ANGELINA FRANCISCO vs. NLRC, KASEI CORPORATION, et al.
G.R. No. 170087
August 31, 2006
FACTS:
In 1995, petitioner Angelina Francisco was hired by Kasei Corporation (Kasei) during its incorporation stage. She was designated as Accountant, Corporate Secretary and Liaison Officer of the company. In 1996, Francisco was designated Acting Manager to handle recruitment of all employees and perform management administration functions, represent the company in all dealings with government agencies, and to administer all other matters pertaining to the operation of Kasei Restaurant which is owned and operated by Kasei.
For five years, petitioner performed the duties of Acting Manager. As of December 31, 2000 her salary was P27,500.00 plus P3,000.00 housing allowance and a 10% share in the profit of Kasei Corporation.
In January 2001, Francisco was replaced as Manager. She alleged that she was required to sign a prepared resolution for her replacement but she was assured that she would still be connected with Kasei. The Treasurer convened a meeting of all employees and announced that Francisco was still connected with Kasei Corporation as Technical Assistant to Seiji Kamura and in charge of all BIR matters.
Thereafter, Kasei reduced her salary by P2,500.00 a month beginning January up to September 2001 for a total reduction of P22,500.00 as of September 2001. She was not paid her mid-year bonus allegedly because the company was not earning well. In October 2001, she did not receive her salary from the company, made repeated follow-ups with the cashier but was advised that the company was not earning well. On October 15, 2001, she asked for her salary, but she was informed that she is no longer connected with the company.
Since she was no longer paid her salary, petitioner did not report for work and filed an action for constructive dismissal before the labor arbiter.
Kasei Corporation claimed that Francisco was not their employee, having been designated as technical consultant who performed work at her own discretion without the control and supervision of the Corporation, and that her consultancy may be terminated any time considering that her services were only temporary in nature and dependent on the needs of the corporation.
To prove that petitioner was not an employee of the corporation, private respondents submitted a list of employees for the years 1999 and 2000 duly received by the BIR showing that petitioner was not among the employees reported to the BIR, as well as a list of payees subject to expanded withholding tax which included petitioner. SSS records were also submitted showing that petitioner’s latest employer was Seiji Corporation.
ISSUES:
Whether or not there was an employer-employee relationship between Francisco and Kasei Corporation; and whether Francisco was illegally dismissed.
HELD:
Generally, courts have relied on the so-called right of control test where the person for whom the services are performed reserves a right to control not only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end. In addition to the standard of right-of-control, the existing economic conditions prevailing between the parties, like the inclusion of the employee in the payrolls, can help in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
However, in certain cases the control test is not sufficient to give a complete picture of the relationship between the parties, owing to the complexity of such a relationship where several positions have been held by the worker. There are instances when, aside from the employer’s power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished, economic realities of the employment relations help provide a comprehensive analysis of the true classification of the individual, whether as employee, independent contractor, corporate officer or some other capacity.
The better approach would therefore be to adopt a two-tiered test involving: (1) the putative employer’s power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished; and (2) the underlying economic realities of the activity or relationship.
This two-tiered test would provide us with a framework of analysis, which would take into consideration the totality of circumstances surrounding the true nature of the relationship between the parties. This is especially appropriate in this case where there is no written agreement or terms of reference to base the relationship on; and due to the complexity of the relationship based on the various positions and responsibilities given to the worker over the period of the latter’s employment.
Thus, the determination of the relationship between employer and employee depends upon the circumstances of the whole economic activity, such as: (1) the extent to which the services performed are an integral part of the employer’s business; (2) the extent of the worker’s investment in equipment and facilities; (3) the nature and degree of control exercised by the employer; (4) the worker’s opportunity for profit and loss; (5) the amount of initiative, skill, judgment or foresight required for the success of the claimed independent enterprise; (6) the permanency and duration of the relationship between the worker and the employer; and (7) the degree of dependency of the worker upon the employer for his continued employment in that line of business.
By applying the control test, there is no doubt that petitioner is an employee of Kasei Corporation because she was under the direct control and supervision of Seiji Kamura, the corporation’s Technical Consultant. She reported for work regularly and served in various capacities as Accountant, Liaison Officer, Technical Consultant, Acting Manager and Corporate Secretary, with substantially the same job functions, that is, rendering accounting and tax services to the company and performing
functions necessary and desirable for the proper operation of the corporation such as securing business permits and other licenses over an indefinite period of engagement.
Under the broader economic reality test, the petitioner can likewise be said to be an employee of respondent corporation because she had served the company for six years before her dismissal, receiving check vouchers indicating her salaries/wages, benefits, 13th month pay, bonuses and allowances, as well as deductions and Social Security contributions from August 1, 1999 to December 18, 2000. When petitioner was designated General Manager, respondent corporation made a report to the SSS signed by Irene Ballesteros. Petitioner’s membership in the SSS as manifested by a copy of the SSS specimen signature card which was signed by the President of Kasei Corporation and the inclusion of her name in the on-line inquiry system of the SSS evinces the existence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent corporation.
It is therefore apparent that petitioner is economically dependent on respondent corporation for her continued employment in the latter’s line of business.
The corporation constructively dismissed petitioner when it reduced her salary by P2,500 a month from January to September 2001. This amounts to an illegal termination of employment, where the petitioner is entitled to full backwages. Since the position of petitioner as accountant is one of trust and confidence, and under the principle of strained relations, petitioner is further entitled to separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement.
A diminution of pay is prejudicial to the employee and amounts to constructive dismissal. Constructive dismissal is an involuntary resignation resulting in cessation of work resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to an employee.
In affording full protection to labor, this Court must ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed. Even as we, in every case, attempt to carefully balance the fragile relationship between employees and employers, we are mindful of the fact that the policy of the law is to apply the Labor Code to a greater number of employees. This would enable employees to avail of the benefits accorded to them by law, in line with the constitutional mandate giving maximum aid and protection to labor, promoting their welfare and reaffirming it as a primary social economic force in furtherance of social justice and national development.
Thursday, January 28, 2010
DEALCO FARMS vs. NLRC
DEALCO FARMS, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (5th DIVISION), CHIQUITO BASTIDA, and ALBERT CABAN
GR No. 153192
January 30, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Dealco Farms is a corporation engaged in the business of importation, production, fattening and distribution of live cattle for sale to meat dealers, meat traders, meat processors, canned good manufacturers and other dealers in Mindanao and in Metro Manila. Petitioner imports cattle by the boatload from Australia into the ports of General Santos City, Subic, Batangas, or Manila. In turn, these imported cattle are transported to, and housed in, petitioner’s farms in Polomolok, South Cotabato, or in Magalang, Pampanga, for fattening until the cattle individually reach the market weight of 430 to 450 kilograms.
Respondents Albert Caban and Chiquito Bastida were hired by petitioner on June 25, 1993 and October 29, 1994, respectively, as escorts or "comboys" for the transit of live cattle from General Santos City to Manila. Respondents’ work entailed tending to the cattle during transportation. It included feeding and frequently showering the cattle to prevent dehydration and to develop heat resistance. On the whole, respondents ensured that the cattle would be safe from harm or death caused by a cattle fight or any such similar incident.
Upon arrival in Manila, the cattle are turned over to and received by the duly acknowledged buyers or customers of petitioner, at which point, respondents’ work ceases. For every round trip travel which lasted an average of 12 days, respondents were each paid P1,500.00. The 12-day period is occasionally extended when petitioner’s customers are delayed in receiving the cattle. In a month, respondents usually made two trips.
On August 19, 1999, respondents were told by Dealco’s hepe de viaje that their replacement had been effected immediately, but no reason was given for their replacement. Respondents attempted to meet with petitioner but failed.
Petitioner denies the existence of an employer-employee relationship with respondents, claiming that: (a) respondents are independent contractors who offer "comboy" services to various shippers and traders of cattle, not only to petitioner; (b) in the performance of work on board the ship, respondents are free from the control and supervision of the cattle owner since the latter is interested only in the result thereof; (c) in the alternative, respondents can only be considered as casual employees performing work not necessary and desirable to the usual business or trade of petitioner, i.e., cattle fattening to market weight and production; and (d) respondents likewise failed to complete the one-year service period, whether continuous or broken, set forth in Article 280 of the Labor Code, as petitioner’s shipments were substantially reduced in 1998-1999, thereby limiting the escort or "comboy" activity for which respondents were employed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner and respondents and therefore the latter’s termination was illegal.
HELD:
Complainant’s task of escorting the livestock shipped to Manila, taking care of the livestock in transit, is an activity which is necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of respondent. It is of judicial notice that the bulk of the market for livestock of big livestock raisers such as respondent is in Manila. Hogs do not swim, they are shipped. The caretaker is a component of the business, a part of the scheme of the operation.
More, it also appears that respondents had rendered service for more than one year doing the same task repeatedly, thus, even assuming they were casual employees they may be considered regular employees with respect to the activity in which they were employed and their employment shall continue while such activity exists (last par. of Art. 280).
In the case at bench, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC were one in their conclusion that respondents were not independent contractors, but employees of petitioner. In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC examined and weighed the circumstances against the four-fold test which has the following elements: (1) the power to hire, (2) the payment of wages, (3) the power to dismiss, and (4) the power to control the employees’ conduct, or the so-called "control test." Of the four, the power of control is the most important element. More importantly, the control test merely calls for the existence of the right to control, and not necessarily the exercise thereof.
The presence of the four (4) elements in the determination of an employer-employee relationship has been clearly established by the facts and evidence on record, starting with the admissions of petitioner who acknowledged the engagement of respondents as escorts of their cattles shipped from General Santos to Manila, and the compensation of the latter at a fee of P1,500.00 per trip.
The element of control, jurisprudentially considered the most essential element of the four, has not been demolished by any evidence to the contrary. The branch has noticed that the preparation of the shipment of cattle, manning and feeding them while in transit, and making a report upon their return to General Santos that the cattle shipped and which reached Manila actually tallied were all indicators of instructions, supervision and control by [petitioner] on [respondents’] performance of work as escorts for which they were hired. This we agree on all fours. The livestock shipment would cost thousands of pesos and the certainty of it reaching its destination would be the only thing any operator would consider at all time and under all circumstances. It is illogical for [petitioner] to argue that the shipment was not necessary or desirable to their business, as their business was mainly livestock production, because they were undeniably the owners of the cattle escorted by respondents. Should losses of a shipment occur due to respondents’ neglect these would still be petitioners’ loss, and nobody else’s.
Considering that we have sustained the Labor Arbiter’s and the NLRC’s finding of an employer-employee relationship between the parties, we likewise sustain the administrative bodies’ finding of respondents’ illegal dismissal. Accordingly, we are not wont to disturb the award of separation pay, claims for COLA and union service fees fixed at 10% of the total monetary award, as these were based on the finding that respondents were dismissed without just or authorized cause.
GR No. 153192
January 30, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Dealco Farms is a corporation engaged in the business of importation, production, fattening and distribution of live cattle for sale to meat dealers, meat traders, meat processors, canned good manufacturers and other dealers in Mindanao and in Metro Manila. Petitioner imports cattle by the boatload from Australia into the ports of General Santos City, Subic, Batangas, or Manila. In turn, these imported cattle are transported to, and housed in, petitioner’s farms in Polomolok, South Cotabato, or in Magalang, Pampanga, for fattening until the cattle individually reach the market weight of 430 to 450 kilograms.
Respondents Albert Caban and Chiquito Bastida were hired by petitioner on June 25, 1993 and October 29, 1994, respectively, as escorts or "comboys" for the transit of live cattle from General Santos City to Manila. Respondents’ work entailed tending to the cattle during transportation. It included feeding and frequently showering the cattle to prevent dehydration and to develop heat resistance. On the whole, respondents ensured that the cattle would be safe from harm or death caused by a cattle fight or any such similar incident.
Upon arrival in Manila, the cattle are turned over to and received by the duly acknowledged buyers or customers of petitioner, at which point, respondents’ work ceases. For every round trip travel which lasted an average of 12 days, respondents were each paid P1,500.00. The 12-day period is occasionally extended when petitioner’s customers are delayed in receiving the cattle. In a month, respondents usually made two trips.
On August 19, 1999, respondents were told by Dealco’s hepe de viaje that their replacement had been effected immediately, but no reason was given for their replacement. Respondents attempted to meet with petitioner but failed.
Petitioner denies the existence of an employer-employee relationship with respondents, claiming that: (a) respondents are independent contractors who offer "comboy" services to various shippers and traders of cattle, not only to petitioner; (b) in the performance of work on board the ship, respondents are free from the control and supervision of the cattle owner since the latter is interested only in the result thereof; (c) in the alternative, respondents can only be considered as casual employees performing work not necessary and desirable to the usual business or trade of petitioner, i.e., cattle fattening to market weight and production; and (d) respondents likewise failed to complete the one-year service period, whether continuous or broken, set forth in Article 280 of the Labor Code, as petitioner’s shipments were substantially reduced in 1998-1999, thereby limiting the escort or "comboy" activity for which respondents were employed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner and respondents and therefore the latter’s termination was illegal.
HELD:
Complainant’s task of escorting the livestock shipped to Manila, taking care of the livestock in transit, is an activity which is necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of respondent. It is of judicial notice that the bulk of the market for livestock of big livestock raisers such as respondent is in Manila. Hogs do not swim, they are shipped. The caretaker is a component of the business, a part of the scheme of the operation.
More, it also appears that respondents had rendered service for more than one year doing the same task repeatedly, thus, even assuming they were casual employees they may be considered regular employees with respect to the activity in which they were employed and their employment shall continue while such activity exists (last par. of Art. 280).
In the case at bench, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC were one in their conclusion that respondents were not independent contractors, but employees of petitioner. In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC examined and weighed the circumstances against the four-fold test which has the following elements: (1) the power to hire, (2) the payment of wages, (3) the power to dismiss, and (4) the power to control the employees’ conduct, or the so-called "control test." Of the four, the power of control is the most important element. More importantly, the control test merely calls for the existence of the right to control, and not necessarily the exercise thereof.
The presence of the four (4) elements in the determination of an employer-employee relationship has been clearly established by the facts and evidence on record, starting with the admissions of petitioner who acknowledged the engagement of respondents as escorts of their cattles shipped from General Santos to Manila, and the compensation of the latter at a fee of P1,500.00 per trip.
The element of control, jurisprudentially considered the most essential element of the four, has not been demolished by any evidence to the contrary. The branch has noticed that the preparation of the shipment of cattle, manning and feeding them while in transit, and making a report upon their return to General Santos that the cattle shipped and which reached Manila actually tallied were all indicators of instructions, supervision and control by [petitioner] on [respondents’] performance of work as escorts for which they were hired. This we agree on all fours. The livestock shipment would cost thousands of pesos and the certainty of it reaching its destination would be the only thing any operator would consider at all time and under all circumstances. It is illogical for [petitioner] to argue that the shipment was not necessary or desirable to their business, as their business was mainly livestock production, because they were undeniably the owners of the cattle escorted by respondents. Should losses of a shipment occur due to respondents’ neglect these would still be petitioners’ loss, and nobody else’s.
Considering that we have sustained the Labor Arbiter’s and the NLRC’s finding of an employer-employee relationship between the parties, we likewise sustain the administrative bodies’ finding of respondents’ illegal dismissal. Accordingly, we are not wont to disturb the award of separation pay, claims for COLA and union service fees fixed at 10% of the total monetary award, as these were based on the finding that respondents were dismissed without just or authorized cause.
BRENT SCHOOL vs. ZAMORA
BRENT SCHOOL, INC.DIMACHE vs. RONALDO ZAMORA and DOROTEO R. ALEGRE
G.R. No. L-48494 February 5, 1990 en banc
FACTS:
Private respondent Doroteo R. Alegre was engaged as athletic director by petitioner Brent School, Inc. at a yearly compensation of P20,000.00. The contract fixed a specific term for its existence, five (5) years, i.e., from July 18, 1971, the date of execution of the agreement, to July 17, 1976. Subsequent subsidiary agreements dated March 15, 1973, August 28, 1973, and September 14, 1974 reiterated the same terms and conditions, including the expiry date, as those contained in the original contract of July 18, 1971.
On April 20,1976, Alegre was given a copy of the report filed by Brent School with the Department of Labor advising of the termination of his services effective on July 16, 1976. The stated ground for the termination was "completion of contract, expiration of the definite period of employment." Although protesting the announced termination stating that his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer, and his employment lasted for 5 years - therefore he had acquired the status of regular employee - Alegre accepted the amount of P3,177.71, and signed a receipt therefor containing the phrase, "in full payment of services for the period May 16, to July 17, 1976 as full payment of contract."
The Regional Director considered Brent School's report as an application for clearance to terminate employment (not a report of termination), and accepting the recommendation of the Labor Conciliator, refused to give such clearance and instead required the reinstatement of Alegre, as a "permanent employee," to his former position without loss of seniority rights and with full back wages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended, have anathematized "fixed period employment" or employment for a term.
RULING:
Respondent Alegre's contract of employment with Brent School having lawfully terminated with and by reason of the expiration of the agreed term of period thereof, he is declared not entitled to reinstatement.
The employment contract between Brent School and Alegre was executed on July 18, 1971, at a time when the Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. 442) had not yet been promulgated. At that time, the validity of term employment was impliedly recognized by the Termination Pay Law, R.A. 1052, as amended by R.A. 1787. Prior, thereto, it was the Code of Commerce (Article 302) which governed employment without a fixed period, and also implicitly acknowledged the propriety of employment with a fixed period. The Civil Code of the Philippines, which was approved on June 18, 1949 and became effective on August 30,1950, itself deals with obligations with a period. No prohibition against term-or fixed-period employment is contained in any of its articles or is otherwise deducible therefrom.
It is plain then that when the employment contract was signed between Brent School and Alegre, it was perfectly legitimate for them to include in it a stipulation fixing the duration thereof Stipulations for a term were explicitly recognized as valid by this Court.
The status of legitimacy continued to be enjoyed by fixed-period employment contracts under the Labor Code (PD 442), which went into effect on November 1, 1974. The Code contained explicit references to fixed period employment, or employment with a fixed or definite period. Nevertheless, obscuration of the principle of licitness of term employment began to take place at about this time.
Article 320 originally stated that the "termination of employment of probationary employees and those employed WITH A FIXED PERIOD shall be subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe." Article 321 prescribed the just causes for which an employer could terminate "an employment without a definite period." And Article 319 undertook to define "employment without a fixed period" in the following manner: …where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
Subsequently, the foregoing articles regarding employment with "a definite period" and "regular" employment were amended by Presidential Decree No. 850, effective December 16, 1975.
Article 320, dealing with "Probationary and fixed period employment," was altered by eliminating the reference to persons "employed with a fixed period," and was renumbered (becoming Article 271).
As it is evident that Article 280 of the Labor Code, under a narrow and literal interpretation, not only fails to exhaust the gamut of employment contracts to which the lack of a fixed period would be an anomaly, but would also appear to restrict, without reasonable distinctions, the right of an employee to freely stipulate with his employer the duration of his engagement, it logically follows that such a literal interpretation should be eschewed or avoided. The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application. Outlawing the whole concept of term employment and subverting to boot the principle of freedom of contract to remedy the evil of employer's using it as a means to prevent their employees from obtaining security of tenure is like cutting off the nose to spite the face or, more relevantly, curing a headache by lopping off the head.
Such interpretation puts the seal on Bibiso upon the effect of the expiry of an agreed period of employment as still good rule—a rule reaffirmed in the recent case of Escudero vs. Office of the President (G.R. No. 57822, April 26, 1989) where, in the fairly analogous case of a teacher being served by her school a notice of termination following the expiration of the last of three successive fixed-term employment contracts, the Court held:
Reyes (the teacher's) argument is not persuasive. It loses sight of the fact that her employment was probationary, contractual in nature, and one with a definitive period. At the expiration of the period stipulated in the contract, her appointment was deemed terminated and the letter informing her of the non-renewal of her contract is not a condition sine qua non before Reyes may be deemed to have ceased in the employ of petitioner UST. The notice is a mere reminder that Reyes' contract of employment was due to expire and that the contract would no longer be renewed. It is not a letter of termination.
Paraphrasing Escudero, respondent Alegre's employment was terminated upon the
expiration of his last contract with Brent School on July 16, 1976 without the necessity of any notice. The advance written advice given the Department of Labor with copy to said petitioner was a mere reminder of the impending expiration of his contract, not a letter of termination, nor an application for clearance to terminate which needed the approval of the Department of Labor to make the termination of his services effective. In any case, such clearance should properly have been given, not denied.
G.R. No. L-48494 February 5, 1990 en banc
FACTS:
Private respondent Doroteo R. Alegre was engaged as athletic director by petitioner Brent School, Inc. at a yearly compensation of P20,000.00. The contract fixed a specific term for its existence, five (5) years, i.e., from July 18, 1971, the date of execution of the agreement, to July 17, 1976. Subsequent subsidiary agreements dated March 15, 1973, August 28, 1973, and September 14, 1974 reiterated the same terms and conditions, including the expiry date, as those contained in the original contract of July 18, 1971.
On April 20,1976, Alegre was given a copy of the report filed by Brent School with the Department of Labor advising of the termination of his services effective on July 16, 1976. The stated ground for the termination was "completion of contract, expiration of the definite period of employment." Although protesting the announced termination stating that his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer, and his employment lasted for 5 years - therefore he had acquired the status of regular employee - Alegre accepted the amount of P3,177.71, and signed a receipt therefor containing the phrase, "in full payment of services for the period May 16, to July 17, 1976 as full payment of contract."
The Regional Director considered Brent School's report as an application for clearance to terminate employment (not a report of termination), and accepting the recommendation of the Labor Conciliator, refused to give such clearance and instead required the reinstatement of Alegre, as a "permanent employee," to his former position without loss of seniority rights and with full back wages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended, have anathematized "fixed period employment" or employment for a term.
RULING:
Respondent Alegre's contract of employment with Brent School having lawfully terminated with and by reason of the expiration of the agreed term of period thereof, he is declared not entitled to reinstatement.
The employment contract between Brent School and Alegre was executed on July 18, 1971, at a time when the Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. 442) had not yet been promulgated. At that time, the validity of term employment was impliedly recognized by the Termination Pay Law, R.A. 1052, as amended by R.A. 1787. Prior, thereto, it was the Code of Commerce (Article 302) which governed employment without a fixed period, and also implicitly acknowledged the propriety of employment with a fixed period. The Civil Code of the Philippines, which was approved on June 18, 1949 and became effective on August 30,1950, itself deals with obligations with a period. No prohibition against term-or fixed-period employment is contained in any of its articles or is otherwise deducible therefrom.
It is plain then that when the employment contract was signed between Brent School and Alegre, it was perfectly legitimate for them to include in it a stipulation fixing the duration thereof Stipulations for a term were explicitly recognized as valid by this Court.
The status of legitimacy continued to be enjoyed by fixed-period employment contracts under the Labor Code (PD 442), which went into effect on November 1, 1974. The Code contained explicit references to fixed period employment, or employment with a fixed or definite period. Nevertheless, obscuration of the principle of licitness of term employment began to take place at about this time.
Article 320 originally stated that the "termination of employment of probationary employees and those employed WITH A FIXED PERIOD shall be subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe." Article 321 prescribed the just causes for which an employer could terminate "an employment without a definite period." And Article 319 undertook to define "employment without a fixed period" in the following manner: …where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
Subsequently, the foregoing articles regarding employment with "a definite period" and "regular" employment were amended by Presidential Decree No. 850, effective December 16, 1975.
Article 320, dealing with "Probationary and fixed period employment," was altered by eliminating the reference to persons "employed with a fixed period," and was renumbered (becoming Article 271).
As it is evident that Article 280 of the Labor Code, under a narrow and literal interpretation, not only fails to exhaust the gamut of employment contracts to which the lack of a fixed period would be an anomaly, but would also appear to restrict, without reasonable distinctions, the right of an employee to freely stipulate with his employer the duration of his engagement, it logically follows that such a literal interpretation should be eschewed or avoided. The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application. Outlawing the whole concept of term employment and subverting to boot the principle of freedom of contract to remedy the evil of employer's using it as a means to prevent their employees from obtaining security of tenure is like cutting off the nose to spite the face or, more relevantly, curing a headache by lopping off the head.
Such interpretation puts the seal on Bibiso upon the effect of the expiry of an agreed period of employment as still good rule—a rule reaffirmed in the recent case of Escudero vs. Office of the President (G.R. No. 57822, April 26, 1989) where, in the fairly analogous case of a teacher being served by her school a notice of termination following the expiration of the last of three successive fixed-term employment contracts, the Court held:
Reyes (the teacher's) argument is not persuasive. It loses sight of the fact that her employment was probationary, contractual in nature, and one with a definitive period. At the expiration of the period stipulated in the contract, her appointment was deemed terminated and the letter informing her of the non-renewal of her contract is not a condition sine qua non before Reyes may be deemed to have ceased in the employ of petitioner UST. The notice is a mere reminder that Reyes' contract of employment was due to expire and that the contract would no longer be renewed. It is not a letter of termination.
Paraphrasing Escudero, respondent Alegre's employment was terminated upon the
expiration of his last contract with Brent School on July 16, 1976 without the necessity of any notice. The advance written advice given the Department of Labor with copy to said petitioner was a mere reminder of the impending expiration of his contract, not a letter of termination, nor an application for clearance to terminate which needed the approval of the Department of Labor to make the termination of his services effective. In any case, such clearance should properly have been given, not denied.
Wednesday, January 27, 2010
MAYON HOTEL & RESTAURANT vs. ADANA
MAYON HOTEL & RESTAURANT, PACITA O. PO vs. ROLANDO ADANA, et al.
G.R. No. 157634
May 16, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner Mayon Hotel & Restaurant (MHR) hired herein 16 respondents as employees in its business in Legaspi City. Its operation was suspended on March 31, 1997 due to the expiration and non-renewal of the lease contract for the space it rented. While waiting for the completion of the construction of its new site, MHR continued its operation in another site with 9 of the 16 employees. When the new site constructed and MHR resumed its business operation, none of the 16 employees was recalled to work.
MHR alleged business losses as the reason for not reinstating the respondents. On various dates, respondents filed complaints for underpayment of wages, money claims and illegal dismissal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondents were illegally dismissed by petitioner;
2. Whether or not respondents are entitled to their money claims due to underpayment of wages, and nonpayment of holiday pay, rest day premium, SILP, COLA, overtime pay, and night shift differential pay.
HELD:
1. Illegal Dismissal: claim for separation pay
Since April 1997 until the time the Labor Arbiter rendered its decision in July 2000, or more than three (3) years after the supposed “temporary” lay-off, the employment of all the respondents with petitioner had ceased, notwithstanding that the new premises had been completed and the same resumed its operation. This is clearly dismissal – or the permanent severance or complete separation of the worker from the service on the initiative of the employer regardless of the reasons therefor.
Article 286 of the Labor Code is clear — there is termination of employment when an otherwise bona fide suspension of work exceeds six (6) months. The cessation of employment for more than six months was patent and the employer has the burden of proving that the termination was for a just or authorized cause.
While we recognize the right of the employer to terminate the services of an employee for a just or authorized cause, the dismissal of employees must be made within the parameters of law and pursuant to the tenets of fair play. And in termination disputes, the burden of proof is always on the employer to prove that the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause. Where there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for termination of employment, the law considers the case a matter of illegal dismissal.
If doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter — the employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause. It is a time-honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements and writing should be resolved in the former's favor. The policy is to extend the doctrine to a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection of labor.
2. Money claims
The Supreme Court reinstated the award of monetary claims granted by the Labor Arbiter.
The cost of meals and snacks purportedly provided to respondents cannot be deducted as part of respondents' minimum wage. As stated in the Labor Arbiter's decision.
Even granting that meals and snacks were provided and indeed constituted facilities, such facilities could not be deducted without compliance with certain legal requirements. As stated in Mabeza v. NLRC, the employer simply cannot deduct the value from the employee's wages without satisfying the following: (a) proof that such facilities are customarily furnished by the trade; (b) the provision of deductible facilities is voluntarily accepted in writing by the employee; and (c) the facilities are charged at fair and reasonable value. The law is clear that mere availment is not sufficient to allow deductions from employees' wages.
As for petitioners repeated invocation of serious business losses, suffice to say that this is not a defense to payment of labor standard benefits. The employer cannot exempt himself from liability to pay minimum wages because of poor financial condition of the company. The payment of minimum wages is not dependent on the employer's ability to pay.
G.R. No. 157634
May 16, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner Mayon Hotel & Restaurant (MHR) hired herein 16 respondents as employees in its business in Legaspi City. Its operation was suspended on March 31, 1997 due to the expiration and non-renewal of the lease contract for the space it rented. While waiting for the completion of the construction of its new site, MHR continued its operation in another site with 9 of the 16 employees. When the new site constructed and MHR resumed its business operation, none of the 16 employees was recalled to work.
MHR alleged business losses as the reason for not reinstating the respondents. On various dates, respondents filed complaints for underpayment of wages, money claims and illegal dismissal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondents were illegally dismissed by petitioner;
2. Whether or not respondents are entitled to their money claims due to underpayment of wages, and nonpayment of holiday pay, rest day premium, SILP, COLA, overtime pay, and night shift differential pay.
HELD:
1. Illegal Dismissal: claim for separation pay
Since April 1997 until the time the Labor Arbiter rendered its decision in July 2000, or more than three (3) years after the supposed “temporary” lay-off, the employment of all the respondents with petitioner had ceased, notwithstanding that the new premises had been completed and the same resumed its operation. This is clearly dismissal – or the permanent severance or complete separation of the worker from the service on the initiative of the employer regardless of the reasons therefor.
Article 286 of the Labor Code is clear — there is termination of employment when an otherwise bona fide suspension of work exceeds six (6) months. The cessation of employment for more than six months was patent and the employer has the burden of proving that the termination was for a just or authorized cause.
While we recognize the right of the employer to terminate the services of an employee for a just or authorized cause, the dismissal of employees must be made within the parameters of law and pursuant to the tenets of fair play. And in termination disputes, the burden of proof is always on the employer to prove that the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause. Where there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for termination of employment, the law considers the case a matter of illegal dismissal.
If doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter — the employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause. It is a time-honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of agreements and writing should be resolved in the former's favor. The policy is to extend the doctrine to a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection of labor.
2. Money claims
The Supreme Court reinstated the award of monetary claims granted by the Labor Arbiter.
The cost of meals and snacks purportedly provided to respondents cannot be deducted as part of respondents' minimum wage. As stated in the Labor Arbiter's decision.
Even granting that meals and snacks were provided and indeed constituted facilities, such facilities could not be deducted without compliance with certain legal requirements. As stated in Mabeza v. NLRC, the employer simply cannot deduct the value from the employee's wages without satisfying the following: (a) proof that such facilities are customarily furnished by the trade; (b) the provision of deductible facilities is voluntarily accepted in writing by the employee; and (c) the facilities are charged at fair and reasonable value. The law is clear that mere availment is not sufficient to allow deductions from employees' wages.
As for petitioners repeated invocation of serious business losses, suffice to say that this is not a defense to payment of labor standard benefits. The employer cannot exempt himself from liability to pay minimum wages because of poor financial condition of the company. The payment of minimum wages is not dependent on the employer's ability to pay.
CHINA BANKING vs. ORTEGA
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and TAN KIM LIONG vs. HON. WENCESLAO ORTEGA, as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VIII, and VICENTE G. ACABAN
G.R. No. L-34964 January 31, 1973
En banc
FACTS:
On December 17, 1968 Vicente Acaban filed a complaint in the court a quo against Bautista Logging Co., Inc., B & B Forest Development Corporation and Marino Bautista for the collection of a sum of money. Upon motion of the plaintiff the trial court declared the defendants in default for failure to answer within the reglementary period, and authorized the Branch Clerk of Court and/or Deputy Clerk to receive the plaintiff's evidence. On January 20, 1970 judgment by default was rendered against the defendants.
To satisfy the judgment, the plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of the defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation with the China Banking Corporation. Accordingly, a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial court and served on said bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. In reply, the bank' cashier invited the attention of the Deputy Sheriff to the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 which, it was alleged, prohibit the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits. Thereupon the plaintiff filed a motion to cite Tan Kim Liong for contempt of court.
In an order dated March 4, 1972 the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion. However, Tan Kim Liong was ordered "to inform the Court within five days from receipt of this order whether or not there is a deposit in the China Banking Corporation of defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation, and if there is any deposit, to hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order from this Court." Tan Kim Liong moved to reconsider but was turned down by order of March 27, 1972. In the same order he was directed "to comply with the order of this Court dated March 4, 1972 within ten (10) days from the receipt of copy of this order, otherwise his arrest and confinement will be ordered by the Court." Resisting the two orders, the China Banking Corporation and Tan Kim Liong instituted the instant petition.
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 relied upon by the petitioners reads:
Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
Sec 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking institution to disclose to any person other than those mentioned in Section two hereof any information concerning said deposits.
Sec. 5. Any violation of this law will subject offender upon conviction, to an imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos or both, in the discretion of the court.
The petitioners argue that the disclosure of the information required by the court does not fall within any of the four (4) exceptions enumerated in Section 2, and that if the questioned orders are complied with Tan Kim Liong may be criminally liable under Section 5 and the bank exposed to a possible damage suit by B & B Forest Development Corporation. Specifically referring to this case, the position of the petitioners is that the bank deposit of judgment debtor B & B Forest Development Corporation cannot be subject to garnishment to satisfy a final judgment against it in view of the aforequoted provisions of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405.
HELD:
We do not view the situation in that light. The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order. It will be noted from the discussion of the conference committee report on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977, which later became Republic Act 1405, that it was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment.
Thus:
Mr. MARCOS. Now, for purposes of the record, I should like the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means to clarify this further. Suppose an individual has a tax case. He is being held liable by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for, say, P1,000.00 worth of tax liability, and because of this the deposit of this individual is attached by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Mr. RAMOS. The attachment will only apply after the court has pronounced sentence declaring the liability of such person. But where the primary aim is to determine whether he has a bank deposit in order to bring about a proper assessment by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, such inquiry is not authorized by this proposed law.
Mr. MARCOS. But under our rules of procedure and under the Civil Code, the attachment or garnishment of money deposited is allowed. Let us assume, for instance, that there is a preliminary attachment which is for garnishment or for holding liable all moneys deposited belonging to a certain individual, but such attachment or garnishment will bring out into the open the value of such deposit. Is that prohibited by this amendment or by this law?
Mr. RAMOS. It is only prohibited to the extent that the inquiry is limited, or rather, the inquiry is made only for the purpose of satisfying a tax liability already declared for the protection of the right in favor of the government; but when the object is merely to inquire whether he has a deposit or not for purposes of taxation, then this is fully covered by the law.
Mr. MARCOS. And it protects the depositor, does it not?
Mr. RAMOS. Yes, it protects the depositor.
Mr. MARCOS. The law prohibits a mere investigation into the existence and the amount of the deposit.
Mr. RAMOS. Into the very nature of such deposit.
Mr. MARCOS. So I come to my original question. Therefore, preliminary garnishment or attachment of the deposit is not allowed?
Mr. RAMOS. No, without judicial authorization.
Mr. MARCOS. I am glad that is clarified. So that the established rule of procedure as well as the substantive law on the matter is amended?
Mr. RAMOS. Yes. That is the effect.
Mr. MARCOS. I see. Suppose there has been a decision, definitely establishing the liability of an individual for taxation purposes and this judgment is sought to be executed ... in the execution of that judgment, does this bill, or this proposed law, if approved, allow the investigation or scrutiny of the bank deposit in order to execute the judgment?
Mr. RAMOS. To satisfy a judgment which has become executory.
Mr. MARCOS. Yes, but, as I said before, suppose the tax liability is P1,000,000 and the deposit is half a million, will this bill allow scrutiny into the deposit in order that the judgment may be executed?
Mr. RAMOS. Merely to determine the amount of such money to satisfy that obligation to the Government, but not to determine whether a deposit has been made in evasion of taxes.
Mr. MACAPAGAL. But let us suppose that in an ordinary civil action for the recovery of a sum of money the plaintiff wishes to attach the properties of the defendant to insure the satisfaction of the judgment. Once the judgment is rendered, does the gentleman mean that the plaintiff cannot attach the bank deposit of the defendant?
Mr. RAMOS. That was the question raised by the gentleman from Pangasinan to which I replied that outside the very purpose of this law it could be reached by attachment.
Mr. MACAPAGAL. Therefore, in such ordinary civil cases it can be attached?
Mr. RAMOS. That is so.
(Vol. II, Congressional Record, House of Representatives, No. 12, pp. 3839-3840, July 27, 1955).
It is sufficiently clear from the foregoing discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no real inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. It is hard to conceive that it was ever within the intention of Congress to enable debtors to evade payment of their just debts, even if ordered by the Court, through the expedient of converting their assets into cash and depositing the same in a bank.
G.R. No. L-34964 January 31, 1973
En banc
FACTS:
On December 17, 1968 Vicente Acaban filed a complaint in the court a quo against Bautista Logging Co., Inc., B & B Forest Development Corporation and Marino Bautista for the collection of a sum of money. Upon motion of the plaintiff the trial court declared the defendants in default for failure to answer within the reglementary period, and authorized the Branch Clerk of Court and/or Deputy Clerk to receive the plaintiff's evidence. On January 20, 1970 judgment by default was rendered against the defendants.
To satisfy the judgment, the plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of the defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation with the China Banking Corporation. Accordingly, a notice of garnishment was issued by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial court and served on said bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. In reply, the bank' cashier invited the attention of the Deputy Sheriff to the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 which, it was alleged, prohibit the disclosure of any information relative to bank deposits. Thereupon the plaintiff filed a motion to cite Tan Kim Liong for contempt of court.
In an order dated March 4, 1972 the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion. However, Tan Kim Liong was ordered "to inform the Court within five days from receipt of this order whether or not there is a deposit in the China Banking Corporation of defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation, and if there is any deposit, to hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order from this Court." Tan Kim Liong moved to reconsider but was turned down by order of March 27, 1972. In the same order he was directed "to comply with the order of this Court dated March 4, 1972 within ten (10) days from the receipt of copy of this order, otherwise his arrest and confinement will be ordered by the Court." Resisting the two orders, the China Banking Corporation and Tan Kim Liong instituted the instant petition.
The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 relied upon by the petitioners reads:
Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
Sec 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking institution to disclose to any person other than those mentioned in Section two hereof any information concerning said deposits.
Sec. 5. Any violation of this law will subject offender upon conviction, to an imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos or both, in the discretion of the court.
The petitioners argue that the disclosure of the information required by the court does not fall within any of the four (4) exceptions enumerated in Section 2, and that if the questioned orders are complied with Tan Kim Liong may be criminally liable under Section 5 and the bank exposed to a possible damage suit by B & B Forest Development Corporation. Specifically referring to this case, the position of the petitioners is that the bank deposit of judgment debtor B & B Forest Development Corporation cannot be subject to garnishment to satisfy a final judgment against it in view of the aforequoted provisions of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405.
HELD:
We do not view the situation in that light. The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the defendant B & B Forest Development Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order. It will be noted from the discussion of the conference committee report on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977, which later became Republic Act 1405, that it was not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment.
Thus:
Mr. MARCOS. Now, for purposes of the record, I should like the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means to clarify this further. Suppose an individual has a tax case. He is being held liable by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for, say, P1,000.00 worth of tax liability, and because of this the deposit of this individual is attached by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
Mr. RAMOS. The attachment will only apply after the court has pronounced sentence declaring the liability of such person. But where the primary aim is to determine whether he has a bank deposit in order to bring about a proper assessment by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, such inquiry is not authorized by this proposed law.
Mr. MARCOS. But under our rules of procedure and under the Civil Code, the attachment or garnishment of money deposited is allowed. Let us assume, for instance, that there is a preliminary attachment which is for garnishment or for holding liable all moneys deposited belonging to a certain individual, but such attachment or garnishment will bring out into the open the value of such deposit. Is that prohibited by this amendment or by this law?
Mr. RAMOS. It is only prohibited to the extent that the inquiry is limited, or rather, the inquiry is made only for the purpose of satisfying a tax liability already declared for the protection of the right in favor of the government; but when the object is merely to inquire whether he has a deposit or not for purposes of taxation, then this is fully covered by the law.
Mr. MARCOS. And it protects the depositor, does it not?
Mr. RAMOS. Yes, it protects the depositor.
Mr. MARCOS. The law prohibits a mere investigation into the existence and the amount of the deposit.
Mr. RAMOS. Into the very nature of such deposit.
Mr. MARCOS. So I come to my original question. Therefore, preliminary garnishment or attachment of the deposit is not allowed?
Mr. RAMOS. No, without judicial authorization.
Mr. MARCOS. I am glad that is clarified. So that the established rule of procedure as well as the substantive law on the matter is amended?
Mr. RAMOS. Yes. That is the effect.
Mr. MARCOS. I see. Suppose there has been a decision, definitely establishing the liability of an individual for taxation purposes and this judgment is sought to be executed ... in the execution of that judgment, does this bill, or this proposed law, if approved, allow the investigation or scrutiny of the bank deposit in order to execute the judgment?
Mr. RAMOS. To satisfy a judgment which has become executory.
Mr. MARCOS. Yes, but, as I said before, suppose the tax liability is P1,000,000 and the deposit is half a million, will this bill allow scrutiny into the deposit in order that the judgment may be executed?
Mr. RAMOS. Merely to determine the amount of such money to satisfy that obligation to the Government, but not to determine whether a deposit has been made in evasion of taxes.
Mr. MACAPAGAL. But let us suppose that in an ordinary civil action for the recovery of a sum of money the plaintiff wishes to attach the properties of the defendant to insure the satisfaction of the judgment. Once the judgment is rendered, does the gentleman mean that the plaintiff cannot attach the bank deposit of the defendant?
Mr. RAMOS. That was the question raised by the gentleman from Pangasinan to which I replied that outside the very purpose of this law it could be reached by attachment.
Mr. MACAPAGAL. Therefore, in such ordinary civil cases it can be attached?
Mr. RAMOS. That is so.
(Vol. II, Congressional Record, House of Representatives, No. 12, pp. 3839-3840, July 27, 1955).
It is sufficiently clear from the foregoing discussion of the conference committee report of the two houses of Congress that the prohibition against examination of or inquiry into a bank deposit under Republic Act 1405 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no real inquiry in such a case, and if the existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely incidental to the execution process. It is hard to conceive that it was ever within the intention of Congress to enable debtors to evade payment of their just debts, even if ordered by the Court, through the expedient of converting their assets into cash and depositing the same in a bank.
PNB vs. GANCAYCO
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and EDUARDO Z. ROMUALDEZ, vs. EMILIO A. GANCAYCO and FLORENTINO FLOR
G.R. No. L-18343
September 30, 1965
en banc
FACTS:
Defendants Emilio A. Gancayco and Florentino Flor, as special prosecutors of the Department of Justice, required the plaintiff Philippine National Bank (PNB) to produce at a hearing on February 20, 1961 the records of the bank deposits of Ernesto T. Jimenez, former administrator of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Administration, who was then under investigation for unexplained wealth. In declining to reveal its records, PNB invoked RA 1405 which provides:
SEC. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
On the other hand, the defendants cited the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) in support of their claim of authority and demanded anew that plaintiff Eduardo Z. Romualdez, as bank president, produce the records or he would be prosecuted for contempt. The defendants invoked Sec. 8 of Ra 3019 which states that:
SEC. 8. Dismissal due to unexplained wealth. — If in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act Numbered One thousand three hundred seventy-nine, a public official has been found to have acquired during his incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be a ground for dismissal or removal. Properties in the name of the spouse and unmarried children of such public official may be taken into consideration, when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary.
Because of the threat of prosecution, plaintiffs filed an action for declaratory judgment in the Manila CFI. After trial, during which Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, author of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act testified, the court rendered judgment, sustaining the power of the defendants to compel the disclosure of bank accounts of ACCFA Administrator Jimenez. The court said that, by enacting Section 8 of RA 3019, Congress clearly intended to provide an additional ground for the examination of bank deposits. Without such provision, the court added prosecutors would be hampered if not altogether frustrated in the prosecution of those charged with having acquired unexplained wealth while in public office.
From that judgment, plaintiffs appealed to this Court. In brief, plaintiffs' position is that section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law "simply means that such bank deposits may be included or added to the assets of the Government official or employee for the purpose of computing his unexplained wealth if and when the same are discovered or revealed in the manner authorized by Section 2 of RA 1405, which are (1) upon written permission of the depositor; (2) in cases of impeachment; (3) upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; and (4) in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation."
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not RA 3019 which took effect on August 17, 1960 is a general law which cannot be deemed to have impliedly repealed section 2 of RA 1405 (which took effect on Sept. 9, 1955), because of the rule that repeals by implication are not favored.
2. Whether or not a bank can be compelled to disclose the records of accounts of a depositor who is under investigation for unexplained wealth.
HELD:
Contrary to their claim that their position effects a reconciliation of the provisions of the two laws, plaintiffs are actually making the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 prevail over those of the RA 3019, because even without the latter law the balance standing to the depositor's credit can be considered provided its disclosure is made in any of the cases provided in RA 1405.
The truth is that RA 3019 and RA 1405 are so repugnant to each other than no reconciliation is possible. Thus, while RA 1405 provides that bank deposits are "absolutely confidential and therefore may not be examined, inquired or looked into, except in those cases enumerated therein, RA 3019 directs in mandatory terms that bank deposits "shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary." The only conclusion possible is that section 8 of the RA 3019 is intended to amend section 2 of RA 1405 by providing additional exception to the rule against the disclosure of bank deposits.
Indeed, if the new law is inconsistent with or repugnant to the old law, the presumption against the intent to repeal by implication is overthrown because the inconsistency or repugnancy reveals an intent to repeal the existing law. And whether a statute, either in its entirety or in part, has been repealed by implication is ultimately a matter of legislative intent. (Crawford, The Construction of Statutes, Secs. 309-310. Cf. Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Ass'n v. Feliciano, G.R. No. L-24022, March 3, 1965).
With regard to the claim that disclosure would be contrary to the policy making bank deposits confidential, it is enough to point out that while section 2 of RA 1405 declares bank deposits to be "absolutely confidential," it nevertheless allows such disclosure in the following instances: (1) Upon written permission of the depositor; (2) In cases of impeachment; (3) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; (4) In cases where the money deposited is the subject matter of the litigation. Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits confidential. The policy as to one cannot be different from the policy as to the other. This policy expresses the motion that a public office is a public trust and any person who enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny.
G.R. No. L-18343
September 30, 1965
en banc
FACTS:
Defendants Emilio A. Gancayco and Florentino Flor, as special prosecutors of the Department of Justice, required the plaintiff Philippine National Bank (PNB) to produce at a hearing on February 20, 1961 the records of the bank deposits of Ernesto T. Jimenez, former administrator of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Administration, who was then under investigation for unexplained wealth. In declining to reveal its records, PNB invoked RA 1405 which provides:
SEC. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
On the other hand, the defendants cited the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) in support of their claim of authority and demanded anew that plaintiff Eduardo Z. Romualdez, as bank president, produce the records or he would be prosecuted for contempt. The defendants invoked Sec. 8 of Ra 3019 which states that:
SEC. 8. Dismissal due to unexplained wealth. — If in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act Numbered One thousand three hundred seventy-nine, a public official has been found to have acquired during his incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be a ground for dismissal or removal. Properties in the name of the spouse and unmarried children of such public official may be taken into consideration, when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary.
Because of the threat of prosecution, plaintiffs filed an action for declaratory judgment in the Manila CFI. After trial, during which Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, author of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act testified, the court rendered judgment, sustaining the power of the defendants to compel the disclosure of bank accounts of ACCFA Administrator Jimenez. The court said that, by enacting Section 8 of RA 3019, Congress clearly intended to provide an additional ground for the examination of bank deposits. Without such provision, the court added prosecutors would be hampered if not altogether frustrated in the prosecution of those charged with having acquired unexplained wealth while in public office.
From that judgment, plaintiffs appealed to this Court. In brief, plaintiffs' position is that section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law "simply means that such bank deposits may be included or added to the assets of the Government official or employee for the purpose of computing his unexplained wealth if and when the same are discovered or revealed in the manner authorized by Section 2 of RA 1405, which are (1) upon written permission of the depositor; (2) in cases of impeachment; (3) upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; and (4) in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation."
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not RA 3019 which took effect on August 17, 1960 is a general law which cannot be deemed to have impliedly repealed section 2 of RA 1405 (which took effect on Sept. 9, 1955), because of the rule that repeals by implication are not favored.
2. Whether or not a bank can be compelled to disclose the records of accounts of a depositor who is under investigation for unexplained wealth.
HELD:
Contrary to their claim that their position effects a reconciliation of the provisions of the two laws, plaintiffs are actually making the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 prevail over those of the RA 3019, because even without the latter law the balance standing to the depositor's credit can be considered provided its disclosure is made in any of the cases provided in RA 1405.
The truth is that RA 3019 and RA 1405 are so repugnant to each other than no reconciliation is possible. Thus, while RA 1405 provides that bank deposits are "absolutely confidential and therefore may not be examined, inquired or looked into, except in those cases enumerated therein, RA 3019 directs in mandatory terms that bank deposits "shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary." The only conclusion possible is that section 8 of the RA 3019 is intended to amend section 2 of RA 1405 by providing additional exception to the rule against the disclosure of bank deposits.
Indeed, if the new law is inconsistent with or repugnant to the old law, the presumption against the intent to repeal by implication is overthrown because the inconsistency or repugnancy reveals an intent to repeal the existing law. And whether a statute, either in its entirety or in part, has been repealed by implication is ultimately a matter of legislative intent. (Crawford, The Construction of Statutes, Secs. 309-310. Cf. Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Ass'n v. Feliciano, G.R. No. L-24022, March 3, 1965).
With regard to the claim that disclosure would be contrary to the policy making bank deposits confidential, it is enough to point out that while section 2 of RA 1405 declares bank deposits to be "absolutely confidential," it nevertheless allows such disclosure in the following instances: (1) Upon written permission of the depositor; (2) In cases of impeachment; (3) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; (4) In cases where the money deposited is the subject matter of the litigation. Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits confidential. The policy as to one cannot be different from the policy as to the other. This policy expresses the motion that a public office is a public trust and any person who enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny.
MARQUEZ vs. DESIERTO
LOURDES T. MARQUEZ vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, et al.
G.R. No. 135882
June 27, 2001
En banc
FACTS:
In May 1998, petitioner Marquez received an Order from the Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto dated April 29, 1998, to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) Julia Vargas Branch where petitioner was the branch manager. The accounts to be inspected were involved in a case pending with the Ombudsman entitled, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v. Amado Lagdameo, et. al, for violation of RA 3019 Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI. The Order was grounded on Section 15 of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) which provides, among others, the following powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman, to wit:
(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum and take testimony in any investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and records;
(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein.
Clearly, the specific provision of R.A. 6770, a later legislation, modifies the law on the Secrecy of Bank Deposits (R.A. 1405) and places the office of the Ombudsman in the same footing as the courts of law in this regard.”
The basis of the Ombudsman in ordering an in camera inspection of the accounts was a trail of managers checks (MCs) purchased by one George Trivinio, a respondent in OMB-0-97-0411, pending with the office of the Ombudsman. It appeared that Trivinio purchased on May 2 and 3, 1995, 51 MCs for a total amount of P272.1 Million at Traders Royal Bank (TRB) UN Ave. Branch. Out of the 51 MCs, eleven 11 MCs in the amount of P70.6M were deposited and credited to an account maintained at the UBP.
On May 26, 1998, the FFIB panel met with petitioner Marquez and Atty. Fe B. Macalino at the bank’s main office in Makati City, for the purpose of allowing petitioner and Atty. Macalino to view the checks furnished by TRB. After convincing themselves of the veracity of the checks, Atty. Macalino advised Ms. Marquez to comply with the order of the Ombudsman. Petitioner agreed to an in camera inspection set on June 3, 1998. However, on June 4, 1998, Marquez wrote the Ombudsman that the accounts in question could not readily be identified since the checks were issued in cash or bearer, and asked for time to respond to the order. Marquez surmised that these accounts had long been dormant, hence were not covered by the new account number generated by the UB system, thus sought to verify from the Interbank records archives for the whereabouts of these accounts.
The Ombudsman, responding to the request of Marquez for time to comply with the order, stated that UBP-Julia Vargas, not Interbank, was the depositary bank of the subject TRB MCs as shown at its dorsal portion and as cleared by the Philippine Clearing House. Notwithstanding the fact that the checks were payable to cash or bearer, the name of the depositor(s) could easily be identified since the account numbers where said checks were deposited were identified in the order.
Even assuming that the accounts were already classified as dormant accounts, the bank was still required to preserve the records pertaining to the accounts within a certain period of time as required by existing banking rules and regulations.
On June 16, 1998, the Ombudsman issued an order directing Marquez to produce the bank documents relative to the accounts in issue, stating that her persistent refusal to comply with the order is unjustified, was merely intended to delay the investigation of the case, constitutes disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order issued by the office and is punishable as Indirect Contempt under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6770.
On July 10, 1998, Marquez together with UBP filed a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and injunction with the Makati RTC against the Ombudsman allegedly because the Ombudsman and other persons acting under his authority were continuously harassing her to produce the bank documents relative to the accounts in question. Moreover, on June 16, 1998, the Ombudsman issued another order stating that unless she appeared before the FFIB with the documents requested, Marquez would be charged with indirect contempt and obstruction of justice.
The lower court denied petitioner’s prayer for a temporary restraining order stating that since petitioner failed to show prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman, no writ of injunction may be issued by the RTC to delay the investigation pursuant to Section 14 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
On August 21, 1998, petitioner received a copy of the motion to cite her for contempt. On August 31, 1998, petitioner filed with the Ombudsman an opposition to the motion to cite her in contempt on the ground that the filing thereof was premature due to the petition pending in the lower court. Petitioner likewise reiterated that she had no intention to disobey the orders of the Ombudsman. However, she wanted to be clarified as to how she would comply with the orders without her breaking any law, particularly RA 1405.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Marquez may be cited for indirect contempt for her failure to produce the documents requested by the Ombudsman.
2. Whether or not the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (RA 1405).
HELD:
An examination of the secrecy of bank deposits law (RA 1405) would reveal the following exceptions:
1. Where the depositor consents in writing;
2. Impeachment case;
3. By court order in bribery or dereliction of duty cases against public officials;
4. Deposit is subject of litigation;
5. Sec. 8, R. A. No. 3019, in cases of unexplained wealth as held in the case of PNB vs. Gancayco
We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case.
In Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, we held that “Section 2 of the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits, as amended, declares bank deposits to be “absolutely confidential” except:
(1) In an examination made in the course of a special or general examination of a bank that is specifically authorized by the Monetary Board after being satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that a bank fraud or serious irregularity has been or is being committed and that it is necessary to look into the deposit to establish such fraud or irregularity,
(2) In an examination made by an independent auditor hired by the bank to conduct its regular audit provided that the examination is for audit purposes only and the results thereof shall be for the exclusive use of the bank,
(3) Upon written permission of the depositor,
(4) In cases of impeachment,
(5) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or
(6) In cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation”
In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What is existing is an investigation by the office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the Office of the Ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts for meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime of the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, and the Intellectual Property Code.
Ombudsman is ordered to cease and desist from requiring Union Bank Manager Lourdes T. Marquez, or anyone in her place to comply with the order dated October 14, 1998, and similar orders.
G.R. No. 135882
June 27, 2001
En banc
FACTS:
In May 1998, petitioner Marquez received an Order from the Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto dated April 29, 1998, to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) Julia Vargas Branch where petitioner was the branch manager. The accounts to be inspected were involved in a case pending with the Ombudsman entitled, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v. Amado Lagdameo, et. al, for violation of RA 3019 Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI. The Order was grounded on Section 15 of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) which provides, among others, the following powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman, to wit:
(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum and take testimony in any investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and records;
(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein.
Clearly, the specific provision of R.A. 6770, a later legislation, modifies the law on the Secrecy of Bank Deposits (R.A. 1405) and places the office of the Ombudsman in the same footing as the courts of law in this regard.”
The basis of the Ombudsman in ordering an in camera inspection of the accounts was a trail of managers checks (MCs) purchased by one George Trivinio, a respondent in OMB-0-97-0411, pending with the office of the Ombudsman. It appeared that Trivinio purchased on May 2 and 3, 1995, 51 MCs for a total amount of P272.1 Million at Traders Royal Bank (TRB) UN Ave. Branch. Out of the 51 MCs, eleven 11 MCs in the amount of P70.6M were deposited and credited to an account maintained at the UBP.
On May 26, 1998, the FFIB panel met with petitioner Marquez and Atty. Fe B. Macalino at the bank’s main office in Makati City, for the purpose of allowing petitioner and Atty. Macalino to view the checks furnished by TRB. After convincing themselves of the veracity of the checks, Atty. Macalino advised Ms. Marquez to comply with the order of the Ombudsman. Petitioner agreed to an in camera inspection set on June 3, 1998. However, on June 4, 1998, Marquez wrote the Ombudsman that the accounts in question could not readily be identified since the checks were issued in cash or bearer, and asked for time to respond to the order. Marquez surmised that these accounts had long been dormant, hence were not covered by the new account number generated by the UB system, thus sought to verify from the Interbank records archives for the whereabouts of these accounts.
The Ombudsman, responding to the request of Marquez for time to comply with the order, stated that UBP-Julia Vargas, not Interbank, was the depositary bank of the subject TRB MCs as shown at its dorsal portion and as cleared by the Philippine Clearing House. Notwithstanding the fact that the checks were payable to cash or bearer, the name of the depositor(s) could easily be identified since the account numbers where said checks were deposited were identified in the order.
Even assuming that the accounts were already classified as dormant accounts, the bank was still required to preserve the records pertaining to the accounts within a certain period of time as required by existing banking rules and regulations.
On June 16, 1998, the Ombudsman issued an order directing Marquez to produce the bank documents relative to the accounts in issue, stating that her persistent refusal to comply with the order is unjustified, was merely intended to delay the investigation of the case, constitutes disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order issued by the office and is punishable as Indirect Contempt under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6770.
On July 10, 1998, Marquez together with UBP filed a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and injunction with the Makati RTC against the Ombudsman allegedly because the Ombudsman and other persons acting under his authority were continuously harassing her to produce the bank documents relative to the accounts in question. Moreover, on June 16, 1998, the Ombudsman issued another order stating that unless she appeared before the FFIB with the documents requested, Marquez would be charged with indirect contempt and obstruction of justice.
The lower court denied petitioner’s prayer for a temporary restraining order stating that since petitioner failed to show prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman, no writ of injunction may be issued by the RTC to delay the investigation pursuant to Section 14 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
On August 21, 1998, petitioner received a copy of the motion to cite her for contempt. On August 31, 1998, petitioner filed with the Ombudsman an opposition to the motion to cite her in contempt on the ground that the filing thereof was premature due to the petition pending in the lower court. Petitioner likewise reiterated that she had no intention to disobey the orders of the Ombudsman. However, she wanted to be clarified as to how she would comply with the orders without her breaking any law, particularly RA 1405.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Marquez may be cited for indirect contempt for her failure to produce the documents requested by the Ombudsman.
2. Whether or not the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (RA 1405).
HELD:
An examination of the secrecy of bank deposits law (RA 1405) would reveal the following exceptions:
1. Where the depositor consents in writing;
2. Impeachment case;
3. By court order in bribery or dereliction of duty cases against public officials;
4. Deposit is subject of litigation;
5. Sec. 8, R. A. No. 3019, in cases of unexplained wealth as held in the case of PNB vs. Gancayco
We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case.
In Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, we held that “Section 2 of the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits, as amended, declares bank deposits to be “absolutely confidential” except:
(1) In an examination made in the course of a special or general examination of a bank that is specifically authorized by the Monetary Board after being satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that a bank fraud or serious irregularity has been or is being committed and that it is necessary to look into the deposit to establish such fraud or irregularity,
(2) In an examination made by an independent auditor hired by the bank to conduct its regular audit provided that the examination is for audit purposes only and the results thereof shall be for the exclusive use of the bank,
(3) Upon written permission of the depositor,
(4) In cases of impeachment,
(5) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or
(6) In cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation”
In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What is existing is an investigation by the office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the Office of the Ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts for meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime of the violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, and the Intellectual Property Code.
Ombudsman is ordered to cease and desist from requiring Union Bank Manager Lourdes T. Marquez, or anyone in her place to comply with the order dated October 14, 1998, and similar orders.
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