacy, can he be substituted as candidate? If so, by whom and why? If not, why not? (2%)<br /><br />[c] If the action/s instituted should be dismissed with finality before the election, and Gabriel assumes office after being proclaimed the winner in the election, can the issue of his candidacy and/or citizenship and residence still be questioned? If so, what action or actions may be filed and where? If not, why not? (2%)<br /><br />III<br /><br />The Municipality of Bulalakaw, Leyte, passed Ordinance No. 1234, authorizing the expropriation of two parcels of land situated in the poblacion as the site of a freedom park, and appropriating the funds needed therefor. Upon review, the |Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Leyte disapproved the ordinance because the municipality has an existing freedom park which, though smaller in size, is still suitable for the purpose, and to pursue expropriation would be needless expenditure of the people’s money. Is the disapproval of the ordinance correct? Explain your answer. (2%)<br /><br />IV<br /><br />The Municipality of Pinatukdao is sued for damages arising from injuries sustained by a pedestrian who was hit by a glass pane that fell from a dilapidated window frame of the municipal hall. The municipality files a motion to dismiss the complaint, invoking state immunity from suit. Resolve the motion with reasons. (3%)<br /><br />V<br /><br />To address the pervasive problem of gambling, Congress is considering the following options: (1) prohibit all forms of gambling; (2) allow gambling only on Sundays; (3) allow gambling only in government-owned casinos; and (4) remove all prohibitions against gambling but impose a tax equivalent to 30% on all winnings.<br /><br />[a] If Congress chooses the first option and passes the corresponding law absolutely prohibiting all forms of gambling, can the law be validly attacked on the ground that it is an invalid exercise of police power? Explain your answer. (2%)<br /><br />[b] If Congress chooses the last option and passes the corresponding law imposing a 30% tax on all winnings and prizes won from gambling, would the law comply with the constitutional limitations on the exercise of the power of taxation? Explain your answer. (2%)<br /><br />VI<br /><br />In a criminal prosecution for murder, the prosecution presented, as witness, an employee of the Manila Hotel who produced in court a videotape recording showing the heated exchange between the accused and the victim that took place at the lobby of the hotel barely 30 minutes before the killing. The accused objects to the admission of the videotape recording on the ground that it was taken without his knowledge or consent, in violation of his right to privacy and the Anti-Wire Tapping law. Resolve the objection with reasons. (3%)<br /><br />VII<br /><br />Crack agents of the Manila Police Anti-Narcotics Unit were on surveillance of a cemetery where the sale and use of prohibited drugs were rumored to be rampant. The team saw a man with reddish and glassy eyes walking unsteadily towards them, but he immediately veered away upon seeing the policemen. The team approached the man, introduced themselves as peace officers, then asked what he had in his clenched fist. Because the man refused to answer, a policeman pried the fist open and saw a plastic sachet filled with crystalline substance. The team then took the man into custody and submitted the contents of the sachet to forensic examination. The crystalline substance in the sachet turned out to be shabu. The man was accordingly charged in court.<br /><br />During the trial, the accused:<br /><br />[a] challenged the validity of his arrest; (2%) and<br /><br />[b] objected to the admission in evidence of the prohibited drug, claiming that it was obtained in an illegal search and seizure. (2%)<br /><br />Decide with reasons.<br /><br />VIII<br /><br />Congressman Nonoy delivered a privilege speech charging the Intercontinental Universal Bank (IUB) with the sale of unregistered foreign securities, in violation of R.A. 8799. He then filed, and the House of Representatives unanimously approved, a Resolution directing the House Committee on Good Government (HCGG) to conduct an inquiry on the matter, in aid of legislation, in order to prevent the recurrence of any similar fraudulent activity.<br /><br />The HCGG immediately scheduled a hearing and invited the responsible officials of IUB, the Chairman and Commissioners of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). On the date set for the hearing, only the SEC Commissioners appeared, prompting Congressman Nonoy to move for the issuance of the appropriate subpoena ad testificandum to compel the attendance of the invited resource persons.<br /><br />The IUB officials filed suit to prohibit HCGG from proceeding with the inquiry and to quash the subpoena, raising the following arguments:<br /><br />[a] The subject of the legislative investigation is also the subject of criminal and civil actions pending before the courts and the prosecutor’s office; thus, the legislative inquiry would preempt judicial action; (3%) and<br /><br />[b] Compelling the IUB officials, who are also respondents in the criminal and civil cases in court, to testify at the inquiry would violate their constitutional right against self-incrimination. (3%)<br /><br />Are the foregoing arguments tenable? Reasons.<br /><br />[c] May the Governor of the BSP validly invoke executive privilege and, thus, refuse to attend the legislative inquiry? Why or why not? (3%)<br /><br />IX<br /><br />Warlito, a natural-born Filipino, took up permanent residence in the United States, and eventually acquired American citizenship. He then married Shirley, an American, and sired three children. In August 2009, Warlito decided to visit the Philippines with his wife and children: Johnny, 23 years of age; Warlito, Jr., 20; and Luisa, 17.<br /><br />While in the Philippines, a friend informed him that he could reacquire Philippine citizenship without necessarily losing U.S. nationality. Thus, he took the oath of allegiance required under R.A. 9225.<br /><br />[a] Having reacquired Philippine citizenship, is Warlito a natural-born or a naturalized Filipino citizen today? Explain your answer. (3%)<br /><br />[b] With Warlito having regained Philippine citizenship, will Shirley also become a Filipino citizen? If so, why? If not, what would be the most speedy procedure for Shirley to acquire Philippine citizenship? Explain. (3%)<br /><br />[c] Do the children — Johnny, Warlito Jr., and Luisa — become Filipino citizens with their father’s reacquisition of Philippine citizenship? Explain your answer. (3%)<br /><br />X<br /><br />Maximino, an employee of the Department of Education, is administratively charged with dishonesty and gross misconduct. During the formal investigation of the charges, the Secretary of Education preventively suspended him for a period of sixty (60) days. On the 60th day of the preventive suspension, the Secretary rendered a verdict, finding Maximino guilty, and ordered his immediate dismissal from the service.<br /><br />Maximino appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which affirmed the Secretary’s decision. Maximino then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA reversed the CSC decision, exonerating Maximino. The Secretary of Education then petitions the Supreme Court (SC) for the review of the CA decision.<br /><br />[a] Is the Secretary of Education a proper party to seek the review of the CA decision exonerating Maximino? Reasons. (2%)<br /><br />[b] If the SC affirms the CA decision, is Maximino entitled to recover back salaries corresponding to the entire period he was out of the service? Explain your answer. (3%)<br /><br />*** END OF PART I ***<br /><br />PART II<br /><br />XI<br /><br />TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement is false. Explain your answer in not more than two (2) sentences. (5%)<br /><br />[a] Aliens are absolutely prohibited from owning private lands in the Philippines.<br /><br />[b] A de facto public officer is, by right, entitled to receive the salaries and emoluments attached to the public office he holds.<br /><br />[c] The President exercises the power of control over all executive departments and agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations.<br /><br />[d] Decisions of the Ombudsman imposing penalties in administrative disciplinary cases are merely recommendatory.<br /><br />[e] Dual citizenship is not the same as dual allegiance.<br /><br />XII<br /><br />William, a private American citizen, a university graduate and frequent visitor to the Philippines, was inside the U.S. embassy when he got into a heated argument with a private Filipino citizen. Then, in front of many shocked witnesses, he killed the person he was arguing with. The police came, and brought him to the nearest police station. Upon reaching the station, the police investigator, in halting English, informed William of his Miranda rights, and assigned him an independent local counsel. William refused the services of the lawyer, and insisted that he be assisted by a Filipino lawyer currently based in the U.S. The request was denied, and the counsel assigned by the police stayed for the duration of the investigation.<br /><br />William protested his arrest.<br /><br />[a] He argued that since the incident took place inside the U.S. embassy, Philippine courts have no jurisdiction because the U.S. embassy grounds are not part of Philippine territory; thus, technically, no crime under Philippine law was committed. Is William correct? Explain your answer. (3%)<br /><br />[b] He also claimed that his Miranda rights were violated because he was not given the lawyer of his choice; that being an American, he should have been informed of his rights in proper English; and that he should have been informed of his rights as soon as he was taken into custody, not when he was already at the police station. Was William denied his Miranda rights? Why or why not? (3%)<br /><br />[c] If William applies for bail, claiming that he is entitled thereto under the “international standard of justice” and that he comes from a U.S. State that has outlawed capital punishment, should William be granted bail as a matter of right? Reasons. (3%)<br /><br />XIII<br /><br />A terrorist group called the Emerald Brigade is based in the State of Asyaland. The government of Asyaland does not support the terrorist group, but being a poor country, is powerless to stop it.<br /><br />The Emerald Brigade launched an attack on the Philippines, firing two missiles that killed thousands of Filipinos. It then warned that more attacks were forthcoming. Through diplomatic channels, the Philippines demanded that Asyaland stop the Emerald Brigade; otherwise, it will do whatever is necessary to defend itself.<br /><br />Receiving reliable intelligence reports of another imminent attack by the Emerald Brigade, and it appearing that Asyaland was incapable of preventing the assault, the Philippines sent a crack commando team to Asyaland. The team stayed only for a few hours in Asyaland, succeeded in killing the leaders and most of the members of the Emerald Brigade, then immediately returned to the Philippines.<br /><br />[a] Was the Philippine action justified under the international law principle of “self-defense”? Explain your answer. (3%)<br /><br />[b] As a consequence of the foregoing incident, Asyaland charges the Philippines with violation of Article 2.4 of the United Nations Charter that prohibits “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.” The Philippines counters that its commando team neither took any territory nor interfered in the political processes of Asyaland. Which contention is correct? Reasons. (3%)<br /><br />[c] Assume that the commando team captured a member of the Emerald Brigade and brought him back to the Philippines. The Philippine Government insists that a special international tribunal should try the terrorist. On the other hand, the terrorist argues that terrorism is not an international crime and, therefore, the municipal laws of the Philippines, which recognize access of the accused to constitutional rights, should apply. Decide with reasons. (3%)<br /><br />XIV<br /><br />The Philippine Government is negotiating a new security treaty with the United States which could involve engagement in joint military operations of the two countries’ armed forces. A loose organization of Filipinos, the Kabataan at Matatandang Makabansa (KMM) wrote the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Department of National Defense (DND) demanding disclosure of the details of the negotiations, as well as copies of the minutes of the meetings. The DFA and the DND refused, contending that premature disclosure of the offers and counter-offers between the parties could jeopardize on-going negotiations with another country. KMM filed suit to compel disclosure of the negotiation details, and be granted access to the records of the meetings, invoking the constitutional right of the people to information on matters of public concern.<br /><br />[a] Decide with reasons. (3%)<br /><br />[b] Will your answer be the same if the information sought by KMM pertains to contracts entered into by the Government in its proprietary or commercial capacity? Why or why not? (3%)<br /><br />XV<br /><br />The KKK Television Network (KKK-TV) aired the documentary, “Case Law: How the Supreme Court Decides,” without obtaining the necessary permit required by P.D. 1986. Consequently, the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) suspended the airing of KKK-TV programs. MTRCB declared that under P.D. 1986, it has the power of prior review over all television programs, except “newsreels” and programs “by the Government”, and the subject documentary does not fall under either of these two classes. The suspension order was ostensibly based on Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 which grants MTRCB the authority to issue such an order.<br /><br />KKK-TV filed a certiorari petition in court, raising the following issues:<br /><br />[a] The act of MTRCB constitutes “prior restraint” and violates the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression; (3%) and<br /><br />[b] While Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was issued and published in a newspaper of general circulation, a copy thereof was never filed with the Office of the National Register of the University of the Philippines Law Center. (2%)<br /><br />Resolve the foregoing issues, with reasons.<br /><br />XVI<br /><br />[a] Angelina, a married woman, is a Division Chief in the Department of Science and Technology. She had been living with a married man, not her husband, for the last fifteen (15) years. Administratively charged with immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, she admits her live-in arrangement, but maintains that this conjugal understanding is in conformity with their religious beliefs. As members of the religious sect, Yahweh’s Observers, they had executed a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness which has been confirmed and blessed by their Council of Elders. At the formal investigation of the administrative case, the Grand Elder of the sect affirmed Angelina’s testimony and attested to the sincerity of Angelina and her partner in the profession of their faith. If you were to judge this case, will you exonerate Angelina? Reasons. (3%)<br /><br />[b] Meanwhile, Jenny, also a member of Yahweh’s Observers, was severely disappointed at the manner the Grand Elder validated what she considered was an obviously immoral conjugal arrangement between Angelina and her partner. Jenny filed suit in court, seeking the removal of the Grand Elder from the religious sect on the ground that his act in supporting Angelina not only ruined the reputation of their religion, but also violated the constitutional policy upholding the sanctity of marriage and the solidarity of the family. Will Jenny’s case prosper? Explain your answer. (2%)<br /><br />XVII<br /><br />Filipinas Computer Corporation (FCC), a local manufacturer of computers and computer parts, owns a sprawling plant in a 5,000-square meter lot in Pasig City. To remedy the city’s acute housing shortage, compounded by a burgeoning population, the Sangguniang Panglungsod authorized the City Mayor to negotiate for the purchase of the lot. The Sanggunian intends to subdivide the property into small residential lots to be distributed at cost to qualified city residents. But FCC refused to sell the lot. Hard pressed to find a suitable property to house its homeless residents, the City filed a complaint for eminent domain against FCC.<br /><br />[a] If FCC hires you as lawyer, what defense or defenses would you set up in order to resist the expropriation of the property? Explain. (5%)<br /><br />[b] If the Court grants the City’s prayer for expropriation, but the City delays payment of the amount determined by the court as just compensation, can FCC recover the property from Pasig City? Explain. (2%)<br /><br />[c] Suppose the expropriation succeeds, but the City decides to abandon its plan to subdivide the property for residential purposes having found a much bigger lot, can FCC legally demand that it be allowed to repurchase the property from the City of Pasig? Why or why not? (2%)<br /><br />XVIII<br /><br />What are the essential elements of a valid petition for a people’s initiative to amend the 1987 Constitution? Discuss. (2%)Elmer Brabantehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17569454269621923153noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3490533786910594568.post-38958855759528376752009-09-06T23:36:00.000-07:002009-09-06T23:37:51.429-07:00Bar Exams 2009: Labor and Social LegislationPART I<br /><br />I<br /><br />TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement is false. Explain your answer in not more than two (2) sentences. (5%)<br /><br />[a] An employment contract prohibiting employment in a competing company within one year from separation is valid.<br /><br />[b] All confidential employees are disqualified to unionize for the purpose of collective bargaining.<br /><br />[c] A runaway shop is an act constituting unfair labor practice.<br /><br />[d] In the law on labor relations, the substitutionary doctrine prohibits a new collective bargaining agent from repudiating an existing collective bargaining agreement.<br /><br />[e] The visitorial and enforcement powers of the DOLE Regional Director to order and enforce compliance with labor standard laws can be exercised even when the individual claim exceeds P5,000.00.<br /><br />II<br /><br />[a] Enumerate at least four (4) policies enshrined in Section 3, Article XIII of the Constitution that are not covered by Article 3 of the Labor Code on declaration of basic policy. (2%)<br /><br />[b] Clarito, an employee of Juan, was dismissed for allegedly stealing Juan’s wristwatch. In the illegal dismissal case instituted by Clarito, the Labor Arbiter, citing Article 4 of the Labor Code, ruled in favor of Clarito upon finding Juan’s testimony doubtful. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter holding that Article 4 applies only when the doubt involves “implementation and interpretation” of the Labor Code provisions. The NLRC explained that the doubt may not necessarily be resolved in favor of labor since this case involves the application of the Rules onEvidence, not the Labor Code. Is the NLRC correct? Reasons. (3%)<br /><br />III<br /><br />Richie, a driver-mechanic, was recruited by Supreme Recruiters (SR) and its principal, Mideast Recruitment Agency (MRA), to work in Qatar for a period of two (2) years. However, soon after the contract was approved by POEA, MRA advised SR to forego Richie’s deployment because it had already hired another Filipino driver-mechanic, who had just completed his contract in Qatar. Aggrieved, Richie filed with the NLRC a complaint against SR and MRA for damages corresponding to his two years’ salary under the POEA-approved contract.<br /><br />SR and MRA traversed Richie’s complaint, raising the following arguments:<br /><br />[a] The Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the case; (2%)<br /><br />[b] Because Richie was not able to leave for Qatar, no employer-employee relationship was established between them; (2%) and<br /><br />[c] Even assuming that they are liable, their liability would, at most, be equivalent to Richie’s salary for only six (6) months, not two years. (3%).<br /><br />Rule on the validity of the foregoing arguments with reasons.<br /><br />IV<br /><br />Diosdado, a carpenter, was hired by Building Industries Corporation (BIC), and assigned to build a small house in Alabang. His contract of employment specifically referred to him as a “project employee,” although it did not provide any particular date of completion of the project.<br /><br />Is the completion of the house a valid cause for the termination of Diosdado’s employment? If so, what are the due process requirements that the BIC must satisfy? If not, why not? (3%)<br /><br />V<br /><br />[a] Baldo was dismissed from employment for having beenabsent without leave (AWOL) for eight (8) months. It turned outthat the reason for his absence was his incarceration after he was mistaken as his neighbor’s killer. Eventually acquitted and released from jail, Baldo returned to his employer and demanded reinstatement and full backwages. Is Baldo entitled to reinstatement and backwages? Explain your answer. (3%)<br /><br />[b] Domingo, a bus conductor of San Juan Transportation Company, intentionally did not issue a ticket to a female passenger, Kim, his long-time crush. As a result, Domingo was dismissed from employment for fraud or willful breach of trust. Domingo contests his dismissal, claiming that he is not a confidential employee and, therefore, cannot be dismissed from the service for breach of trust. Is Domingo correct? Reasons. (2%)<br /><br />VI<br /><br />Albert, a 40-year old employer, asked his domestic helper, Inday, to give him a private massage. When Inday refused, Albert showed her Article 141 of the Labor Code, which says that one of the duties of a domestic helper is to minister to the employer’s personal comfort and convenience.<br /><br />[a] Is Inday’s refusal tenable? Explain. (3%)<br /><br />[b] Distinguish briefly, but clearly, a “househelper” from a “homeworker.” (2%)<br /><br />VII<br /><br />Johnny is the duly elected President and principal union organizer of the Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Manila Restaurant (NMMR), a legitimate labor organization. He was unceremoniously dismissed by management for spending virtually 95% of his working hours in union activities. On the same day Johnny received the notice of termination, the labor union went on strike.<br /><br />Management filed an action to declare the strike illegal, contending that:<br /><br />[a] The union did not observe the “cooling-off period” mandated by the Labor Code; (2%) and<br /><br />[b] The union went on strike without complying with the strike-vote requirement under the Labor Code. (2%)<br /><br />Rule on the foregoing contentions with reasons.<br /><br />[c] The Labor Arbiter found management guilty of unfair labor practice for the unlawful dismissal of Johnny. The decision became final. Thereafter, the NMMR filed a criminal case against the Manager of Manila Restaurant. Would the Labor Arbiter’s finding be sufficient to secure the Manager’s conviction? Why or why not? (2%)<br /><br />VIII<br /><br />Alexander, a security guard of Jaguar Security Agency (JSA), could not be given any assignment because no client would accept him. He had a face only a mother could love. After six (6) months of being on “floating” status, Alexander sued JSA for constructive dismissal. The Labor Arbiter upheld Alexander’s claim of constructive dismissal and ordered JSA to immediately reinstate Alexander. JSA appealed the decision to the NLRC. Alexander sought immediate enforcement of the reinstatement order while the appeal was pending.<br /><br />JSA hires you as lawyer, and seeks your advice on the following:<br /><br />[a] Because JSA has no client who would accept Alexander, can it still be compelled to reinstate him pending appeal even if it has posted an appeal bond? (2%)<br /><br />[b] Can the order of reinstatement be immediately enforced in the absence of a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution? (2%)<br /><br />[c] If the order of reinstatement is being enforced, what should JSA do in order to prevent reinstatement? (2%)<br /><br />Explain your answers.<br /><br />IX<br /><br />[a] What is wage distortion? Can a labor union invoke wage distortion as a valid ground to go on strike? Explain. (2%)<br /><br />[b] What procedural remedies are open to workers who seek correction of wage distortion? (2%)<br /><br />X<br /><br />[a] State briefly the compulsory coverage of the Government Service Insurance Act. (2%)<br /><br />[b] Can a member of a cooperative be deemed an employee for purposes of compulsory coverage under the Social Security Act? Explain. (2%)<br /><br />*** END OF PART I ***<br /><br /> <br /><br />PART II<br /><br />XI<br /><br />TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement is false. Explain your answer in not more than two (2) sentences. (5%)<br /><br />[a] Seafarers who have worked for twenty (20) years on board the same vessel are regular employees.<br /><br />[b] Employment of children below fifteen (15) years of age in any public or private establishment is absolutely prohibited.<br /><br />[c] Government employees have the right to organize and join concerted mass actions without incurring administrative liability.<br /><br />[d] A waiver of the right to claim overtime pay is contrary to law.<br /><br />[e] Agency fees cannot be collected from a non-union member in the absence of a written authorization signed by the worker concerned.<br /><br />XII<br /><br />In her State of the Nation Address, the President stressed the need to provide an investor-friendly business environment so that the country can compete in the global economy that now suffers from a crisis bordering on recession. Responding to the call, Congress passed two innovative legislative measures, namely: (1) a law abolishing the security of tenure clause in the Labor Code; and (2) a law allowing contractualization in all areas needed in the employer’s business operations. However, to soften the impact of these new measures, the law requires that all employers shall obtain mandatory unemployment insurance coverage for all their employees.<br /><br />The constitutionality of the two (2) laws is challenged in court. As judge, how will you rule? (5%)<br /><br />XIII<br /><br />Atty. Renan, a CPA-lawyer and Managing Partner of an accounting firm, conducted the orientation seminar for newly-hired employees of the firm, among them, Miss Maganda. After the seminar, Renan requested Maganda to stay, purportedly to discuss<br /><br />some work assignment. Left alone in the training room, Renan asked Maganda to go out with him for dinner and ballroom dancing. Thereafter, he persuaded her to accompany him to the mountain highway in Antipolo for sight-seeing. During all these, Renan told Maganda that most, if not all, of the lady supervisors in the firm are where they are now, in very productive and lucrative posts, because of his favorable endorsement.<br /><br /> <br /><br />[a] Did Renan commit acts of sexual harassment in a work- related or employment environment? Reasons. (3%)<br /><br />[b] The lady supervisors in the firm, slighted by Renan’s revelations about them, succeeded in having him expelled from the firm. Renan then filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC an illegal dismissal case with claims for damages against the firm. Will the case prosper? Reasons. (2%)<br /><br />XIV<br /><br />Jolli-Mac Restaurant Company (Jolli-Mac) owns and operates the largest food chain in the country. It engaged Matiyaga Manpower Services, Inc. (MMSI), a job contractor registered with the Department of Labor and Employment, to provide its restaurants the necessary personnel, consisting of cashiers, motorcycle delivery boys and food servers, in its operations. The Service Agreement warrants, among others, that MMSI has a paid- up capital of P2,000,000.00; that it would train and determine the qualification and fitness of all personnel to be assigned to Jolli- Mac; that it would provide these personnel with proper Jolli-Mac uniforms; and that it is exclusively responsible to these personnel for their respective salaries and all other mandatory statutory benefits.<br /><br />After the contract was signed, it was revealed, based on research conducted, that MMSI had no other clients except Jolli- Mac, and one of its major owners was a member of the Board of Directors of Jolli-Mac.<br /><br />[a] Is the Service Agreement between Jolli-Mac and MMSI legal and valid? Why or why not? (3%)<br /><br />[b] If the cashiers, delivery boys and food servers are not paid their lawful salaries, including overtime pay, holiday pay, 13th<br /><br />month pay, and service incentive leave pay, against whom may these workers file their claims? Explain. (2%)<br /><br />XV<br /><br />Among the 400 regular rank-and-file workers of MNO Company, a certification election was ordered conducted by the Med-Arbiter of the Region. The contending parties obtained the following votes:<br /><br />1. Union A – 70<br /><br />2. Union B – 71<br /><br />3. Union C – 42<br /><br />4. Union D – 33<br /><br />5. No union – 180<br /><br />6. Spoiled votes – 4<br /><br />There were no objections or challenges raised by any party on the results of the election.<br /><br />[a] Can Union B be certified as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent among the rank-and-file workers of MNO Company considering that it garnered the highest number of votes among the contending unions? Why or why not? (3%)<br /><br />[b] May the management or lawyer of MNO Company legally ask for the absolute termination of the certification election proceedings because 180 of the workers — a clear plurality of the voters — have chosen not to be represented by any union? Reasons. (3%)<br /><br />[c] If you were the duly designated election officer in this case, what would you do to effectively achieve the purpose of certification election proceedings? Discuss. (3%)<br /><br />XVI<br /><br />The Company and Triple-X Union, the certified bargaining agent of rank-and-file employees, entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) effective for the period January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2007.<br /><br />For the 4th and 5th years of the CBA, the significant<br /><br />improvements in wages and other benefits obtained by the Union were:<br /><br />1) Salary increases of P1,000 and P1,200 monthly, effective January 1, 2006 and January 1, 2007, respectively;<br /><br />2) Vacation Leave and Sick Leave were adjusted from 12 days to 15 days annually for each employee;<br /><br />3) Medical subsidy of P3,000 per year for the purchase of medicines and hospitalization assistance of P10,000 per year for actual hospital confinement;<br /><br />4) Rice Subsidy of P600 per month, provided the employee has worked for at least 20 days within the particular month; and<br /><br />5) Birthday Leave with Pay and Birthday Gift of P1,500.<br /><br />As early as October 2007, the Company and the Union started negotiations to renew the CBA. Despite mutual good faith and earnest efforts, they could not agree. However, no union filed a petition for certification election during the freedom period. On March 30, 2008, no CBA had been concluded. Management learned that the Union would declare a bargaining deadlock on the next scheduled bargaining meeting.<br /><br />As expected, on April 3, 2008, the Union declared a deadlock. In the afternoon of the same day, management issued a formal announcement in writing, posted on the bulletin board, that due to the CBA expiration on December 31, 2007, all fringe benefits contained therein are considered withdrawn and can no longer be implemented, effective immediately.<br /><br />[a] When was the “freedom period” referred to in the foregoing narration of facts? Explain. (2%)<br /><br />[b] After April 3, 2008, will a petition for certification election filed by another legitimate labor union representing the rank-and-file employees legally prosper? Reasons. (3%)<br /><br />[c] Is management’s withdrawal of the fringe benefits valid?<br /><br />Reasons. (2%)<br /><br />[d] If you were the lawyer for the union, what legal recourse<br /><br />or action would you advise? Reasons. (3%)<br /><br />XVII<br /><br />Alfredo was dismissed by management for serious misconduct. He filed suit for illegal dismissal, alleging that although there may be just cause, he was not afforded due process by management prior to his termination. He demands reinstatement with full backwages.<br /><br />[a] What are the twin requirements of due process which the employer must observe in terminating or dismissing an employee? Explain. (3%)<br /><br />[b] Is Alfredo entitled to reinstatement and full backwages? Why or why not? (3%)<br /><br />XVIII<br /><br />[a] Cite four (4) instances when an illegally dismissed employee may be awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. (3%)<br /><br />[b] Explain the impact of the union security clause to the employees’ right to security of tenure. (2%)<br /><br />-NOTHING FOLLOWS-Elmer Brabantehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17569454269621923153noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3490533786910594568.post-18320002505084458982009-09-01T18:38:00.000-07:002009-09-01T20:10:13.361-07:00Heroic, Statemanly<a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_-6S970EQqtw/Sp3gryZg9rI/AAAAAAAACZA/4OWvZzwi5ds/s1600-h/mar.bmp"><img style="float:right; margin:0 0 10px 10px;cursor:pointer; cursor:hand;width: 200px; height: 278px;" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_-6S970EQqtw/Sp3gryZg9rI/AAAAAAAACZA/4OWvZzwi5ds/s320/mar.bmp" border="0" alt=""id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5376700573018027698" /></a><br />Brilliant. Heroic. Statemanly. A true leader. <br /><br />Last night, Senator Mar Roxas unexpectedly issued his decision to abandon his political ambition of running for President in next year’s elections. He said before the press that he was extending all his support for Noynoy Aquino to be the standard-bearer of the Liberal Party (LP’s). His statement was surprising, considering his and LP’s massive campaign beginning 2007 to clinch the political leadership in the country. <br /><br />Who would have thought Mar Roxas would do such heoric, statemanly act? Forgoing with an ardent ambition at least for the time being in all certain terms is not an easy decision to make, considering that millions of pesos had already been spent on informercials and the campaign network has been continually growing. Especially in these political times of greed for power, the path that Mar took is the road less traveled, albeit arguably the road all must lead. Unless of course one was born of the garcic type of politician, no gloric runner would simply concede to a darkhorse probable candidate. Seen from that gloric-garcic perspective, that would be a political suicide. Said in another way, no hungry wolf already served with a bounty would eventually turn around and retreat to the forest. Well, Mar Roxas is no wolf, and definitely no gloric nor garcic kind. Mar Roxas, by last night’s standards, is his father’s son. And am not only referring to his father, the late esteemed Senator Gerry Roxas. He is who every Manuel Roxas, Benigno Aquino, Jr., Claro M. Recto, Lorenzo Tañada, Jose Diokno, Raul Roco and Jovito Salonga should be proud of. The one that every Juan dela Cruz and Jocelynang Baliwag should emulate.<br /><br />Although he was in my short shortlist of rightful next President of the Republic of the Philippines, Mar Roxas has never been my top favorite for the Chief Executive. I confess, my fixation has been to put a nationalist, competent, morally upright, no-nonsense lawyer to Malacañang, to lead this graft-laden, morally degenerating government. I thought Mar Roxas might be consistent in his pro-Filipino approach to economic progress but I was looking for that x-factor that my biased cerebrum poked only on law school trained executives. (Well, there had been and still are bad lawyers in Malacañang - just look behind the sitting "president" and you’d know who I mean.) <br /><br />But last night dawned on us once again the kind of leader this country should have. Mar’s act is what I conceive to be part of the moral revolution that our country needs. I hasten to equate this Mar phenomenon as just an offshoot nor hangover of the Cory passing. If it is, doing such heroic act is a tall imperative order to follow the lead of Cory and continue her legacy. I’d like to think that if one Mar Roxas is capable of making sacrifice for loftier reasons, then everyone can as well. And they, we, all should. It is high time that selfless service to country, to the people and to God take primordial priority over personal ambition.Elmer Brabantehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17569454269621923153noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3490533786910594568.post-88684602712960289632009-08-26T23:57:00.000-07:002009-08-27T02:40:10.915-07:00Teddy for Senator<a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_-6S970EQqtw/SpYu0ucmQdI/AAAAAAAACY0/5I5eiR5FOrI/s1600-h/teddy+casino.jpg"><img style="float:right; margin:0 0 10px 10px;cursor:pointer; cursor:hand;width: 262px; height: 272px;" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_-6S970EQqtw/SpYu0ucmQdI/AAAAAAAACY0/5I5eiR5FOrI/s320/teddy+casino.jpg" border="0" alt=""id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5374534688669319634" /></a><br />Congressman Teddy Casiño is a genuine social reformist and one of the most dynamic young leaders in the country today. He was first swept into the politics of change when, as a high school student in La Salle Green Hills, he volunteered for the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) and took part in the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution. The experience changed him so that since then, his life has been characterized by a conscious choice for the road less traveled.<br /><br />The EDSA experience moved Teddy to become an activist in his freshman year at the University of the Philippines at Los Baños (UPLB). He became editor in chief of the student paper, The UPLB Perspective, from 1989-1991 even as he consistently made it to the honor roll. In 1991, Teddy was elected national president of the College Editors Guild of the Philippines (CEGP), an alliance of over 700 student publications nationwide. He graduated from UPLB with a bachelor’s degree in Sociology in 1993.<br /><br /><br /><br />After his stint in the student movement, Teddy joined the labor movement as part of the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), where he deepened his commitment to serve the people, especially the working class. Teddy later joined the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), the largest alliance of progressive people’s organizations in the country. He was elected secretary general in 1999 and was catapulted to national prominence in 2001 as one of the youngest leaders of EDSA 2. He was appointed commissioner of the EDSA People Power Commission from 2001-2002. In 2002, he was accorded the UPLB Distinguished Alumnus Award for Extension.<br /><br />Teddy is also an accomplished writer and journalist. After being a regular contributor to the Philippine Daily Inquirer’s Youngblood column, he became a regular columnist for BusinessWorld, from 1995-2004. He also wrote columns for the tabloids People’s Bagong Taliba and Frontpage, the OFW weekly Pinoy Gazette and the online magazine Bulatlat.com. In 2002, he had a short stint in ABS-CBN’s Hoy Gising and The Correspondents.<br /><br />As a Bayan Muna congressman since 2004, Teddy is proof that integrity, honor, competence, patriotism and compassion for the poor and oppressed still has a place in the political mainstream. He has proven his mettle as a progressive legislator, spearheading the fight against corruption and government abuse and pushing for fundamental reforms in the areas of good governance and justice, educational reform, the protection of the national patrimony and the environment, and the appropriate use of information and communications technology.<br /><br />In his six years in Congress, Teddy has never figured in any scandal or anomaly. He has maintained his simple lifestyle and is, in fact, on record as being the second poorest member of the House. For him, public service is a public trust that should not be used to enrich oneself, one’s relatives or friends.<br /><br />Teddy is married to Ruth Garcia Cervantes, herself a former CEGP president and a human rights advocate now taking up law at the San Beda College with whom he has two sons, Elian (6) and Emilio (1). They are his main source of strength and inspiration in striving for a better kind of politics that gives rise to a better government and society.<br /><br />Given the chance, Teddy vows to continue bringing the issues of the common tao – youth and students, workers and employees, professionals, small and medium-scale entrepreneurs, and environment advocates – into the halls of the Senate. <br /><br />reposted from <a href="http://teddycasinoforsenator.blogspot.com">http://teddyforsenator.blogspot.com</a><br /><br /><a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c2Jm-eQrPxQ&eurl=http%3A%2F%2Fteddycasinoforsenator%2Eblogspot%2Ecom%2F&feature=player_embedded#t=71"></a>Elmer Brabantehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17569454269621923153noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3490533786910594568.post-75333432511366954732009-08-26T19:00:00.000-07:002009-08-26T19:02:17.054-07:00To the Bar, to the BarTwelve more days, and we are off to Taft Avenue once again, to De La Salle University to be exact. It is for the first of the four Sundays of the Bar examinations beginning on the 6th of September. Thousands of students, lawyers, supporters and kibitzers will troop to the site to boost thousands of law graduates as they hurdle the most difficult examination there is in this part of the earth. Banners of hundreds of law schools in the Philippines will fly along the avenue, of UP, Ateneo, San Beda, UST, lined up along with the most unknown. The atmosphere will be a mix of enthusiasm, goodwill, hope, anxiety…. It will just be the start of the six ordealsome months of waiting for the examinees. Four years (in my case, eight, altered) of studies in the law school (in my case, six law schools) – make that 1,460 days of literally burning the midnight oil - were not enough proof of fitness to enter the legal profession. The Bar Examinations is the final test to prove that one possesses all the qualifications to assist in the administration justice in the Philippines. Of course, there are continuing protests among discontented persons, usually flunkers, questioning the Supreme Court’s prerogative to shut permanently those who failed the Bar five times from taking it further. Most of these dissenters insist their “right” to be a lawyer despite the failing the exams several times. They insist on the wrong premise. That the legal profession is a matter of privilege and not a right is the basic reason for the regulation of entry into the profession through competitive examinations. Some can only question the validity and integrity of the examiners’ grading system, but what better way to gauge a graduate’s general grasp of laws and competency? Until better alternatives are set, the Bar is indispensable. <br /><br />So you really want to study law and be a lawyer?<br /><br />You should be very – and that’s very – serious. And your decision must not be a latent one. The idea must have been conceived years before you’d even been aware of it. The truth is, you should have prepared enough for it, from day one – that is, from the first day you stepped in college, or better yet, in high school, or better yet…. What they say is true about the troubling difficulty and even futility of plunging yourself into the ocean and learning to swim just then.<br /><br />Alright, am not an expert nor an exemplary law student, but to provide some “advice” to those who opt to take up law, here’s my brief checklist of what I call the Law School Kit.<br /><br />1. English grammar and communications skills. The language of the law, whether you’re patriotic or not, is English. That is because Philippine laws are written in English. Ergo, your first best weapon is your firm grasp of Standard English. A precaution: you should have at least eighteen (18) units of English in your pre-law curriculum; otherwise, most law schools require students to add English to their law subjects. Does that sound odd? Ridiculous at most. Pardon my impertinence, but should law schools be really filling this big, crucial gap? According to Bar examiners and law professors, most candidates did fail the Bar because of faulty English grammar, sentence construction, reading comprehension. You could just drop your jaw to hear students having difficulty in expressing themselves in English. If there is difficulty in the basic communication skills, could they excel in higher skills of creative and critical reasoning? Thus, the first book to grab is not any law book; rather, try to get a hold of an English Workbook. Hurdle the English communication skills tests – of active reading, writing, speaking, listening.<br /><br />2. Logic and reasoning abilities. Laws are not constructed the way other disciplines are normally constructed. The meaning of words between legal provisions is not exactly the same as we ordinarily understand them to be. Study of law demands correct reasoning ability. No, it doesn’t mean we should learn how to debate or argue; it means finding the right reason for the answer to some questions however erronous the answer might be. Question, answer, but justify the answer. It must be a sound answer, based on some principles or established rulings (call that precedents), or some accepted custom. We train how to think properly in the same way that we must also train our brains to remember, and remember important provisions. In the past, and as correctly provided in the Rules, the pre-law courses had been and should be Bachelor of Arts (AB) studies, since AB is designed to train the students to think and reason out properly. Now, for as long as he/she has completed four years of college, anyone can be admitted to the LlB program. [This challenges me to make a comparative study on the Law graduates' performance in the Bar vis a vis their pre-law course; there must be an underlying connection somewhere].<br /><br />3. Good health and strict discipline. If you see that there are incoherence in this piece, the writer must be suffering from mental or physical fatigue due to myriad of factors. But there are just no excuses once the recitations begin (which is the fixed call of each day). When your name is called, don’t aim to touch nor glance at your book/notes - go to the classroom aisle with only the kilometric provisions, doctrines and principles and case laws stored in your brain as your ammunition. Do not fidget nor be “onion-skinned” even if the “terror” professor hurls invectives for unsatisfactory answers, as being soaked to humiliations forms part of the training or admonitions for not doing what is expected. Cadets and seminarians hurdle similar degrees of discipline-harnessing trainings and tests. So must law students. To succeed in the jungles of legal studies, the keys are always the basics: good health and strict discipline. One is not exaggerating when you hear him say he lives a regimented lifestyle. That is, he divides 24 hours of his day into meaningful, productive endeavors and strictly following each task to the letter. No cigarettes, no alcohol, no movies, no loud music, no gossips, even no relationships. Say no to everything that will divide your attention. Remember: Lady Justice is a jealous mistress, and you should devote your commitment to her alone from the very moment you stepped into the study of law. Also, make sure that you get eight hours of sleep each day – if this sounds impossible, then find ways to catch up on it. Now that you get 8, devote at least six hours to reading each day. For us working students, this is a tall order – of getting “enough” of quality reading hours each day. What I do, I try to devote at least double the hours of the number of units in any subject. For example, give a minimum of eight hours per week of active reading for a 4-unit subject. Couple this with at least 30-minute of proper exercise each day, and a bunch of healthy food. Don’t forget to attend to daily devotions – at least it relieves your soul, which in effect calms down tired muscles and weary nerves.<br /><br />4. Personal library. Never rely on books from the school library alone. What’s ideal is to stack a copy of each author for a given subject. Call this a valued investment which will not depreciate even until you have become a lawyer. While it’s good to have a laptop to store your database of laws and cases, it is still best to have hard copies of the basic documents. Books are indispensable, so invest on them. First list would be: <br /><br /><blockquote>Legal Profession and Introduction to Law <br />Philippine Constitution Annotated <br />Revised Penal Code Annotated <br />Family Code of the Philippines Annotated <br />Civil Code of the Philippines, Book One Annotated <br />Statutory Construction <br />Legal Writing <br />Legal Research <br />Codal Provisions of Revised Penal Code, Philippine Constitution, Civil Code of the Philippines </blockquote> <br /><br />5. (I reserve this for later discussions. Better yet, let me hear from youElmer Brabantehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17569454269621923153noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3490533786910594568.post-53682037741964736062009-08-11T00:25:00.000-07:002009-08-11T19:54:23.659-07:00Lesson on ArroganceArrogance may be defined as the lack of diligence in one’s speech and actions. It manifests in over-focus on the self without regard to the feelings and opinions of others. The overarching importance is placed on popularity, at whatever cost. Thesaurus provides the following synonyms for arrogance: conceit, haughtiness, egotism, superiority, pride, overconfidence, self-importance. Its opposite is humility. Integrity, on the other hand, is that moral virtue which puts premium on the speaker’s or actor’s reputation above popularity, fairness, truth and honor above fame. Its opposite is dishonesty. A gargantuan roadblock to integrity is arrogance. <br /><br />Arrogance can well be given flesh by a lunchtime television variety show host who complains about presenting a video update on the ongoing funeral for a revered national icon, for the Woman of Great Integrity. To Wowowee host Willie Revillame, the funeral footage ran unparallel to the jubilant mood which the show was catering. He was aware of the implication of his statements as he said he was unperturbed of possible sanction by his network bosses or by the MTRCB. He defended his tantrum of disallowing the videos, saying his concern was to prevent presenting Wowowee as insensitive to the bereavement of the Aquino family and the nation. His end though does not justify the means. He could have been cautious, reminding himself of the pervasive impact his statement might have on the sensitive viewer. Sympathy takes many forms, but not how he said what he had said. Better yet, he could rather not have said anything at all. To say that one has no regard about other people’s reactions to his statement is to display utter arrogance. He should not have thought about its (the arrogant statement) effect to his popularity alone but on its impact on the network’s credibility and integrity. It is not an easy road to be in the defensive for dismissing an offensive, arrogant remark. <br /><br />The Willie case is just one tidbit example of arrogance. What could be more glaring examples of arrogance than the selection of this year’s National Artists, the return to the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) of the list of nominees for the next Supreme Court Justices, and the defense for an imeldific dinner in New York, all by Her Excellency?<br /> <br />The conferment of the National Artist title is a presidential prerogative. It is protected by a decree precisely so as to prevent the abuse of that presidential prerogative. As such, the process is that the President selects the conferee from a list of nominees forwarded to Malacañang by peer institutions, such as the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) and the National Center for Culture and the Arts (NCCA)—two institutions which are supposedly built by prestige and credibility. If Malacañang would insist on the President’s personal choices, the selection process would rather be abolished once and for all. Add presidential prerogative to the list of synonyms of arrogance. <br /><br />Malacañang named Cecile Guidote-Alvarez (for theater) and Carlo J. Caparas (for film/visual arts) as two of this year’s National Artists (NA). Alvarez’s arrogance may not be evident as yet in defending that her title is backed by years of unprecedented commitment to the establishment of a national theater movement since the 60s. But if you look at where she sits when she says this defense, then that is where the arrogant slip shows. As the head of NCCA, she could have at least begged off the title or, if she’s keen on the “award”, leave NCCA. The issue is not Ms. Alvarez’s qualifications to the title; rather, the issue is her moral integrity, her delicadeza. Alvarez’s case is the irony of decades of committed service now betrayed by a moment of lust for recognition. Add to the list of synonyms for arrogance: lust for recognition; absence of delicadeza.<br /><br />I would not have bothered to discuss Carlo J. Caparas, as to indulge in the discussion of his works would be an exercise in futility. As he says, let his massacre movies speak for themselves; let Panday and Totoy Bato save his whatever needs saving. What irks me is his remark, undermining the value of my most revered nationalist writer, F. Sionil Jose—a most deserving National Artist. The nerve of Caparas to diminish Jose’s national and international worth. The arrogance of this accidental, commercial filmmaker cum visual artist only manifests in his inadequate reading of socially and culturally enshrining works, and in his condescending regard for the academic community who, to Caparas, are the only patrons of Jose’s works. I do not wonder the condescending attitude toward the academe, to the value of education. How many of his works have made it to the Top Ten, Top Fifty, or Top 100 Filipino Films by the most respected scholarly film institutes? Not a single? <br /><br />Whenever there is a vacancy in the Justices of the Supreme Court, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) is tasked by the Constitution to recommend to Malacañang at least three (3) nominees for every vacancy. The JBC submitted to President Arroyo six (6) nominees from which two (2) shall be appointed to fill the two vacancies. Apparently, Malacañang’s protégées were not in the list that the list was returned to the JBC, days before the 90-day deadline. This arrogance by the President is backed by its disregard for the constitutional mandate to the JBC, the indifference to the 90-day deadline and the subsequent constitutional crisis, and the utter disdain for the competence, integrity and overall qualifications of the six nominees. She thinks of herself as the singular, most powerful constitutional figure in the government. What better term than arrogance do we have for a president who has no respect for the equal sharing of power of the three branches of government?<br /><br />Just as when the entire world, and her third world country is in dire financial crisis and food insufficiency, the President and her minions had the temerity to dine in a Ritz New York restaurant, to the tune of a million pesos. That is arrogance, plain and simple. To her defenders, this dinner is just a token gesture to an invitation by a Congressman. Not a good defense, either. The issue is not the amount of the bill in proportion to the assets of the dinner host; rather, it is the moral integrity of the public officials accepting the invitation, if indeed it was a response to an invitation. This dinner is reminiscent of the grand life, of the delusion of grandeur, of the Marcoses while the rest of Filipinos wallow in abject poverty. <br /><br />What moral authority does your leader have when she says she cares for your children when she has not enough budget for your children’s education, food and medicine—while she can have the gall to party on caviar and the most expensive wines. What moral integrity does your president have when she says she emulates the honesty, simplicity and integrity of Corazon C. Aquino, while displaying her wealth and power for all the world to see? That is arrogance, pure and simple. <br /><br />Looking at these public figures, it is not difficult to identify who is arrogant and who has the integrity. Their speech must complement their actions, and their actions their speech. They can indulge in self-adulation sometimes, but they cannot deceive the careful eye of the public all the time.Elmer Brabantehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17569454269621923153noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3490533786910594568.post-44231536028853897972009-08-02T18:37:00.000-07:002009-08-02T18:46:59.260-07:00Thank you, Madame Cory Aquino<a href="http://top100pinoys.files.wordpress.com/2006/12/422px-caquino.jpg"><img style="display:block; margin:0px auto 10px; text-align:center;cursor:pointer; cursor:hand;width: 422px; height: 600px;" src="http://top100pinoys.files.wordpress.com/2006/12/422px-caquino.jpg" border="0" alt="" /></a><br />The entire Filipino people and the rest of the freedom-loving community worldwide mourn the passing of our great leader, former President Corazon C. Aquino. <br /><br /> Her death is surely a painful loss for those who have lived in the dark days of tyranny and for us who continue to fight for truth, and struggle to pursue, achieve, restore and preserve genuine democracy. <br /><br /> Never had the Filipino people have a great leader than Cory, the true symbol of unity, democracy and humble rise to power.<br /><br /> Never in the history of the Philippines had we as a people been prouder to claim to be Filipinos than under the leadership of Cory.<br /><br />Cory rose to power amidst the vestiges of violence and lies of the former dictatorship. Despite the opportunity of getting even to her husband Ninoy’s tormentors, Cory offered her presidency to ensure that the Filipino people would never again suffer under a repressive government. Hence, among the first things that the Aquino leadership did was to promulgate the Constitution, the basic document that ensures the reign of democracy and respects the civil and political rights of the people. <br /><br />Even long after she stepped down from Malacañang, even as she silently suffered the pains of colon cancer, Cory continuously and selflessly offered her remaining days to rally the people against threats to democracy and tinker with the Constitution. For us, the Constitution is not just a collective expression of the Filipino people’s quest for a just and humane society; the Constitution is the symbol of Cory’s visionary leadership. We then as a people who fought great battles that cost the lives of thousands of Filipinos should not let any move to tinker with the Constitution. We should unite, under the spirit of People Power and by the inspiration of Cory, to quell any self-servient move to amend the Constitution – at least not in the proximate time.<br /><br /> Cory will be remembered for People Power. And as long as the flames that sparked People Power keep burning, the spirit of Cory will never die. As long as every individual clamors for truth, justice and peace, Cory Aquino will live as an inspiration for generations and generations.<br /><br /> We are grateful to Cory for all the fruits of liberty and democracy that we so enjoy now in our land. As Cory leaves this temporal world, we pray that God receives her in His kingdom. God is truly marvelous for giving us Cory as His instrument for restoring peace and faith in our land. <br /><br />May you rest in the arms of our Lord, Madame President Cory C. Aquino. Thank you for sharing your life with us, for us. Thank you too, to your family for selflessly sharing you and Ninoy with us.Elmer Brabantehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17569454269621923153noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3490533786910594568.post-5842733632447436992009-06-30T23:02:00.000-07:002009-06-30T23:05:21.592-07:00The Real State of the NationExpect lies to honk from the speakers as your president delivers her version of the State of the Nation before the month ends. As usual, she would highlight her government’s “achievements” throughout the past fiscal year. Expect a report of economic growth inspite of global economic crisis, contained unemployment threats (thanks mainly to business process outsourcing), sufficient food supply and productivity, winning anti-terrorism mechanisms, etc. Expect glossy graphs and tables from an economics expert, to bloat the positives and hide the real statistics. Expect a handful of “outstanding” Filipino acheivers like Manny Pacquiao to be given recognition by the government. Expect a runway of solons clad in signature barongs and gowns and jewelries. Expect a showcase of wealth and prosperity as the real state of the nation. Yes, expect a spectacle of lies in the grand cinematic tradition. Expect as well public agitations and uproars. It won’t be a special day. Only a realization that we had been toyed for five long years, and we just sat and watched, letting all the lies to run our lives. The choice is ours. Let the whole world know of the real state of our nation.<br /><br />Just a glimpse of the conditions gripping our nation today:<br /><br />We are still hounded by massive graft and corruption, and the government agencies fail miserably in eliminating this chronic vice basically because it is rooted from the very government bureaucracy itself. All the laws are the there supposedly to arrest the manic situation, but the people who are tasked to implement these laws can even be guilty of the crimes themselves. Years in and years out, we had been treated to corruption scandals like the ZTE- NBN deal that probably points to the Malacañang as the culprit. Unexplained multi-million government spendings like the trips abroad (either “official” or the whimsical “support” trip to the Pacquiao bouts) at the expense of public coffers – remain unchecked; the responsible officials remain unaccountable to the public.<br /><br />The number of extra-judicial killings of journalists and political activists continues to grow by the day. And we have their executors-perpetrators being rewarded with seats in the halls of Congress. Convicts of heinous crimes are being given summary pardon by the chief executive, presumably for possible political favors or for popularity from the masses. The drugs maze remains a no-brainer for the government task forces – they try and try formula solutions.<br /><br />Hail to our English-speaking Filipinos! Global employment is no problem. We send our heroic domestic helpers, nurses, teachers, doctors – name them, we have them – abroad. Or, we don’t even need to leave our shores since the BPOs (business process outsourcing companies) grow like mushrooms right in our neighborhood. Learn some net-surfing and neutralize your accent, and, presto, you’ll have a seat in the call center for a pay that is equivalent to a regular local supervisory job. This has been the flagship of the Arroyo government, thank you. The Philippines will soon become the BPO capital of the world. Ergo, the Philippine educational system should have geared the curriculum towards training the students to be efficient, submissive call center agents. These BPOs not only reflect the Filipino workers’ commendable ability to multi-task; these BPOs represent the Philippine economy as a mouthpiec of global capitalism.<br /><br />By and large, the Philippines remains a neo-colony of the superpowers (The United States and the rest of the G7) and its creditors (the International Monetary Fund, etc.). Our primarily agricultural lands are being transformed into golf courses, real estates, economic zones, and techno-hubs of foreign investors. The best of our produce goes to the global market, while the tables (if any) of the Filipino masses remain servient to leftovers and under-nourishing food stuffs. The dumping of excess products into our shores, care of the much-in-placed trade liberalization policies, has left the growth of the local industy stunted. Our economy has remained dependent to foreign and domestic loans (read: grants, aids).<br /><br />The Philippine political and social set up remains a semi-feudal one. The seats in the executive and legislative branches of the government, from the national down to the municipal levels, remain occupied (read: reserved) by the few monied clans, the oligarchs. From this reality, we expect the laws and policies they pass to be servient to their and their cohorts’ interests, while apathetic to the plights of our people.<br /><br />Despite all the socio-political and economic ills pervading the nation, the Filipinos remain as the most patient, persevering, jubilant people among the Third World countries. Historically too, Filipinos collectively act to oust a system that is no longer serving the purpose of public good. We will see tomorrow how the nation will react to another sets of lies. One thing for sure, we know the truth and we are at the helm of taking the necessary steps in the name of truth and justice.Elmer Brabantehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17569454269621923153noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3490533786910594568.post-87604107750081192142009-06-07T15:17:00.000-07:002009-06-07T18:13:09.655-07:00Puno for President[THIS ARTICLE IS UNDER CONSTRUCTION]<br /><br /><br /><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_-6S970EQqtw/SixBfuQNdmI/AAAAAAAACD4/YK-Ffw8nylA/s1600-h/ipc+puno.jpg"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer; width: 400px; height: 303px;" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_-6S970EQqtw/SixBfuQNdmI/AAAAAAAACD4/YK-Ffw8nylA/s400/ipc+puno.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5344718871029708386" border="0" /></a><br /><div style="text-align: center;"><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-size:130%;">I support the move to have Chief Justice Reynato Puno run for President. At this stage of our nation's history, we need a leader with the vision, expertise, experience, moral integrity -someone who earns the respect and admiration of the Filipino people and the international community. Chief Justice Puno is the perfect fit. No only does he have the stellar educational qualifications; CJ Puno has the untarnished, exemplary character and reputation required of the leader to correctly push a corrupt government and crisis-laden economy into a glorious destiny.<br /></span></div><br /><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_-6S970EQqtw/Siw964pKhnI/AAAAAAAACDo/hMJjFcaXgrI/s1600-h/puno-for-president.jpg"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer; width: 319px; height: 220px;" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_-6S970EQqtw/Siw964pKhnI/AAAAAAAACDo/hMJjFcaXgrI/s400/puno-for-president.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5344714939628684914" border="0" /></a><span style="font-size:78%;">(from http://www.mb.com.ph/)<br /></span><div class="Section1"> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;" align="center"><span style="font-size:100%;"><b><span style="font-family:Arial;"></span></b></span></p><blockquote> <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;" align="center"><span style="font-size:130%;"><b><span style="font-family:Arial;"><br /></span></b></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;" align="center"><span style="font-size:130%;"><b><span style="font-family:Arial;">CURRICULUM VITAE<br /></span></b></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;" align="center"><span style="font-size:130%;"><b><span style="font-family:Arial;">OF CHIEF JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO</span></b></span></p> <div style="text-align: left;"><blockquote><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 102, 0);">I</span><span style="font-size:100%;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 102, 0);">.PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES:</span><br /><br />a. Born on May 17, 1940 in Manila;<br /><br />b. Married to the former LUZVIMINDA T. DELGADO, former Clerk of Court, Supreme Court;<br /><br /><br />c. Blessed with three children:<br /><br />Reynato, Jr., male, born on June 21, 1970, finished college at De La Salle University in 1992 (BSBA Management), an independent businessman, married to Cherryl Mae H. Yap;<br /><br />Emmanuel, male, born on December 25, 1974, finished college at De La Salle University in 2003 (Human Resource Management), an independent businessman, married to Rachelle Catherine Fabreo, have three children namely: Alessandra Isabelle F. Puno, born on January 22, 2001; Laticia Raquelle F. Puno, born on July 19, 2003; and Elijah Rey F. Puno, born on October 30, 2004;<br /><br />Ruth, female, born on April 15, 1981, finished college at Ateneo de Manila University in 2003 (Management Economics), currently pursuing Masters in Business Administration major in Marketing at Graduate School of Business University of Technology, Sydney, Australia.<br /><br /><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 102, 0);">II. ACADEMIC DEGREE:</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">a. Undergraduate:</span><br /><br />1. Finished Bachelor of Science in Jurisprudence, U.P., 1962;<br /><br />2. Finished Bachelor of Laws, U.P., 1962.<br /><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">b. Graduate:</span><br /><br />1. Finished Master of Comparative Laws, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas, U.S.A., 1967;<br /><br />2. Finished Master of Laws, University of California, Berkeley, California, U.S.A., 1968;<br /><br />3. Finished all academic requirements of the degree of Doctor of Juridical Science, University of Illinois, Champaign, Urbana, U.S.A., 1969.<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">c. Honorary:</span><br /><br />1. Doctor of Humanities, honoris causa, given by the Philippine Wesleyan University, April 1994;<br /><br />2. Doctor of Laws, honoris causa, conferred by Angeles University Foundation, April 20, 2005;<br /><br />3. Doctor of Laws, honoris causa, conferred by the Bulacan State University, August 30, 2005.<br /><br />4. Doctor of Philosophy in Law, honoris causa, Hannam University, South Korea, October 26, 2005.<br /><br /><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 102, 0);">III. ACADEMIC AND OTHER DISTINCTIONS:</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">a. As an undergraduate student:</span><br /><br />1. Editor-in-Chief, The Philippine Collegian, official weekly student newspaper, U.P., 1960-1961;<br /><br />2. Chairman, Editorial Board, The Law Register official student newspaper, College of Law, U.P., 1960-1961;<br /><br />3. Recent Documents Editor, The Philippine Law Journal, official law journal, College of Law, U.P., 1961-1962;<br /><br />4. Asst. Editor-in-Chief, the 1962 Philippinensian, official graduate annual, U.P., 1961;<br /><br />5. Recipient, Outstanding Student Award for Excellence and Leadership given by the Alpha Phi Beta fraternity of the U.P. College of Law, 1960, 1961, 1962.<br /><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">b. As a post graduate student:</span><br /><br />1. Grantee, full scholarship given by the Academy of American Law to study the Degree of Master of Comparative Laws (M.C.L.) at the Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas;<br /><br />2. Grantee, full scholarship given by the Walter Perry Johnson Foundation to study the degree of Master of Laws (LL.M) at the University of California, Berkeley, California;<br /><br />3. Grantee, tuition scholarship given by the University of Illinois of Champaign, Urbana to study the degree of Doctor of Juridical Science (S.J.D.);<br /><br />4. Finished the degree of Master of Comparative Laws (M.C.L.), with high honors and as valedictorian of a class consisting of 23 graduate scholars from various parts of the world;<br /><br />5. Recipient, American Jurisprudence Prize for excellence in Comparative Private International Law given by the Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co., of New York and the Bancroft Whitney Publishing Co., of California, 1966-1967;<br /><br />6. Recipient, American Jurisprudence Prize for excellence in U.S. Constitutional Structure given by the Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co., of New York and the Bancroft Whitney Publishing Co., of California, 1966-1967;<br /><br />7. Recipient, American Jurisprudence Prize for excellence in International Organization given by the Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co., of New York and the Bancroft Whitney Publishing Co., of New York and Bancroft Whitney Publishing Co., of California 1966-1967;<br /><br />8. Recipient, American Jurisprudence Prize for excellence in Problems of Doing Business Abroad given by the Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co., of New York and the Bancroft Publishing Co., of California, 1966-1967;<br /><br />9. Recipient, American Jurisprudence Prize for excellence in Commercial Law given by the Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co., of New York and the Bancroft Whitney Publishing Co., of California, 1966-1967;<br /><br />10. Granted honorary citizenship by the State of Texas, U.S.A. in 1966.<br /><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">c. As a professional:</span><br /><br />1. Chosen as one of the Outstanding Men (TOYM) of the Philippines in the field of law, 1977;<br /><br />2. Chosen as one of the Outstanding Alumni of the Alpha Phi Beta Law, Alumni, U.P. College of Law, 1975;<br /><br />3. Elected Co-Chairman of the World Section of Prosecutors, 8th Manila World Law Conference of the World Peace Thru Law Center;<br /><br />4. Represented the Philippines in the legal Congress on the Court Defense of the State Administration sponsored by the Advocate General of Italy in Rome, Italy, 1976;<br /><br />5. Delegate, International Law Association Conference, Manila, 1978;<br /><br />6. Lecturer, U.P. Law Center, Institute of Judicial Administration; Professor of Law, F.E.U., 1969 - 1973;<br /><br />7. Special Lecturer on Constitutional Law, Philippine Judicial Academy;<br /><br />8. Bar Examiner in Criminal Law, 1979; Bar Examiner in Mercantile Law, 1989; Bar Examiner in Taxation, 1993;<br /><br />9. Recipient, Araw ng Maynila Award as Outstanding Jurist, June 24, 1987;<br /><br />10. Chosen as one of the Distinguished Citizens of the Philippines, 1980;<br /><br />11. Chosen as one of the Outstanding Residents of Quezon City and included in its Honor Roll, 1979;<br /><br />12. Recipient, Certificate of Recognition, Province of Pampanga for Outstanding Public Service in the Judiciary, 1987;<br /><br />13. Recipient, Sunburst Award, Arellano High School; Outstanding Alumnus, 1995;<br /><br />14. Ten Outstanding Masons of the Philippines, April 26, 1990;<br /><br />15. Chairman, Committee of the Supreme Court digesting its Decisions for distribution to Members of the Judiciary;<br /><br />16. Chairman, Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court, 1999 up to the present which drafted the Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000), Child Witness Rule, Rules on Rehabilitation of Corporations; Rules on Intra-Corporate Disputes; Rules on Family Courts; Rule on Commitment of Children; Rule on Adoption, Rule on Declaration of Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages; Rule on Legal Separation; Rule on Provisional Orders; and Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children;<br /><br />17. Chairman, Raffle Committee (En Banc cases) 1999 up to the present;<br /><br />18. Working Chairman, First Division, Supreme Court up to May 29, 2002;<br /><br />19. Chairman, Court Systems Journal of the Supreme Court;<br /><br />20. Editorial Consultant, Journal of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines;<br /><br />21. Outstanding Alumnus, UP College of Law, 1996;<br /><br />22. Grand Cross Award, (March 1998) highest award of the Supreme Council 330 Ancient & Accepted Scottish Rite of the Republic of the Philippines;<br /><br />23. Grand Lodge Gold Medal, (April 1998) highest award of the Grand Lodge of Free & Accepted Masons of the Republic of the Philippines;<br /><br />24. Grand Cross of Rizal, (1998) highest award of Order of the Knights of Rizal;<br /><br />25. UP's Most Outstanding Law Alumnus 1997;<br /><br />26. Delegate, UN Judicial Colloqium on the Application of International Human Rights Law at the Domestic Level, Vienna, Austria, October 27, 1999;<br /><br />27. Delivered Paper on Role of Courts In Protecting Environment in UNEP sponsored conference, Bangkok, Thailand, January 31-February 1, 2001;<br /><br />28. Headed the Philippine Delegation of Judges to observe Commercial Courts in Sydney, Australia, March 2001;<br /><br />29. Headed Philippine delegation to the Symposium on Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights and Patent Litigation sponsored by the European Patent Office, Munich, Germany, September 10 to 14, 2001;<br /><br />30. Read papers on (1) Jurisdiction, Categories of Cases and Standing to Sue; (2) Standards and Scope of Judicial Review; and (3) Remedies, ADRs and Access to Information at the Conference on Administrative Law and Environmental Protection, sponsored by the Office of the Administrative Courts of Thailand and the US-Asia Environmental Partnership held on December 7-8, 2001 at Bangkok, Thailand;<br /><br />31. Delegate to the First International Forum for Training of the Judiciary, Jerusalem, Israel, March 2002; and the Second Forum, Ottawa, Canada, 2004;<br /><br />32. Participated in Judicial Administration and Reform Course held in Sydney, Australia from June 2 to 21, 2002 sponsored by the International Development Law Institute (IDLI);<br /><br />33. Participated, together with Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., in the Round Table Meeting of Chief Justices to Review the Draft Universal Declaration of Judicial Standards under the auspices of the United Nations Center for International Crime Prevention held at The Hague, Netherlands last 25 to 27 November 2002;<br /><br />34. Presented Philippine Paper in First Regional Seminar of Asian Constitutional Court, September 8-9, 2003, Jakarta, Indonesia;<br /><br />35. Centennial Awardee in the field of law given by the United Methodist Church on the occasion of its 100th Anniversary, Philippine Wesleyan University, 1999;<br /><br />36. Certificate of Recognition, 90th Founding Anniversary of the UP College of Law, January 12,2001;<br /><br />37. Chairman, 1994 Board of Judges TOYM;<br /><br />38. Voted as the Most Outstanding Jurist Activist by the Consumers Union of the Philippines, July 4, 2003;<br /><br />39. Delivered Paper on Election Disputes: Waste of Means or Constitutional Necessity in the Second Regional Seminar of Asian Constitutional Court Judges, March 31-April 2, 2004, Bangkok, Thailand;<br /><br />40. First Filipino Recipient of the Distinguished Global Alumni Award, 2003-2004, given by the Dedman School of Law, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas, March 31, 2005;<br /><br />41. Ulirang Ama Awardee 2005 given by the National Mother's Day & Father's Day Foundation of the Philippines, Inc.;<br /><br />42. Delivered the Philippine Paper on the subjects Problems between Constitutional Courts and Politics and Legal Basis for the Election/Dismissal of Constitutional Justices at the 3rd Conference of Constitutional Courts Judges held in Mongolia from September 6 to 8, 2005;<br /><br />43.Has written numerous legal articles published in law journals.<br /><br /><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 102, 0);">IV. PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE:</span><br /><br />a. Assistant Attorney, Gerardo Roxas and Abraham F. Sarmiento Law Office, 1962-1963;<br /><br />b. Tax Attorney; Joint Legislative and Executive Tax Commission, 1963-1967;<br /><br />c. Partner, Puno Law Office, 1969-1971;<br /><br />d. Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor General, 1971-1974;<br /><br />e. Acting City Judge, Quezon City Branch II, 1972-1974;<br /><br />f. Assistant Solicitor General, 1974 to November 28, 1982; and on several occasions, Acting Solicitor General;<br /><br />g. Appointed Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, June 20, 1980;<br /><br />h. Reappointed Appellate Justice of the Intermediate Appellate Court (First Special Division), January, 1983;<br /><br />i. Appointed Deputy Minister of Justice, November 7, 1984 and on several occasions as Acting Secretary of Justice;<br /><br />j. Acting Chairman of the Board of Pardons and Parole, February 1985;<br /><br />k. Appointed Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, August 1, 1986;<br /><br />l. Appointed Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, June 1993;<br /><br />m. Member, House Electoral Tribunal, 1998-1999;<br /><br />n. Member, Senate Electoral Tribunal, 1999-2002;<br /><br />o. Member, Presidential Electoral Tribunal;<br /><br />p. Chairman, House Electoral Tribunal, May 30, 2002;<br /><br />q. Chairman, Third Division of the Supreme Court, May 30, 2002;<br /><br />r. Chairman, Second Division of the Supreme Court, November 2003;<br /><br />s. Chairman, Senate Electoral Tribunal, November 2003 to present;<br /><br />t. Chairman, Committee of Zero Backlog of Cases.<br /><br /><br /><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 102, 0);">V. CIVIC AND CHURCH AFFILIATIONS:</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Church:</span><br /><br />Puno United Methodist Church - No. 33 Holy Spirit Drive,Don Antonio Heights, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Congregation:</span><br /><br />Morning Congregation<br />Vesper Congregation<br />MASA Mission<br /><br />a. Lay Preacher, United Methodist Church; present Chairman of the Administrative Council, Puno Memorial United Methodist Church; past Chairman of the Administrative Board of the Knox United Methodist Church, the biggest and oldest Methodist Church in the Philippines;<br />b. Elected Sovereign Grand Commander, Supreme Council of the S.G.I.G. of the thirty-third and last degree, Ancient and Accepted Scottish Rite of the Philippines (1991-1994);<br />c. Elected Grandmaster, Grand Lodge of Free & Accepted Masons of the Philippines, (1984);<br />d. Knights of Rizal;<br />e. Integrated Bar of the Philippines;<br />f. UP Law Alumni;<br />g. Alpha Phi Beta Alumni.</span></blockquote><span style="font-size:100%;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><br /></div><br /><div style="text-align: left;"> </div><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;" align="center"><span style="font-size:100%;"><span style="font-family:Arial;"> </span></span></p><br /></blockquote><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 45pt; text-align: justify; text-indent: -0.25in;"><span style="font-size:100%;"><span style="font-family:Arial;"></span></span></p> </div></div>Elmer Brabantehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17569454269621923153noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3490533786910594568.post-2410057532958632142009-06-02T19:01:00.000-07:002009-06-02T19:36:38.573-07:00Campus Press Freedom<p>I just have a first-hand experience of censorship. Ironically, it occurs right at the corridors of the College of Law, by no less than the appointed editor-in-chief (EIC) of the Manila Law Journal.</p> <p>I don’t mind submitting my opinion article under the scrutiny of the EIC. However, the authority of EIC to edit one’s work has its limitations. The EIC should at all times be wary of censorships as this would be anathema to freedom of expression, one of the emblems of democracy. To practice censorship is to muddle with democracy. Thus, when the said EIC castrated my article and showed it to third persons (tantamount to publication) wihout first (at the very least) consulting its author, the EIC becomes guilty of censorship.</p> <p>Upon confrontation, the EIC managed to profess that as the appointed EIC, she has the “power and prerogative” to edit, censor, and decide what comes out for publication.</p> <p>The article pertains to <span style="font-size:130%;"><span style="font-weight: bold;">Back to the Basics </span></span>which has been published here. My vehement contention is the EIC’s indiscriminate tinkering of the last paragraph. I anticipate (should she insist on her derelicition) the following lines to come out instead of its original form:</p> <p></p><blockquote style="color: rgb(255, 102, 102);">“Then, we must pass these tests to achieve our vision. Students, STUDY IN THE GRAND MANNER – WITHOUT EXCUSES! Facilitators of learnings (Law Professors), TEACH WITH PASSION AND COMMITMENT! Our commitment must begin HERE and NOW – right before MLC perish into oblivion.”</blockquote><p></p> <p>That is not the way I write! Definitely, I would not use ALL CAPS coupled with exclamation point unnecessarily. Worse, the power-tripper EIC had taken the context all wrong. There are other unfair editing she made in the whole manuscript, but it is sufficient to zero in on the above paragraph. Her comments maintain that my lines were “reprimanding the professors here!” She justifies that </p><blockquote style="color: rgb(255, 102, 102);">“We don’t have an edge. We are not good/exemplary students sir!”</blockquote> I suggest that she go over the whole article and comprehend its context.<p></p> <p>Being a <span style="font-style: italic;">de facto EIC</span> does not give her the blanket authority to edit her Associate Editor’s commentary without the latter’s consent, for such act is a clear attempt to butcher freedom of speech. Freedom of speech and of expression are not absolute, alright. The Editorial Board may edit its staff’s work when such work, among other grounds, tends to espouse unlawful endeavors, or endanger a person or property, or promote immorality, or pose a threat to national security, or had been obtained through illegal means. Even then, there lies a thin gray line between the exercise of editorial prerogative and prior restraint. In case of conflict between editorial prerogative (aka prior restraint), freedom of expression prevails. That may be a bitter lesson that we have to take under a democracy. Absolutely, censorship has no place in a democracy.</p> <p>Taking a lesson from the dark years under Martial Law, the writers either allowed their works to go under the hatchet blindly or they butchered the butcher himself.</p><p><span style="font-size:130%;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Last week:</span><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size:100%;">A text message from the Journal’s “adviser”, said the “EIC” threatens to remove me from the editorial board of the Manila Law Journal. She (the bogus EIC) takes this act single-handedly, allegedly, because of my unprofessional and ubecoming [conduct]. The nerve of her to announce such bold, violative scheme.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:100%;">Let me now raise the legal issues surrounding the matter.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:100%;"></span></p><blockquote><span style="font-size:100%;">1. </span><span style="font-weight: bold;font-size:100%;" >Law students’ publications are covered by Republic Act 7079</span><span style="font-size:100%;">, or the Campus Journalism Act of 1991. This I verified with Rep. Teddy Casiño, one of the proponents of the law.</span></blockquote><span style="font-size:100%;"></span><p></p> <p><span style="font-size:100%;">Teddy and I were together in the student movement at that time – I was the National Director for Advocacy of the Natonal Union of Students of the Philippines (NUSP), while he was the President of the College Editors Guild of the Philippines (CEGP). The NUSP then criticized Teddy and the CEGP for allowing themselves, wittingly, as instruments in legislating a rather touted as oppressive and delimiting enactment. With rectificatory tone, Teddy and CEGP concluded that we could as well maximize the law in favor of freedom of the press. But as expected, school adminstrators across the country have used the law to perpetuate oppressive acts in violation of our constitutiional rights to speech, expression and of the press.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:100%;">Hence, going back to the EIC case, the Manila Law Journal is covered by RA 7079.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:100%;"></span></p><blockquote><span style="font-size:100%;">2. The law specifically provides that </span><span style="font-weight: bold;font-size:100%;" >the student publication shall be independent</span><span style="font-size:100%;">, “published by the student body through an editorial board and publication staff composed of students selected by fair and competitive examinations. Once the publication is established, its editorial board shall freely determine its editorial policies and manage the publication’s funds.”</span></blockquote><span style="font-size:100%;"></span><p></p> <p><span style="font-size:100%;">On the other hand, Sec 1. Rule VII of the Implementing Rules, provides:</span></p> <blockquote style="color: rgb(255, 102, 102);"><blockquote><span style="font-size:100%;">SEC. 1. Selection of Student Staff Members. – The selection of the chief editor and other members of the staff of tertiary student publication shall be through competitive examinations prepared, conducted and supervised by a committee composed of a representative of the school administration, one faculty member, one mass media practitioner who is acceptable to both (school administration and editorial board) and two past editors to be chosen by the outgoing editorial board.</span></blockquote></blockquote> <p><span style="font-size:100%;">No fair and competitive (editorial) examination ever took place. There were only three students who took the exams last year, among whom was the bogus EIC (beic). Interestingly, the bogus EIC, being the Legal English teacher of the College, was the one who conducted the exam. Viola, where on earth could you find an examinee being adminstered by herself as the judge? If she desired to be part of the publication, she could have at least inhibited from being a judge, or vise versa, be a judge and not take the exam. A double personality, a case of conflicting interests. Pronto, this bogus EIC said she was appointed by the Dean to head the publication and gave her the blanket authority to appoint her staff. With due respect to the venerable Dean, but as students of law, would we allow ignorance of the law to reign in our College of Law?</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:100%;">Before the whole scam, I inquired from the Dean’s Secretary if I could still take the exam, having learned from her that no editorial exam had been called so far. She assured me that there was no need for the exam as the editorial board was already being consolidated by this beic. Ironically, I coordinated with the beic, who outright appointed me as her Associate Editor. I admit my fault for perpetuating the seeming conspiracy. I did attempt to seek for the exercise of the proper process, but thinking that perhaps indeed no student was interested to form the publication, I blindly danced to the beic’s cacophony.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:100%;">Several meetings were held – by only I and the beic. The first was rather awkward. We spent a couple of hours in a cafe, only to listen to her private stories. I had to cut her several times to get to the bottom of the meeting. In other words, the whole concept of the next issue emanated from me, since her only concern was the layout. Why would she trouble ourselves early with the layout when there were no articles yet to layout? She did not even bother to think about the theme. But anyway, it was my moment of privilege to iron out my ideas, thank you. Thereafter, I busied myself doing research and writing the commentary as well as the case digests. (Was I hallucinating or having a delusion of grandeur to claim that we could produce a scholarly journal)?</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:100%;">Thus, the editorial board has been void from the start. Ergo, it cannot validly publish in the name of the student body and utilize the publication funds for that purpose.</span></p> <p><span style="font-size:100%;"></span></p><blockquote><span style="font-size:100%;">3. </span><span style="font-weight: bold;font-size:100%;" >The contents of the publication are determined by the editorial board </span><span style="font-size:100%;">through a deliberative process, and not singularly by the editor-in-chief nor by the adviser. </span></blockquote><span style="font-size:100%;">However, supposing that the subject editorial board is legitimate, the herein beic exclusively edited the manuscripts sans the proper deliberative process. She contended that “the edior-in-chief” has all the power and authority to decide what comes out in the paper, and can remove an erring editor and staff.” Whooa, such whimsical power! She might think that she was acting as an adviser for an elementary school paper. Ironically, none of her appointed staff seems to have the gut to question her capricious acts.</span><p></p> <p><span style="font-size:100%;"></span></p><blockquote><span style="font-size:100%;">4. </span><span style="font-weight: bold;font-size:100%;" >The appointment of an adviser is optional</span><span style="font-size:100%;">, according to the decision of the editorial board. </span></blockquote><span style="font-size:100%;">And once the editorial board decides to have an adviser, the latter’s function is limited to “technical” advising. In other words, the appointment does not grant the adviser the authority to interfere upon the contents of the publication. The principle behind this is to allow the students (editors and staff) to manage the publication among themselves, and mature into professional, competent, responsible journalists. The technical aspect would be analogous to making sure that no law is violated by the student editors and staff.</span><p></p><p><span style="font-size:130%;"><span style="font-size:100%;">Sure, I always believed even way back my college days, that what transpires in the campus are but the microcosm of the larger social realities. Attempts may be made by power-greedy individuals (wittingly or unwittingly), but these attempt would succeed only if we remained passive, blind and numb to their impacts. What use do our vigilant eyes and dissenting voices have in a democracy? Otherwise, let us all go back to the monolithic eras when laws were mere tapestries of disguise.</span><br /></span></p> <div class="post-info"> </div> <div class="post-footer"> </div>Elmer Brabantehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17569454269621923153noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3490533786910594568.post-25095205275395618512009-05-24T11:05:00.001-07:002009-06-02T18:00:40.602-07:00A Constant Reminder: DESIDERATA<div style="text-align: center; color: rgb(153, 0, 0);"><span style="font-weight: bold;font-size:130%;" >DESIDERATA</span> </div><p style="text-align: center;" align="center"><!--[if gte vml 1]><v:shapetype id="_x0000_t75" coordsize="21600,21600" spt="75" preferrelative="t" path="m@4@5l@4@11@9@11@9@5xe" filled="f" stroked="f"> <v:stroke joinstyle="miter"> <v:formulas> <v:f eqn="if lineDrawn pixelLineWidth 0"> <v:f eqn="sum @0 1 0"> <v:f eqn="sum 0 0 @1"> <v:f eqn="prod @2 1 2"> <v:f eqn="prod @3 21600 pixelWidth"> <v:f eqn="prod @3 21600 pixelHeight"> <v:f eqn="sum @0 0 1"> <v:f eqn="prod @6 1 2"> <v:f eqn="prod @7 21600 pixelWidth"> <v:f eqn="sum @8 21600 0"> <v:f eqn="prod @7 21600 pixelHeight"> <v:f eqn="sum @10 21600 0"> </v:formulas> <v:path extrusionok="f" gradientshapeok="t" connecttype="rect"> <o:lock ext="edit" aspectratio="t"> </v:shapetype><v:shape id="_x0000_i1025" type="#_x0000_t75" alt="Desiderata" style="'width:173.25pt;height:45.75pt'"> <v:imagedata src="file:///C:\DOCUME~1\TESS\LOCALS~1\Temp\msohtml1\01\clip_image001.gif" href="http://www.fleurdelis.com/graphics/desiderata.gif"> </v:shape><![endif]--><!--[if !vml]--><span style="font-size:130%;"><br /></span></p> <p style="text-align: center;" align="center"><span style="font-size:130%;">- written by Max Ehrmann in the 1920s --<br /><br /></span></p> <p style="text-align: center;" align="center"><span style=";font-size:130%;" >Go placidly amid the noise and the haste,<br />and remember what peace there may be in silence. </span></p> <p style="text-align: center;" align="center"><span style=";font-size:130%;" >As far as possible, without surrender,<br />be on good terms with all persons.<br />Speak your truth quietly and clearly;<br />and listen to others,<br />even to the dull and the ignorant;<br />they too have their story.<br />Avoid loud and aggressive persons;<br />they are vexatious to the spirit. </span></p> <p style="text-align: center;" align="center"><span style=";font-size:130%;" >If you compare yourself with others,<br />you may become vain or bitter,<br />for always there will be greater and lesser persons than yourself.<br />Enjoy your achievements as well as your plans.<br />Keep interested in your own career, however humble;<br />it is a real possession in the changing fortunes of time. </span></p> <p style="text-align: center;" align="center"><span style=";font-size:130%;" >Exercise caution in your business affairs,<br />for the world is full of trickery.<br />But let this not blind you to what virtue there is;<br />many persons strive for high ideals,<br />and everywhere life is full of heroism.<br />Be yourself. Especially do not feign affection.<br />Neither be cynical about love,<br />for in the face of all aridity and disenchantment,<br />it is as perennial as the grass. </span></p> <p style="text-align: center;" align="center"><span style=";font-size:130%;" >Take kindly the counsel of the years,<br />gracefully surrendering the things of youth.<br />Nurture strength of spirit to shield you in sudden misfortune.<br />But do not distress yourself with dark imaginings.<br />Many fears are born of fatigue and loneliness. </span></p> <p style="text-align: center;" align="center"><span style=";font-size:130%;" >Beyond a wholesome discipline,<br />be gentle with yourself.<br />You are a child of the universe<br />no less than the trees and the stars;<br />you have a right to be here.<br />And whether or not it is clear to you,<br />no doubt the universe is unfolding as it should. </span></p> <p style="text-align: center;" align="center"><span style=";font-size:130%;" >Therefore be at peace with God,<br />whatever you conceive Him to be.<br />And whatever your labors and aspirations,<br />in the noisy confusion of life,<br />keep peace in your soul. </span></p> <p style="text-align: center;" align="center"><span style=";font-size:130%;" >With all its sham, drudgery, and broken dreams,<br />it is still a beautiful world.<br />Be cheerful. Strive to be happy.</span></p>Elmer Brabantehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17569454269621923153noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3490533786910594568.post-71589558551251564432009-05-24T09:50:00.000-07:002009-06-02T18:10:10.450-07:00Back to the Basics<p><span style="font-size:small;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 153);"></span></span></p><blockquote style="color: rgb(255, 204, 255);"><span style=";font-family:courier new;font-size:130%;" ><br /><br /><span style="color: rgb(153, 153, 255); font-weight: bold;font-family:verdana;font-size:180%;" >BACK TO THE BASICS</span><br /><br /><span style="font-family:verdana;">The Manila Law College turns 110. And as we brave the years onward, we are collectively compelled to revisit our glorious history, understand our reason for existence, gauge our present performance, and define our immediate tasks ahead. Only by doing this mandatory assessment shall we determine our place in the competitive arena of Philippine legal education. We must go back to the basics.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-family:verdana;">At the outset, we are wont to ask : Are we living up to the distinction of </span><span style="font-style: italic;font-family:verdana;" >Escuela de Derecho de Manila</span><span style="font-family:verdana;"> as the first and oldest Filipino law school, where luminaries in all the branches of the government and the private sector had demonstrated brilliance and excellence in their study of law? Have we learned from their examples and do we take pride in their achievements? Are we proud to be students and graduates of the Manila Law College?</span><br /><br /><span style="font-family:verdana;">Our answers to these cursory questions can spell our success or failure not only as students of law but more importantly in our individual performance in the Bar examinations.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-family:verdana;">Don Felipe de Calderon, in establishing the Escuela, envisioned the school as the producer not only of great Filipino lawyers, but of men and women who would exhibit exemplary values in all human activities. The Escuela was founded on nationalism and the pursuit of excellence – where diligence, intelligence, and articulateness were the standard qualities of every student of Law. Our predecessors had put flesh to the ideals of the great Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes – to teach and study law in the grand manner. These vision and ideals are as poignant now as they were then.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-family:verdana;">Concededly, the Bar is the singular validator of a graduate’s fitness for the practice of law. The gruelling examinations put on probe, in similar albeit indirect fashion, the credibility of the institution, the faculty, and the quality of instruction that they provide. This conclusion is fairly based on the evident practice of taking credit by the school when its graduates pass and top the Bar. In the same manner, the trajectory is cast upon the school when its examinees fail.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-family:verdana;">At this stage of MLC’s history, we are impelled to ask: How did we perform in the two immediately preceding Bar exams? We must face this basic question and provide the honest answers if we are committed to pursue the vision and the ideals of our noble forebears. We must realistically recognize our present condition if we are avowed to prevent driving the institution into certain oblivion.</span><br /><br /><span style="color: rgb(204, 204, 255); font-weight: bold;font-family:verdana;" >Where then do we go from here?</span><br /><br /><span style="font-family:verdana;">Most certainly, our standard response would be: in the pursuit of excellence – that is, to place the MLC in the Top Ten – to produce highly competitive, competent and virtuous lawyers.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-family:verdana;">We must satisfy some tests if we desire to be certain of our direction. For each student, the most important test would be: Do we have the knowledge, skills, diligence, dedication, and character to reach those ultimate goals? To the administrators and the faculty: Are we providing the necessary materials and facilities, utilizing the most effective teaching-testing methodologies, and instillling the proper values to bring out the best from the students?</span><br /><br /><span style="color: rgb(204, 204, 255); font-weight: bold;font-family:verdana;" >Knowledge</span><br /><br /><span style="font-family:verdana;">Knowledge here pertains to the optimum amount of understanding of the laws, rules, jurisprudence and legal precepts. We had made the commitment to arm ourselves with the knowledge the very moment that we entered the law school. It would be a futile undertaking if this primordial task were not our top priority. In our global age of technology, there is no room for excuse as to where to find the knowledge that we are expected to possess. Each student is expected to have read and understood the codal provisions, the annotations and commentaries of authors, and the landmark cases.</span><br /><br /><span style="color: rgb(204, 204, 255); font-weight: bold;font-family:verdana;" >Skills</span><br /><br /><span style="font-family:verdana;">This is synonymous with English communication skills. Thus, each applicant to the study of law is required to had completed at least eighteen (18) units of English in his/her pre-law course. This requirement is not borne out of whim or caprice dictated by our English-speaking colonizers – that is entirely besides the point. Our laws and other legal materials are written in the Standard English. It follows that the main tool used in our studies (be it in writing, speaking, reading and listening) is our facility of the English medium. It would not be pathetic to conclude that most failures of students and bar examinees can be attributed to the faulty English communication skills. Like any skill or hobby, proficiency in English is acquired through habitual use and the conscious effort to check the grammar, construction, usage and vocabulary. Lawyers are viewed as pedantic, bombastic and eloquent writers and speakers in English, and this should be so. Those skills were the product of constant practice. In the same manner, we must master the skills of active listening and reading. Given the pressure in which recitations and the Bar examinations are conducted, we must equip ourselves with active reading and listening skills so as to grasp the questions fast and correctly and corollarily provide the correct answers.</span><br /><br /><span style="color: rgb(204, 204, 255); font-weight: bold;font-family:verdana;" >Diligence</span><br /><br /><span style="font-family:verdana;">Some people have the misconception that the legal profession is reserved only for the intelligent, gifted individuals. Lawyers, however, commonly agree that their success is the product of diligence. But what is our appreciation of diligence? Is it the opposite of negligence? That is a correct view in some respects. For example, a student who works nine hours a day, five days a week, enrolled in six subjects: the number of hours allotted for studying should be at least double the number of units per subject. conversely, for Persons and Family Relations which is a 4-unit subject, the minimum number of hours to be devoted to studying the subject should be not less than 8 hours in a week. Ergo, for a load of 18 units, there must be a minimum of 36 hours devoted to private reading in a week. The bottomline is careful time management. The task can be challenging, but will prove fun and rewarding once it becomes a habit. If it is impossible to meet this demand, then perhaps it would be better to lessen the loads to a manageable level; otherwise, be prepared for the consequences. As a wise judge would advise, “it is better to graduate and be a lawyer after long years of studying than graduate soon and fail the Bar early on.”</span><br /><br /><span style="color: rgb(204, 204, 255); font-weight: bold;font-family:verdana;" >Dedication</span><br /><br /><span style="font-family:verdana;">As students of law, our focus should be to pass all subjects with flying colors, and become a competent lawyer soon. Hence, we must dedicate our time, energy and passion in mastering the laws. (Coincidentally, why not rename the degree Master of Laws?) Have you heard of the paradoxical line, “Lady Justice is a jealous mistress”? Ironically, why only regard Law as a mistress and not make her s spouse? That way, everything that we do and aim for would be glady and holistically committed to make our “significant other” happy and contented. That should be our attitude towards our study of law: glad and holistically committed. Indeed, it would not be excessive to set aside social activities for the time being. Sometimes, even immature relationships can be an obstacle in our paths.</span><br /><br /><span style="color: rgb(204, 204, 255); font-weight: bold;font-family:verdana;" >Character</span><br /><br /><span style="font-family:verdana;">Of the five desirable – make that imperative – traits of students of law (students of law include lawyers since the study of law is a continuing process), character is of paramount importance. Character is manifested in what we do in our most private, unguarded moments. Character too is gauged by how we spend our time, power, and money. It involves honesty, integrity, nationalism, industry, courage, humility, faith, and justice – all the good virtues that make great men and women worthy of accolades and emulation even long after they are gone. Character must be the defining quality that sets the legal profession several notches higher than the other professions.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-family:verdana;">We must pass these tests if we are committed to achieve our vision. We must make the firm commitment to teach and study law in the grand manner – without excuses. Our commitment must begin here and now, before we are perished into oblivion.</span><br /><span style=";font-family:verdana;font-size:100%;" ><br /><span style="font-style: italic;">(from the Manila Law Journal)</span></span><br /></span><span style=";font-family:courier new;font-size:130%;" ><br /></span><p style="font-family:courier new;"><span style="font-size:130%;"><br /></span></p><p><span style="font-size:130%;"><span style="color: rgb(192, 192, 192);font-family:courier new;" ></span><br /></span></p></blockquote><p><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 153);"></span></p>Elmer Brabantehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17569454269621923153noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3490533786910594568.post-46381715231040487122009-05-24T09:08:00.002-07:002009-05-24T09:13:18.278-07:00A Homage to MLC Alumni and Movers<p style="text-align: center;"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:130%;" ><span style="color: rgb(0, 255, 255);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="line-height: normal;"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(0, 255, 255);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p><p style="text-align: center;"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:130%;" ><span style="color: rgb(0, 255, 255);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="line-height: normal;"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(0, 255, 255);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);">The Manila Law College (or the former Escuela de Derecho de Manila) has a formidable list of alumni. We boast of producing a former President, twelve (12) Supreme Court Justices, officers of the Judiciary, and an array of Local Government executives, legislators, educators, businessmen, artists, and revolutionaries.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p><div style="text-align: center;"> </div><p style="text-align: center; color: rgb(255, 255, 153);"><span style="font-size:130%;">To begin with, Escuela de Derecho de Manila could not had been conceived without the visionary leadership of Don Felipe de Calderon, the father of the Malolos Constitution.</span></p><div style="text-align: center; color: rgb(255, 255, 153);"> </div><p style="text-align: center; color: rgb(255, 255, 153);"><span style="font-size:130%;">As we celebrate 110 glorious years, we pay tribute to our marvelous, exemplary alumni:</span></p><div style="text-align: center;"> </div><p style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);font-size:130%;" ><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Jose P. Laurel</span> – President of the Republic of the Philippines (1943-1945); Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (1935-1941),; obtained his Master of Laws from Escuela de Derecho de Manila in 1918</span><span style="font-size:130%;"><br /></span><span style="color: rgb(0, 255, 255);font-size:130%;" ><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><br /><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Manuel V. Moran</span> – Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (1945-1966); the Father of Remedial Law, <span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);">first Philippine ambassador to Spain and the Vatican, </span></span>LlB 1913</span></span></span><span style="font-size:130%;"><br /></span><span style="color: rgb(0, 255, 255);font-size:130%;" ><a href="http://www.servimg.com/image_preview.php?i=11&u=13791071" target="_blank"><img style="width: 155px; height: 146px;" src="http://i89.servimg.com/u/f89/13/79/10/71/moran_11.jpg" alt="" /></a></span></p><div style="text-align: center;"> </div><p style="text-align: center;"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:130%;" ><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><br /><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="line-height: normal;"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Felix Angelo Bautista</span><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"> – Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (1950-1956), First Dean of the Manila Law College</span><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><br />Manuel Briones</span><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"> – Associate Justice of the Supreme Court<br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Norberto Romualdez</span> – Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (1921-1932)<br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Anacleto Diaz</span> – Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (1933-1941)<br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Antonio Horilleno</span> – Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (1940-1945)<br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Carlos Imperial</span> – Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (1931)<br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Guillermo Pablo</span> – Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (1945-1955)<br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Luis Torres</span> – Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (1949-1950); Secretary of Justice<br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Jose Gutierrez David</span> – Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (1959-1961)</span></span></span><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Felix Martinez</span> – Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals</span></span><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Domingo Laperal</span> – Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals</span></span><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;">Gloria Conti Paras<span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"> – Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals<br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Concepcion Felix-Calderon</span> – founder, Assocacion Feminista de Filipinas<br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Francisco Zulueta</span> – Senator, 1931-1934<br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Jose Clarin</span> – Senator, 1916-1935<br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Jose O. Vera</span> – Senator, 1922-1935<br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Emiliano Trias Tirona</span> – Senator, 1922-1928<br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Jose Imperial</span> – Senator</span></span></span><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Jose Altavas</span> – Senator, 1916-1922</span></span><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Mariano Jesus Cuenco</span> – Senator, 1941-1965; Cebu Governor, 1931-1934</span></span><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Vicente Rama</span> – Senator, 1922-1935; Father of Cebu Charter</span></span><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Pedro Canu Hernaez</span> – Senator, 1941-1947; Father of Bacolod</span></span><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Pablo Angeles David</span> – Senator, 1947-1953; Pampanga Governor</span></span><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Vicente Singson Encarnacion</span> – Senator, 1916-1925</span></span><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Teofisto Guingona, Sr.</span> – Senator, 1919-1925</span></span><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Jose Clemente Zulueta</span> – Senator, 1951-1957</span></span><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Vicente J. Francisco</span> – Senator, 1946-1951</span></span><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Antero Soriano</span> – Senator; Cavite Governor</span></span><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Eligio Lagman </span>- Pampanga Governor</span></span><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Pedro Magsalin</span> – Congressman<br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Leonardo Festin</span> – Congressman<br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Mauro Versoza</span> – Congressman<br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Fernando Veloso</span> – Congressman<br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Marcelino Veloso</span> – Congressman<br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Pablo Ocampo</span> – Congressman<br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Jose Roño</span> – Cabinet Secretary<br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Adolfo Brillantes</span> – Congressman; Bar topnotcher, 1920<br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Agapito Cruz</span> – Regional Trial Court Judge<br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Leonardo Cruz</span> – Regional Trial Court Judge<br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">David Nitafan</span> – Regional Trial Court Judge</span></span><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;">Andres Borromeo<span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"> – Judge<br /></span>Leon Guinto Sr. <span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);">- Senate Secretary; Manila Mayor</span><br />Quintin Salas – <span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);">Colonel<br /></span>Jose Corazon de Jesus – <span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);">Nationalist writer<br /></span>Teodoro M. Kalaw <span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);">- Director of National Museum; Secretary of Interior</span><br />Jose Escaler <span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);">- industrialist</span><br />Oscar Castelo <span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);">- Judge; Secretary of National Defense</span><br />Marcelo Balatbat <span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);">- Budget Commissioner</span><br />Enrique Altavas <span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);">- Commissioner</span><br />Enrico Palomar <span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);">- Postmaster General</span></span></span><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;">Rafael Corpuz <span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);">- Business Executive</span></span></span><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;">Pedro Ocampo <span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);">- BUsiness Executive</span></span></span><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;">Alfonso Encarnacion <span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);">- Business Executive</span></span></span><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;">Jose Gatchalian <span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);">- Business Executive</span></span></span><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;">Benjamin Bautista <span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);">- Business Executive</span></span></span><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;">Angel dela Paz <span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);">- Banker</span></span></span><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;">Homer delos Reyes <span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);">- Banker</span></span></span><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;">Romeo Echauz <span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);">- Insurance Bank Executive</span><br />Flavio Zaragosa Cano <span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);">- Hiligaynon poet; Bicol Labor Leader (Law undergraduate)</span><br />Antonio Molina <span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);">- National Artist (Law undergraduate)</span><br />Carlos Ronquillo <span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);">- Revolutionary leader (Law undergraduate)</span><br />Sergio Canlas Navarro<span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"> – Kapampangan writer (Law undergraduate</span></span></span><br /><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);">Michaelina Ramos Balasbas </span>- Law firm partner</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p><div style="text-align: center;"> </div><p style="text-align: center;"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);font-size:130%;" ><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;"><span style="line-height: normal;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 165, 0);">Roster of Deans:</span></span></span></span></p><div style="text-align: center;"> </div><div style="text-align: center;"><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:130%;" ><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;"><span style="color: rgb(238, 130, 238);">01 – Dean Felipe G. Calderon</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-size:130%;"><br /></span><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:130%;" ><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;"><span style="color: rgb(238, 130, 238);">02 – Dean Rafael V. Palma</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-size:130%;"><br /></span><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:130%;" ><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;"><span style="color: rgb(238, 130, 238);">03 – Dean Teodoro M. Kalaw</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-size:130%;"><br /></span><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:130%;" ><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;"><span style="color: rgb(238, 130, 238);">04 – Dean Quintin Paredes</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-size:130%;"><br /></span><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:130%;" ><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;"><span style="color: rgb(238, 130, 238);">05 – Dean Emiliano Tria Tirona</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-size:130%;"><br /></span><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:130%;" ><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;"><span style="color: rgb(238, 130, 238);">06 – Dean Jose B. Abad Santos</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-size:130%;"><br /></span><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:130%;" ><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;"><span style="color: rgb(238, 130, 238);">07 – Dean Felix Angelo Bautista</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-size:130%;"><br /></span><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:130%;" ><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;"><span style="color: rgb(238, 130, 238);">08 – Dean Manuel Camus</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-size:130%;"><br /></span><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:130%;" ><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;"><span style="color: rgb(238, 130, 238);">09 – Dean Perfecto Laguio</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-size:130%;"><br /></span><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:130%;" ><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;"><span style="color: rgb(238, 130, 238);">10 – Dean Pablo Meer</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-size:130%;"><br /></span><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:130%;" ><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;"><span style="color: rgb(238, 130, 238);">11 – Dean Edgardo L. Paras</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-size:130%;"><br /></span><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:130%;" ><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;"><span style="color: rgb(238, 130, 238);">12 – Dean Enrique Galang</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-size:130%;"><br /></span><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:130%;" ><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;"><span style="color: rgb(238, 130, 238);">13 – Dean Porfirio V. Sison</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-size:130%;"><br /></span><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:130%;" ><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;"><span style="color: rgb(238, 130, 238);">14 – Dean Benjamin B. Domingo<br /><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></div><p><span style=";font-family:Arial;font-size:100%;" ><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 255, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial;"><span style="color: rgb(255, 0, 0);"><span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><span style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;"> </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></p>Elmer Brabantehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17569454269621923153noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3490533786910594568.post-74528072905375004942009-05-24T09:04:00.000-07:002009-05-24T09:18:53.928-07:00EUGENIA MENDOZA vs. ATTY. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE<div style="text-align: center; font-family: verdana;"><span class="postbody" style="font-size:100%;"><span style="font-weight: bold;">EUGENIA MENDOZA vs. ATTY. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE </span></span><span style="font-size:100%;"><br /></span><span class="postbody" style="font-size:100%;"><span style="font-weight: bold;"> A.C. No. 5338 </span></span><span style="font-size:100%;"><br /></span><span class="postbody" style="font-size:100%;"><span style="font-weight: bold;"> February 23, 2009 </span></span><span style="font-size:100%;"><br /></span><span class="postbody" style="font-size:100%;"><span style="font-weight: bold;"> en banc</span></span><span style="font-size:100%;"><br /></span></div><span style="font-family: verdana;font-size:100%;" class="postbody" ><br />**Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority for there is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law.<br /><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">FACTS:</span><br /><br />Complainant Augenia Mendoza, a mail sorter at the Central Post Office Manila, borrowed from Rodela Loans, Inc., through respondent Atty. Victor Deciembre, the amount of P20,000.00 payable in six months at 20% interest, secured by 12 blank checks, with numbers 47253, 47256 to 47266, drawn against the Postal Bank. Although she was unable to faithfully pay her obligations on their due dates, she made remittances, however, to respondent's Metrobank account from November 11, 1998 to March 15, 1999 in the total sum of P12,910.00. Claiming that the amounts remitted were not enough to cover the penalties, interests and other charges, respondent warned complainant that he would deposit Postal Check No. 47253 filled up by him on March 30, 1999 in the amount of P16,000.00. Afraid that respondent might sue her in court, complainant made good said check and respondent was able to encash the same on March 30, 1999. Thereafter, complainant made subsequent payments to the Metrobank account of respondent from April 13, 1999 to October 15, 1999, thereby paying respondent the total sum of P35,690.00.<br /><br />Respondent filled up two of the postal checks she issued in blank, Check Nos. 47261 and 47262 with the amount of P50,000.00 each and with the dates January 15, 2000 and January 20, 2000 respectively, which respondent claims was in exchange for the P100,000.00 cash that complainant received on November 15, 1999. Complainant insisted however that she never borrowed P100,000.00 from respondent and that it was unlikely that respondent would lend her such amount. Complainant also claimed that respondent victimized other employees of the Postal Office by filling up, without authorization, blank checks issued to him as condition for loans.<br /><br />Respondent averred that his dealings with complainant were done in his private capacity and not as a lawyer, and that when he filed a complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. Blg.) 22 against complainant, he was only vindicating his rights as a private citizen. He alleged further that: it was complainant who deliberately deceived him by not honoring her commitment to their November 15, 1999 transaction involving P100,000.00 and covered by two checks which bounced for the reason “account closed”; the October 13, 1999 transaction was a separate and distinct transaction; complainant filed the disbarment case against him to get even with him for filing the estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 case against the former; complainant's claim that respondent filled up the blank checks issued by complainant is a complete lie; the truth was that the checks referred to were already filled up when complainant affixed her signature thereto; it was unbelievable that complainant would issue blank checks, and that she was a mere low-salaried employee, since she was able to maintain several checking accounts; and if he really intended to defraud complainant, he would have written a higher amount on the checks instead of only P50,000.00.<br /><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">ISSUE:</span> whether or not Atty. Victor Deciembre is guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and should therefore be disbarred from the practice of law.<br /><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">HELD:</span><br /><br />The practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. A high sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is expected and required of members of the bar. They must conduct themselves with great propriety, and their behavior must be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times.<br /><br />The fact that there is no attorney-client relationship in this case and the transactions entered into by respondent were done in his private capacity cannot shield respondent, as a lawyer, from liability.<br /><br />A lawyer may be disciplined for acts committed even in his private capacity for acts which tend to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public. Indeed, there is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in a lawyer's private life or in his professional capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.<br /><br />In this case, evidence abounds that respondent has failed to live up to the standards required of members of the legal profession. Specifically, respondent has transgressed provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:<br /><br /> <ul> * CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.<br /> Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.<br />CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the integrated bar.<br />Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.</ul><br /><br />As manifested [in the Olbes and Acosta] cases, respondent's offenses are manifold. First, he demands excessive payments from his borrowers; then he fills up his borrowers' blank checks with fictitious amounts, falsifying commercial documents for his material gain; and then he uses said checks as bases for filing unfounded criminal suits against his borrowers in order to harass them. Such acts manifest respondent's perversity of character, meriting his severance from the legal profession.<br /><br />While the power to disbar is exercised with great caution and is withheld whenever a lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired, the seriousness of respondent's offense compels the Court to wield its supreme power of disbarment. Indeed, the Court will not hestitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it. This is because in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court, with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.<br /><br />As respondent's misconduct brings intolerable dishonor to the legal profession, the severance of his privilege to practice law for life is in order.</span>Elmer Brabantehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17569454269621923153noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3490533786910594568.post-16204085733922198452009-05-24T09:03:00.000-07:002009-05-24T09:04:30.739-07:00MARIA ANGALAN, et al. vs. ATTY. LEONIDO C. DELANTE<div style="text-align: center;"><span class="postbody"><span style="font-weight: bold;">MARIA ANGALAN, et al. vs. ATTY. LEONIDO C. DELANTE </span></span><br /><span class="postbody"><span style="font-weight: bold;"> AC No. 7181 </span></span><br /><span class="postbody"><span style="font-weight: bold;"> February 6, 2009 </span></span><br /><span class="postbody"><span style="font-weight: bold;"> en banc</span></span><br /><span class="postbody"></span></div><span class="postbody"> <br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">FACTS:</span><br /><br /><br />In April 1971, herein complainants mortgaged 8.102 hectares of their property to the Eustaquio espouses in consideration of a loan in the amount of P15,000. The Eustaquios prepared a document and sked the complainants to sign it; but because complainants were illiterates, they affixed their marks instead. It turned out that the document was a deed of absolute sale and not a real estate mortgage. Hence, TCT No. 9926 was issued in the name of Navarro Eustaquio.<br /><br />Complainants engaged the services of respondent Atty. Leonido Delante in November 1971 as shown in the receipt by respondent of P12,000 representing full payment of his professional fees from the complainants. Thereafter, an amicable settlement was entered into between complainants and the Eustaquios which stipulated that the complainants would repurchase the lot at P30,000. But since the complainants did not have the money, Atty. Delante advanced the money to complainants, possessed the property and gathered its produce.<br /><br />When the complainants tried to repay the money and recover the property, Atty. Delante refused. Complainants learned that Delante transferred the title of the property to his name as evidenced by TCT No. T-57932.<br /><br />On April 30, 2004, complainants filed with the RTC of Davao a complaint for (1) nullification of the deed of absolute sale, and (2) nullification of TCT No. T-57932; and on December 28, 2005 charged respondent with gross violation of the Code Professional Responsibilty. In April 2007, complainants filed with the Court a motion to withdraw the complaint for disbarment and an affidavit of desistance.<br /><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">ISSUES:</span><br /><br /><ul>(1.) whether or not a motion to withdraw the complaint for disbarment and an affidavit of desistance terminates the disbarment proceeding;<br /><br />(2.) whether or not respondent committed grave violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he bought the property of his clients without their consent and against their will.<br /></ul><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">HELD:</span><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">1. </span>A motion to withdraw the complaint for disbarment and an affidavit of desistance is immaterial. Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that, “No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same.”<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">2. </span>Respondent violated Canons 16 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 16 states that lawyers shall hold in trust all properties of their clients that may come into their possession. Respondent should have held in trust TCT No. T-9926 and returned the property to complainants upon demand. Instead of holding in trust the property of complainants, respondent (1) transferred the title of the property to his name, (2) refused to return the property to complainants, and (3) referred to complainants’ charges as malicious and untruthful.<br /><br />Canon 17 states that lawyers shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. Respondent should have been mindful of the trust and confidence complainants reposed in him. Complainants allege that they are illiterate and that the Spouses Eustaquio took advantage of them. Complainants engaged the services of respondent in the hope that he would help them recover their property. Instead of protecting the interests of complainants, respondent took advantage of complainants and transferred the title of the property to his name.<br /><br />Considering the depravity of respondent’s offense, the Court finds the recommended penalty too light. Violation of Canons 16 and 17 constitutes gross misconduct. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Court for gross misconduct.<br /><br />A person who takes the 8.102-hectare property of his illiterate clients and who is incapable of telling the truth is unfit to be a lawyer.<br /><br />The Court finds Atty. Leonido C. Delante GUILTY of violating Canons 16 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.</span>Elmer Brabantehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17569454269621923153noreply@blogger.com0