Criminally Law (3)

Proximate cause

Article 4, paragraph 1 presupposes that the act done is the proximate cause of the resulting felony. It must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the felonious act.

Proximate cause is that cause which sets into motion other causes and which unbroken by any efficient supervening cause produces a felony without which such felony could not have resulted. He who is the cause of the cause is the evil of the cause. As a general rule, the offender is criminally liable for all the consequences of his felonious act, although not intended, if the felonious act is the proximate cause of the felony or resulting felony. A proximate cause is not necessarily the immediate cause. This may be a cause which is far and remote from the consequence which sets into motion other causes which resulted in the felony.

Illustrations:

A, B, C, D and E were driving their vehicles along Ortigas Aveue. A's car was ahead, followed by those of B, C, D, and E. When A's car reached the intersection of EDSA and Ortigas Avenue, the traffic light turned red so A immediately stepped on his break, followed by B, C, D. However, E was not aware that the traffic light had turned to red, so he bumped the car of D, then D hit the car of C, then C hit the car of B, then, finally, B hit the car of A. In this case, the immediate cause to the damage of the car of A is the car of B, but that is not the proximate cause. The proximate cause is the car of E because it was the car of E which sets into motion the cars to bump into each other.

In one case, A and B, who are brothers-in-law, had a quarrel. At the height of their quarrel, A shot B with an airgun. B was hit at the stomach, which bled profusely. When A saw this, he put B on the bed and told him not to leave the bed because he will call a doctor. While A was away, B rose from the bed, went into the kitchen and got a kitchen knife and cut his throat. The doctor arrived and said that the wound in the stomach is only superficial; only that it is a bleeder, but the doctor could no longer save him because B’s throat was already cut. Eventually, B died. A was prosecuted for manslaughter. The Supreme Court rationalized that what made B cut his throat, in the absence of evidence that he wanted to commit suicide, is the belief that sooner or later, he would die out of the wound inflicted by A. Because of that belief, he decided to shorten the agony by cutting his throat. That belief would not be engendered in his mind were it not because of the profuse bleeding from his wound. Now, that profusely bleeding would not have been there, were it not for the wound inflicted by A. As a result, A was convicted for manslaughter.

In criminal law, as long as the act of the accused contributed to the death of the victim, even if the victim is about to die, he will still be liable for the felonious act of putting to death that victim. In one decision, the Supreme Court held that the most precious moment in a man’s life is that of losing seconds when he is about to die. So when you robbed him of that, you should be liable for his death. Even if a person is already dying, if one suffocates him to end up his agony, one will be liable for murder, when you put him to death, in a situation where he is utterly defenseless.

In US v. Valdez, the deceased is a member of the crew of a vessel. Accused is in charge of the crewmembers engaged in the loading of cargo in the vessel. Because the offended party was slow in his work, the accused shouted at him. The offended party replied that they would be better if he would not insult them. The accused resented this, and rising in rage, he moved towards the victim, with a big knife in hand threatening to kill him. The victim believing himself to be in immediate peril, threw himself into the water. The victim died of drowning. The accused was prosecuted for homicide. His contention that his liability should be only for grave threats since he did not even stab the victim, that the victim died of drowning, and this can be considered as a supervening cause. It was held that the deceased, in throwing himself into the river, acted solely in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation, and was in no sense legally responsible for his own death. As to him, it was but the exercise of a choice between two evils, and any reasonable person under the same circumstance might have done the same. The accused must, therefore, be considered as the author of the death of the victim.

This case illustrates that proximate cause does not require that the offender needs to actually touch the body of the offended party. It is enough that the offender generated in the mind of the offended party the belief that made him risk himself.

If a person shouted fire, and because of that a moviegoer jumped into the fire escape and died, the person who shouted fire when there is no fire is criminally liable for the death of that person.

In a case where a wife had to go out to the cold to escape a brutal husband and because of that she was exposed to the element and caught pneumonia, the husband was made criminally liable for the death of the wife.

Even though the attending physician may have been negligent and the negligence brought about the death of the offending party – in other words, if the treatment was not negligent, the offended party would have survived – is no defense at all, because without the wound inflicted by the offender, there would have been no occasion for a medical treatment.

Even if the wound was called slight but because of the careless treatment, it was aggravated, the offender is liable for the death of the victim not only of the slight physical injuries. Reason – without the injury being inflicted, there would have been no need for any medical treatment. That the medical treatment proved to be careless or negligent, is not enough to relieve the offender of the liability for the inflicting injuries.

When a person inflicted wound upon another, and his victim upon coming home got some leaves, pounded them and put lime there, and applying this to the wound, developed locked jaw and eventually he died, it was held that the one who inflicted the wound is liable for his death.

In another instance, during a quarrel, the victim was wounded. The wound was superficial, but just the same the doctor put inside some packing. When the victim went home, he could not stand the pain, so he pulled out the packing. That resulted into profuse bleeding and he died because of loss of blood. The offender who caused the wound, although the wound caused was only slight, was held answerable for the death of the victim, even if the victim would not have died were it not for the fact that he pulled out that packing. The principle is that without the wound, the act of the physician or the act of the offended party would not have anything to do with the wound, and since the wound was inflicted by the offender, whatever happens on that wound, he should be made punishable for that.

In Urbano v. IAC, A and B had a quarrel and started hacking each other. B was wounded at the back. Cooler heads intervened and they were separated. Somehow, their differences were patched up. A agreed to shoulder all the expenses for the treatment of the wound of B, and to pay him also whatever lost of income B may have failed to receive. B, on the other hand, signed a forgiveness in favor of A and on that condition, he withdrew the complaint that he filed against A. After so many weeks of treatment in a clinic, the doctor pronounced the wound already healed. Thereafter, B went back to his farm. Two months later, B came home and he was chilling. Before midnight, he died out of tetanus poisoning. The heirs of B filed a case of homicide against A. The Supreme Court held that A is not liable. It took into account the incubation period of tetanus toxic. Medical evidence were presented that tetanus toxic is good only for two weeks. That if, indeed, the victim had incurred tetanus poisoning out of the wound inflicted by A, he would not have lasted two months. What brought about tetanus to infect the body of B was his working in his farm using his bare hands. Because of this, the Supreme Court said that the act of B of working in his farm where the soil is filthy, using his own hands, is an efficient supervening cause which relieves A of any liability for the death of B. A, if at all, is only liable for physical injuries inflicted upon B.

If you are confronted with this facts of the Urbano case, where the offended party died because of tetanus poisoning, reason out according to that reasoning laid down by the Supreme Court, meaning to say, the incubation period of the tetanus poisoning was considered. Since tetanus toxic would affect the victim for no longer than two weeks,, the fact that the victim died two months later shows that it is no longer tetanus brought about by the act of the accused. The tetanus was gathered by his working in the farm and that is already an efficient intervening cause.

The one who caused the proximate cause is the one liable. The one who caused the immediate cause is also liable, but merely contributory or sometimes totally not liable.


Wrongful act done be different from what was intended

What makes the first paragraph of Article 4 confusing is the qualification “although the wrongful act done be different from what was intended”. There are three situations contemplated under paragraph 1 of Article 4:

(1) Aberratio ictus or mistake in the blow;
(2) Error in personae or mistake in identity; and
(3) Praeter intentionem or where the consequence exceeded the intention.


Aberration ictus

In aberratio ictus, a person directed the blow at an intended victim, but because of poor aim, that blow landed on somebody else. In aberratio ictus, the intended victim as well as the actual victim are both at the scene of the crime.
Distinguish this from error in personae, where the victim actually received the blow, but he was mistaken for another who was not at the scene of the crime. The distinction is important because the legal effects are not the same.

In aberratio ictus, the offender delivers the blow upon the intended victim, but because of poor aim the blow landed on somebody else. You have a complex crime, unless the resulting consequence is not a grave or less grave felony. You have a single act as against the intended victim and also giving rise to another felony as against the actual victim. To be more specific, let us take for example A and B. A and B are enemies. As soon as A saw B at a distance, A shot at B. However, because of poor aim, it was not B who was hit but C. You can readily see that there is only one single act – the act of firing at B. In so far as B is concerned, the crime at least is attempted homicide or attempted murder, as the case may be, if there is any qualifying circumstance. As far as the third party C is concerned, if C were killed, crime is homicide. If C was only wounded, the crime is only physical injuries. You cannot have attempted or frustrated homicide or murder as far as C is concerned, because as far as C is concern, there is no intent to kill. As far as that other victim is concerned, only physical injuries – serious or less serious or slight.

If the resulting physical injuries were only slight, then you cannot complex; you will have one prosecution for the attempted homicide or murder, and another prosecution for slight physical injuries for the innocent party. But if the innocent party was seriously injured or less seriously injured, then you have another grave or less grave felony resulting from the same act which gave rise to attempted homicide or murder against B; hence, a complex crime.

In other words, aberratio ictus, generally gives rise to a complex crime. This being so, the penalty for the more serious crime is imposed in the maximum period. This is the legal effect. The only time when a complex crime may not result in aberratio ictus is when one of the resulting felonies is a light felony.


Question & Answer

The facts were one of aberratio ictus, but the facts stated that the offender aimed carelessly in firing the shot. Is the felony the result of dolo or culpa? What crime was committed?

All three instances under paragraph 1, Article 4 are the product of dolo. In aberratio ictus, error in personae and praeter intentionem, never think of these as the product of culpa. They are always the result of an intended felony, and, henc,e dolo. You cannot have these situations out of criminal negligence. The crime committed is attempted homicide or attempted murder, not homicide through reckless imprudence.


Error in personae

In error in personae, the intended victim was not at the scene of the crime. It was the actual victim upon whom the blow was directed, but he was not really the intended victim. There was really a mistake in identity.

This is very important because Article 49 applies only in a case of error in personae and not in a case of abberatio ictus.

In Article 49, when the crime intended is more serious than the crime actually committed or vice-versa, whichever crime carries the lesser penalty, that penalty will be the one imposed. But it will be imposed in the maximum period. For instance, the offender intended to commit homicide, but what was actually committed with parricide because the person he killed by mistake was somebody related to him within the degree of relationship in parricide. In such a case, the offender will be charged with parricide, but the penalty that would be imposed will be that of homicide. This is because under Article 49, the penalty for the lesser crime will be the one imposed, whatever crime the offender is prosecuted under. In any event, the offender is prosecuted for the crime committed not for the crime intended.

Illustrations:

A thought of killing B. He positioned himself at one corner where B would usually pass. When a figure resembling B was approaching, A hid and when that figure was near him, he suddenly hit him with a piece of wood on the nape, killing him. But it turned out that it was his own father. The crime committed is parricide, although what was intended was homicide. Article 49, therefore, will apply because out of a mistake in identity, a crime was committed different from that which was intended.

In another instance, A thought of killing B. Instead of B, C passed. A thought that he was B, so he hit C on the neck, killing the latter. Just the same, the crime intended to be committed is homicide and what was committed is actually homicide, Article 49 does not apply. Here, error in personae is of no effect.

How does error in personae affect criminal liability of the offender?

Error in personae is mitigating if the crime committed is different from that which was intended. If the crime committed is the same as that which was intended, error in personae does not affect the criminal liability of the offender.

In mistake of identity, if the crime committed was the same as the crime intended, but on a different victim, error in persona does not affect the criminal liability of the offender. But if the crime committed was different from the crime intended, Article 49 will apply and the penalty for the lesser crime will be applied. In a way, mistake in identity is a mitigating circumstance where Article 49 applies. Where the crime intended is more serious than the crime committed, the error in persona is not a mitigating circumstance
Praeter intentionem

In People v. Gacogo, 53 Phil 524, two persons quarreled. They had fist blows. The other started to run away and Gacogo went after him, struck him with a fist blow at the back of the head. Because the victim was running, he lost balance, he fell on the pavement and his head struck the cement pavement. He suffered cerebral hemorrhage. Although Gacogo claimed that he had no intention of killing the victim, his claim is useless. Intent to kill is only relevant when the victim did not die. This is so because the purpose of intent to kill is to differentiate the crime of physical injuries from the crime of attempted homicide or attempted murder or frustrated homicide or frustrated murder. But once the victim is dead, you do not talk of intent to kill anymore. The best evidence of intent to kill is the fact that victim was killed. Although Gacogo was convicted for homicide for the death of the person, he was given the benefit of paragraph 3 of Article13, that is, " that the offender did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as that committed”.

This is the consequence of praeter intentionem. In short, praeter intentionem is mitigating, particularly covered by paragraph 3 of Article 13. In order however, that the situation may qualify as praeter intentionem, there must be a notable disparity between the means employed and the resulting felony. If there is no disparity between the means employed by the offender and the resulting felony, this circumstance cannot be availed of. It cannot be a case of praeter intentionem because the intention of a person is determined from the means resorted to by him in committing the crime.

Illustrations:

A stabbed his friend when they had a drinking spree. While they were drinking, they had some argument about a basketball game and they could not agree, so he stabbed him eleven times. His defense is that he had no intention of killing his friend. He did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. It was held that the fact that 11 wounds were inflicted on A's friend is hardly compatible with the idea that he did not intend to commit so grave a wrong that committed.

In another instance, the accused was a homosexual. The victim ridiculed or humiliated him while he was going to the restroom. He was so irritated that he just stabbed the victim at the neck with a lady’s comb with a pointed handle, killing the victim. His defense was that he did not intend to kill him. He did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as that of killing him. That contention was rejected, because the instrument used was pointed. The part of the body wherein it was directed was the neck which is a vital part of the body. In praeter intentionem, it is mitigating only if there is a notable or notorious disparity between the means employed and the resulting felony. In criminal law, intent of the offender is determined on the basis employed by him and the manner in which he committed the crime. Intention of the offender is not what is in his mind; it is disclosed in the manner in which he committed the crime.

In still another case, the accused entered the store of a Chinese couple, to commit robbery. They hogtied the Chinaman and his wife. Because the wife was so talkative, one of the offenders got a pan de sal and put it in her mouth. But because the woman was trying to wriggle from the bondage, the pan de sal slipped through her throat. She died because of suffocation. The offender were convicted for robbery with homicide because there was a resulting death, although their intention was only to rob. They were given the benefit of paragraph 3 of Article 13, “that they did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as that committed”. There was really no intention to bring about the killing, because it was the pan de sal they put into the mouth. Had it been a piece of rag, it would be different. In that case, the Supreme Court gave the offenders the benefit of praeter intentionem as a mitigating circumstance. The means employed is not capable of producing death if only the woman chewed the pan de sal.

A man raped a young girl. The young girl was shouting so the man placed his hand on the mouth and nose of the victim. He found out later that the victim was dead already; she died of suffocation. The offender begged that he had no intention of killing the girl and that his only intention was to prevent her from shouting. The Supreme Court rejected the plea saying that one can always expect that a person who is suffocated may eventually die. So the offender was prosecuted for the serious crime of rape with homicide and he was not given the benefit of paragraph 3, Article 13.

Differentiating this first case with the case of the Chinamana nd his wife, it would seem that the difference lies in the means employed by the offender.

In praeter intentionem, it is essential that there is a notable disparity between the means employed or the act of the offender and the felony which resulted. This means that the resulting felony cannot be foreseen from the acts of the offender. If the resulting felony can be foreseen or anticipated from the means employed, the circumstance of praeter intentionem does not apply.

For example, if A gave B a karate blow in the throat, there is no praeter intentionem because the blow to the throat can result in death.

So also, if A tried to intimidate B by poking a gun at the latter’s back, and B died of a cardiac arrest, A will be prosecuted for homicide but will be given the mitigating circumstance praeter intentionem.


Impossible crime

An impossible crime is an act which would be an offense against person or property were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.


Question & Answer

1. Accused was a houseboy in a house where only a spinster resides. It is customary for the spinster to sleep nude because her room was warm. It was also the habit of the houseboy that whenever she enters her room, the houseboy would follow and peek into the keyhole. Finally, when the houseboy could no longer resist the urge, he climbed into the ceiling, went inside the room of his master, placed himself on top of her and abused her, not knowing that she was already dead five minutes earlier. Is an impossible crime committed?

Yes. Before, the act performed by the offender could not have been a crime against person or property. The act performed would have been constituted a crime against chastity. An impossible crime is true only if the act done by the offender constitutes a crime against person or property. However, with the new rape law amending the Revised Penal Code and classifying rape as a crime against persons, it is now possible that an impossible crime was committed. Note, however, that the crime might also fall under the Revised Administrative Code – desecrating the dead.

2. A was driving his car around Roxas Boulevard when a person hitched a ride. Because this person was exquisitely dressed, A readily welcomed the fellow inside his car and he continued driving. When he reached a motel, A suddenly swerved his car inside. A started kissing his passenger, but he found out that his passenger was not a woman but a man, and so he pushed him out of the car, and gave him fist blows. Is an impossible crime committed? If not, is there any crime committed at all?

It cannot be an impossible crime, because the act would have been a crime against chastity. The crime is physical injuries or acts of lasciviousness, if this was done against the will of the passenger. There are two ways of committing acts of lasciviousness. Under Article 336, where the acts of lasciviousness were committed under circumstances of rape, meaning to say, there is employment of violence or intimidation or the victim is deprived of reason. Even if the victim is a man, the crime of acts of lasciviousness is committed. This is a crime that is not limited to a victim who is a woman. Acts of lasciviousness require a victim to be a woman only when it is committed under circumstances of seduction. If it is committed under the circumstances of rape, the victim may be a man or a woman. The essence of an impossible crime is the inherent impossibility of accomplishing the crime or the inherent impossibility of the means employed to bring about the crime. When we say inherent impossibility, this means that under any and all circumstances, the crime could not have materialized. If the crime could have materialized under a different set of facts, employing the same mean or the same act, it is not an impossible crime; it would be an attempted felony.

Under Article 4, paragraph 2, impossible crime is true only when the crime committed would have been against person or against property. It is, therefore, important to know what are the crimes under Title VIII, against persons and those against property under Title X. An impossible crime is true only to any of those crimes.

3. A entered a department store at about midnight, when it was already closed. He went directly to the room where the safe or vault was being kept. He succeeded in opening the safe, but the safe was empty. Is an impossible crime committed? If not, what crime is possibly committed?

This is not an impossible crime. That is only true if there is nothing more to steal. But in a department store, where there is plenty to steal, not only the money inside the vault or safe. The fact that the vault had turned out to be empty is not really inherently impossible to commit the crime of robbery. There are other things that he could take. The crime committed therefore is attempted robbery, assuming that he did not lay his hands on any other article. This could not be trespass to dwelling because there are other things that can be stolen.

4. A and B were lovers. B was willing to marry A except that A is already married. A thought of killing his wife. He prepared her breakfast every morning, and every morning, he placed a little dose of arsenic poison into the breakfast of the wife. The wife consumed all the food prepared by her husband including the poison but nothing happened to the wife. Because of the volume of the household chores that the wife had to attend to daily, she developed a physical condition that rendered her so strong and resistance to any kind of poisoning, so the amount of poison applied to her breakfast has no effect to her. Is there an impossible crime?

No impossible crime is committed because the fact itself stated that what prevented the poison from taking effect is the physical condition of the woman. So it implies that if the woman was not of such physical condition, the poison would have taken effect. Hence, it is not inherently impossible to realize the killing. The crime committed is frustrated parricide.

If it were a case of poisoning , an impossible crime would be constituted if a person who was thinking that it was a poison that he was putting into the food of the intended victim but actually it was vetsin or sugar or soda. Under any and all circumstances, the crime could not have been realized. But if due to the quantity of vetsin or sugar or soda, the intended victim developed LBM and was hospitalized, then it would not be a case of impossible crime anymore. It would be a case of physical injuries, if the act done does not amount to some other crime under the Revised Penal Code.

Do not confuse an impossible crime with the attempted or frustrated stage.

5. Scott and Charles are roommate in a boarding house. Everyday, Scott leaves for work but before leaving he would lock the food cabinet where he kept his food. Charles resented this. One day, he got an electric cord tied the one end to the door knob and plugged the other end to an electric outlet. The idea was that, when Scott comes home to open the door knob, he would be electrocuted. Unknown to Charles, Scott is working in an electronic shop where he received a daily dosage of electric shock. When Scott opened the doorknob, nothing happened to him. He was just surprised to find out that there was an electric cord plugged to the outlet and the other hand to the door knob. Whether an impossible crime was committed or not?

It is not an impossible crime. The means employed is not inherently impossible to bring about the consequence of his felonious act. What prevented the consummation of the crime was because of some cause independent of the will of the perpetrator.

6. A and B are enemies. A, upon seeing B, got the revolver of his father, shot B, but the revolver did not discharge because the bullets were old, none of them discharged. Was an impossible crime committed?

No. It was purely accidental that the firearm did not discharge because the bullets were old. If they were new, it would have fired. That is a cause other than the spontaneous desistance of the offender, and therefore, an attempted homicide.

But if let us say, when he started squeezing the trigger, he did not realize that the firearm was empty. There was no bullet at all. There is an impossible crime, because under any and all circumstances, an unloaded firearm will never fire.

Whenever you are confronted with a problem where the facts suggest that an impossible crime was committed, be careful about the question asked. If the question asked is: “Is an impossible crime committed?”, then you judge that question on the basis of the facts. If really the facts constitute an impossible crime, then you suggest than an impossible crime is committed, then you state the reason for the inherent impossibility.

If the question asked is “Is he liable for an impossible crime?”, this is a catching question. Even though the facts constitute an impossible crime, if the act done by the offender constitutes some other crimes under the Revised Penal Code, he will not be liable for an impossible crime. He will be prosecuted for the crime constituted so far by the act done by him. The reason is an offender is punished for an impossible crime just to teach him a lesson because of his criminal perversity. Although objectively, no crime is committed, but subjectively, he is a criminal. That purpose of the law will also be served if he is prosecuted for some other crime constituted by his acts which are also punishable under the RPC.

7. A and B are neighbors. They are jealous of each other’s social status. A thought of killing B so A climbed the house of B through the window and stabbed B on the heart, not knowing that B died a few minutes ago of bangungot. Is A liable for an impossible crime?

No. A shall be liable for qualified trespass to dwelling. Although the act done by A against B constitutes an impossible crime, it is the principle of criminal law that the offender shall be punished for an impossible crime only when his act cannot be punished under some other provisions in the Revised Penal Code.

In other words, this idea of an impossible crime is a one of last resort, just to teach the offender a lesson because of his criminal perversity. If he could be taught of the same lesson by charging him with some other crime constituted by his act, then that will be the proper way. If you want to play safe, you state there that although an impossible crime is constituted, yet it is a principle of criminal law that he will only be penalized for an impossible crime if he cannot be punished under some other provision of the Revised Penal Code.

If the question is “Is an impossible crime is committed?”, the answer is yes, because on the basis of the facts stated, an impossible crime is committed. But to play safe, add another paragraph: However, the offender will not be prosecuted for an impossible crime but for _____ [state the crime]. Because it is a principle in criminal law that the offender can only be prosecuted for an impossible crime if his acts do not constitute some other crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code. An impossible crime is a crime of last resort.


Modified concept of impossible crime:

In a way, the concept of impossible crime has been modified by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Intod v. CA, et al., 215 SCRA 52. In this case, four culprits, all armed with firearms and with intent to kill, went to the intended victim’s house and after having pinpointed the latter’s bedroom, all four fired at and riddled said room with bullets, thinking that the intended victim was already there as it was about 10:00 in the evening. It so happened that the intended victim did not come home on the evening and so was not in her bedroom at that time. Eventually the culprits were prosecuted and convicted by the trial court for attempted murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment but the Supreme Court modified the same and held the petitioner liable only for the so-called impossible crime. As a result, petitioner-accused was sentenced to imprisonment of only six months of arresto mayor for the felonious act he committed with intent to kill: this despite the destruction done to the intended victim’s house. Somehow, the decision depreciated the seriousness of the act committed, considering the lawlessness by which the culprits carried out the intended crime, and so some members of the bench and bar spoke out against the soundness of the ruling. Some asked questions: Was it really the impossibility of accomplishing the killing that brought about its non-accomplishment? Was it not purely accidental that the intended victim did not come home that evening and, thus, unknown to the culprits, she was not in her bedroom at the time it was shot and riddled with bullets? Suppose, instead of using firearms, the culprits set fire on the intended victim’s house, believing she was there when in fact she was not, would the criminal liability be for an impossible crime?

Until the Intod case, the prevailing attitude was that the provision of the Revised Penal Code on impossible crime would only apply when the wrongful act, which would have constituted a crime against persons or property, could not and did not constitute another felony. Otherwise, if such act constituted any other felony although different from what the offender intended, the criminal liability should be for such other felony and not for an impossible crime. The attitude was so because Article 4 of the Code provides two situations where criminal liability shall be incurred, to wit:

Art 4. Criminal liability – Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act be different from that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

Paragraph 1 refers to a situation where the wrongful act done constituted a felony although it may be different from what he intended. Paragraph 2 refers to a situation where the wrongful act done did not constitute any felony, but because the act would have given rise to a crime against persons or against property, the same is penalized to repress criminal tendencies to curtail their frequency. Because criminal liability for impossible crime presupposes that no felony resulted from the wrongful act done, the penalty is fixed at arresto mayor or a fine from P200.00 to P500.00, depending on the “social danger and degree of criminality shown by the offender” (Article 59), regardless of whether the wrongful act was an impossible crime against persons or against property.

There is no logic in applying paragraph 2 of Article 4 to a situation governed by paragraph 1 of the same Article, that is, where a felony resulted. Otherwise, a redundancy and duplicity would be perpetrated.

In the Intod case, the wrongful acts of the culprits caused destruction to the house of the intended victim; this felonious act negates the idea of an impossible crime. But whether we agree or not, the Supreme Court has spoken, we have to respect its ruling.


NO CRIME UNLESS THERE IS A LAW PUNISHING IT

When a person is charged in court, and the court finds that there is no law applicable, the court will acquit the accused and the judge will give his opinion that the said act should be punished.

Article 5 covers two situations:

(1) The court cannot convict the accused because the acts do not constitute a crime. The proper judgment is acquittal, but the court is mandated to report to the Chief Executive that said act be made subject of penal legislation and why.

(2) Where the court finds the penalty prescribed for the crime too harsh considering the conditions surrounding the commission of he crime, the judge should impose the law. The most that he could do is to recommend to the Chief Executive to grant executive clemency.

Criminal Law (2)

FELONY, OFFENSE, MISDEMEANOR AND CRIME

Felony
A crime under the Revised Penal Code is referred to as a felony. Do not use this term in reference to a violation of special law.

Offense
A crimes punished under a special law is called as statutory offense.

Misdemeanor
A minor infraction of the law, such as a violation of an ordinance, is referred to as a misdemeanor.


Crime
Whether the wrongdoing is punished under the Revised Penal Code or under a special law, the generic word crime can be used.


SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE

The provision in Article 2 embraces two scopes of applications:
(1) Intraterritorial – refers to the application of the Revised Penal Code within the Philippine territory;
(2) Extraterritorial – refers to the application of the Revised Penal Code outside the Philippine territory.


Intraterritorial application

In the intraterritorial application of the Revised Penal Code, Article 2 makes it clear that it does not refer only to Philippine archipelago but it also includes the atmosphere, interior waters and maritime zone. So whenever you use the word territory, do not limit this to land area only.

As far as jurisdiction or application of the Revised Penal Code over crimes committed on maritime zones or interior waters, the Archipelagic Rule shall be observed. So the three-mile limit on our shoreline has been modified by the rule. Any crime committed in interior waters comprising the Philippine archipelago shall be subject to our laws although committed on board a foreign merchant vessel.

A vessel is considered a Philippine ship only when it is registered in accordance with Philippine laws. Under international law, as long as such vessel is not within the territorial waters of a foreign country, Philippine laws shall govern.


Extraterritorial application

Extraterritorial application of the Revised Penal Code on crime committed on board Philippine ship or airship refers only to a situation where the Philippine ship or airship is not within the territorial waters or atmosphere of a foreign country. Otherwise, it is the foreign country’s criminal law that will apply.

However, there are two situations where the foreign country may not apply its criminal law even if a crime was committed on board a vessel within its territorial waters and these are:

(1) When the crime is committed in a war vessel of a foreign country, because war vessels are part of the sovereignty of the country to whose naval force they belong;

(2) When the foreign country in whose territorial waters the crime was committed adopts the French Rule, which applies only to merchant vessels, except when the crime committed affects the national security or public order of such foreign country.


The French Rule

The French Rule provides that the nationality of the vessel follows the flag which the vessel flies, unless the crime committed endangers the national security of a foreign country where the vessel is within jurisdiction in which case such foreign country will never lose jurisdiction over such vessel.


The American or Anglo-Saxon Rule

This rule strictly enforces the territoriality of criminal law. The law of the foreign country where a foreign vessel is within its jurisdiction is strictly applied, except if the crime affects only the internal management of the vessel in which case it is subject to the penal law of the country where it is registered.

Both the rules apply only to a foreign merchant vessel if a crime was committed aboard that vessel while it was in the territorial waters of another country. If that vessel is in the high seas or open seas, there is no occasion to apply the two rules. If it is not within the jurisdiction of any country, these rules will not apply.


Question & Answer

A vessel is not registered in the Philippines. A crime is committed outside Philippine territorial waters. Then the vessel entered our territory. Will the Revised Penal Code apply?

Yes. Under the old Rules of Criminal Procedure, for our courts to take cognizance of any crime committed on board a vessel during its voyage, the vessel must be registered in the Philippines in accordance with Philippine laws.
Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, however, the requirement that the vessel must be licensed and registered in accordance with Philippine laws has been deleted from Section 25, paragraph c of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. The intention is to do away with that requirement so that as long as the vessel is not registered under the laws of any country, our courts can take cognizance of the crime committed in such vessel.

More than this, the revised provision added the phrase “in accordance with generally accepted principles of International Law”. So the intention is clear to adopt generally accepted principles of international law in the matter of exercising jurisdiction over crimes committed in a vessel while in the course of its voyage. Under international law rule, a vessel which is not registered in accordance with the laws of any country is considered a pirate vessel and piracy is a crime against humanity in general, such that wherever the pirates may go, they can be prosecuted.

Prior to the revision, the crime would not have been prosecutable in our court. With the revision, registration is not anymore a requirement and replaced with generally accepted principles of international law. Piracy is considered a crime against the law of nations.

In your answer, reference should be made to the provision of paragraph c of Section15 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The crime may be regarded as an act of piracy as long as it is done with “intent to gain”.


When public officers or employees commit an offense in the exercise of their functions

The most common subject of bar problems in Article 2 is paragraph 4: “While being public officers or employees, [they] should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions:”

As a general rule, the Revised Penal Code governs only when the crime committed pertains to the exercise of the public official’s functions, those having to do with the discharge of their duties in a foreign country. The functions contemplated are those, which are, under the law, to be performed by the public officer in the Foreign Service of the Philippine government in a foreign country.

Exception: The Revised Penal Code governs if the crime was committed within the Philippine Embassy or within the embassy grounds in a foreign country. This is because embassy grounds are considered an extension of sovereignty.

Illustration:

A Philippine consulate official who is validly married here in the Philippines and who marries again in a foreign country cannot be prosecuted here for bigamy because this is a crime not connected with his official duties. However, if the second marriage was celebrated within the Philippine embassy, he may be prosecuted here, since it is as if he contracted the marriage here in the Philippines.


Question & Answer

A consul was to take a deposition in a hotel in Singapore. After the deposition, the deponent approached the consul’s daughter and requested that certain parts of the deposition be changed in consideration for $10,000.00. The daughter persuaded the consul and the latter agreed. Will the crime be subject to the Revised Penal Code? If so, what crime or crimes have been committed?

Yes. Falsification.

Normally, the taking of the deposition is not the function of the consul, his function being the promotion of trade and commerce with another country. Under the Rules of Court, however, a consul can take depositions or letters rogatory. There is, therefore, a definite provision of the law making it the consul’s function to take depositions. When he agreed to the falsification of the deposition, he was doing so as a public officer in the service of the Philippine government.

Paragraph 5 of Article 2, use the phrase “as defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code.”
This is a very important part of the exception, because Title I of Book 2 (crimes against national security) does not include rebellion. So if acts of rebellion were perpetrated by Filipinos who were in a foreign country, you cannot give territorial application to the Revised Penal Code, because Title I of Book 2 does not include rebellion.

Illustration:

When a Filipino who is already married in the Philippines, contracts another marriage abroad, the crime committed is bigamy. But the Filipino can not be prosecuted when he comes back to the Philippines, because the bigamy was committed in a foreign country and the crime is not covered by paragraph 5 of Article 2. However, if the Filipino, after the second marriage, returns to the Philippines and cohabits here with his second wife, he commits the crime of concubinage for which he can be prosecuted.

The Revised Penal Code shall not apply to any other crime committed in a foreign country which does not come under any of the exceptions and which is not a crime against national security.


HOW A FELONY MAY ARISE

Punishable by the Revised Penal Code

The term felony is limited only to violations of the Revised Penal Code. When the crime is punishable under a special law you do not refer to this as a felony. So whenever you encounter the term felony, it is to be understood as referring to crimes under the Revised Penal Code
.
This is important because there are certain provisions in the Revised Penal Code where the term “felony” is used, which means that the provision is not extended to crimes under special laws. A specific instance is found in Article 160 – Quasi-Recidivism, which reads:

A person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve sentence or while serving the same, shall be punished under the maximum period of the penalty.

Note that the word "felony" is used.


Questions & Answers

1. If a prisoner who is serving sentence is found in possession of dangerous drugs, can he be considered a quasi-recidivist?

No. The violation of Presidential Decree No. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) is not a felony. The provision of Article 160 specifically refers to a felony and felonies are those acts and omissions punished under the Revised Penal Code.

2. Is illegal possession of bladed weapon a felony?

No. It is not under the Revised Penal Code.


An act or omission

To be considered as a felony there must be an act or omission; a mere imagination no matter how wrong does not amount to a felony. An act refers to any kind of body movement that produces change in the outside world. For example, if A, a passenger in a jeepney seated in front of a lady, started putting out his tongue suggesting lewdness, that is already an act in contemplation of criminal law. He cannot claim that there was no crime committed. If A scratches something, this is already an act which annoys the lady he may be accused of unjust vexation, not malicious mischief.


Dolo or culpa

However, It does not mean that if an act or omission is punished under the Revised Penal Code, a felony is already committed. To be considered a felony, it must also be done with dolo or culpa.

Under Article 3, there is dolo when there is deceit. This is no longer true. At the time the Revised Penal Code was codified, the term nearest to dolo was deceit. However, deceit means fraud, and this is not the meaning of dolo.

Dolo is deliberate intent otherwise referred to as criminal intent, and must be coupled with freedom of action and intelligence on the part of the offender as to the act done by him.

The term, therefore, has three requisites on the part of the offender:
(1) Criminal intent;
(2) Freedom of action; and
(3) Intelligence.

If any of these is absent, there is no dolo. If there is no dolo, there could be no intentional felony.


Question & Answer

What requisites must concur before a felony may be committed?

There must be (1) an act or omission; (2) punishable by the Revised Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or the omission incurred by means of dolo or culpa.


But although there is no intentional felony, there could be a culpable felony. Culpa requires the concurrence of three requisites:

(1) criminal negligence on the part of the offender , that is, the crime was the result of negligence, reckless imprudence, lack of foresight or lack of skill;

(2) freedom of action on the part of the offender, that is, he was not acting under duress; and

(3) Intelligence on the part of the offender in performing the negligent act.

Between dolo and culpa, the distinction lies on the criminal intent and criminal negligence. If any of these requisites is absent, there can be no dolo nor culpa. When there is no dolo or culpa, a felony cannot arise.


Question & Answer

What do you understand by “voluntariness” in criminal law?

The word voluntariness in criminal law does not mean acting in one’s own volition. In criminal law, voluntariness comprehends the concurrence of freedom of action, intelligence and the fact that the act was intentional. In culpable felonies, there is no voluntariness if either freedom, intelligence or imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill is lacking. Without voluntariness, there can be no dolo or culpa, hence, there is no felony.

In a case decided by the Supreme Court, two persons went wild boar hunting. On their way, they met Pedro standing by the door of his house and they asked him where they could find wild boars. Pedro pointed to a place where wild boars were supposed to be found, and the two proceeded thereto. Upon getting to the place, they saw something moving, they shot, unfortunately the bullet ricocheted killing Pedro. It was held that since there was neither dolo nor culpa, there is no criminal liability.

In US v. Bindoy, accused had an altercation with X. X snatched the bolo from the accused. To prevent X from using his bolo on him, accused tried to get it from X. Upon pulling it back towards him, he hit someone from behind, instantly killing the latter. The accused was found to be not liable. In criminal law, there is pure accident, and the principle damnum absque injuria is also honored.

Even culpable felonies require voluntariness. It does not mean that if there is no criminal intent, the offender is absolved of criminal liability, because there is culpa to consider.


Criminal Intent

Criminal Intent is not deceit. Do not use deceit in translating dolo, because the nearest translation is deliberate intent.

In criminal law, intent is categorized into two:

(1) General criminal intent; and

(2) Specific criminal intent.

General criminal intent is presumed from the mere doing of a wrong act. This does not require proof. The burden is upon the wrong doer to prove that he acted without such criminal intent.

Specific criminal intent is not presumed because it is an ingredient or element of a crime, like intent to kill in the crimes of attempted or frustrated homicide/parricide/murder. The prosecution has the burden of proving the same.

Distinction between intent and discernment

Intent is the determination to do a certain thing, an aim or purpose of the mind. It is the design to resolve or determination by which a person acts.

On the other hand, discernment is the mental capacity to tell right from wrong. It relates to the moral significance that a person ascribes to his act and relates to the intelligence as an element of dolo, distinct from intent.

Distinction between intent and motive

Intent is demonstrated by the use of a particular means to bring about a desired result – it is not a state of mind or a reason for committing a crime.

On the other hand, motive implies motion. It is the moving power which impels one to do an act. When there is motive in the commission of a crime, it always comes before the intent. But a crime may be committed without motive.

If the crime is intentional, it cannot be committed without intent. Intent is manifested by the instrument used by the offender. The specific criminal intent becomes material if the crime is to be distinguished from the attempted or frustrated stage. For example, a husband came home and found his wife in a pleasant conversation with a former suitor. Thereupon, he got a knife. The moving force is jealousy. The intent is the resort to the knife, so that means he is desirous to kill the former suitor. Even if the offender states that he had no reason to kill the victim, this is not criminal intent. Criminal intent is the means resorted to by him that brought about the killing. If we equate intent as a state of mind, many would escape criminal liability.

In a case where mother and son were living in the same house, and the son got angry and strangled his mother, the son, when prosecuted for parricide, raised the defense that he had no intent to kill his mother. It was held that criminal intent applies on the strangulation of the vital part of the body. Criminal intent is on the basis of the act, not on the basis if what the offender says.

Look into motive to determine the proper crime which can be imputed to the accused. If a judge was killed, determine if the killing has any relation to the official functions of the judge in which case the crime would be direct assault complexed with murder/homicide, not the other way around. If it has no relation, the crime is simply homicide or murder.

Omission is the inaction, the failure to perform a positive duty which he is bound to do. There must be a law requiring the doing or performing of an act.

Distinction between negligence and imprudence
(1) In negligence, there is deficiency of action;
(2) in imprudence, there is deficiency of perception.

Mens rea

The technical term mens rea is sometimes referred to in common parlance as the gravamen of the offense. To a layman, that is what you call the “bullseye” of the crime. This term is used synonymously with criminal or deliberate intent, but that is not exactly correct.

Mens rea of the crime depends upon the elements of the crime. You can only detect the mens rea of a crime by knowing the particular crime committed. Without reference to a particular crime, this term is meaningless. For example, in theft, the mens rea is the taking of the property of another with intent to gain. In falsification, the mens rea is the effecting of the forgery with intent to pervert the truth. It is not merely writing something that is not true; the intent to pervert the truth must follow the performance of the act.

In criminal law, we sometimes have to consider the crime on the basis of intent. For example, attempted or frustrated homicide is distinguished from physical injuries only by the intent to kill. Attempted rape is distinguished from acts of lasciviousness by the intent to have sexual intercourse. In robbery, the mens rea is the taking of the property of another coupled with the employment of intimidation or violence upon persons or things; remove the employment of force or intimidation and it is not robbery anymore.


Mistake of fact

When an offender acted out of a misapprehension of fact, it cannot be said that he acted with criminal intent. Thus, in criminal law, there is a “mistake of fact”. When the offender acted out of a mistake of fact, criminal intent is negated, so do not presume that the act was done with criminal intent. This is absolutory if crime involved dolo.

Mistake of fact would be relevant only when the felony would have been intentional or through dolo, but not when the felony is a result of culpa. When the felony is a product of culpa, do not discuss mistake of fact. When the felonious act is the product of dolo and the accused claimed to have acted out of mistake of fact, there should be no culpa in determining the real facts, otherwise, he is still criminally liable, although he acted out of a mistake of fact. Mistake of fact is only a defense in intentional felony but never in culpable felony.


Real concept of culpa

Under Article 3, it is clear that culpa is just a modality by which a felony may be committed. A felony may be committed or incurred through dolo or culpa. Culpa is just a means by which a felony may result.

In Article 365, you have criminal negligence as an omission which the article definitely or specifically penalized. The concept of criminal negligence is the inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform an act. If the danger impending from that situation is clearly manifest, you have a case of reckless imprudence. But if the danger that would result from such imprudence is not clear, not manifest nor immediate you have only a case of simple negligence. Because of Article 365, one might think that criminal negligence is the one being punished. That is why a question is created that criminal negligence is the crime in itself.

In People v. Faller, it was stated indirectly that that criminal negligence or culpa is just a mode of incurring criminal liability. In this case, the accused was charged with malicious mischief. Malicious mischief is an intentional negligence under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code. The provision expressly requires that there be a deliberate damaging of property of another, which does not constitute destructive arson. You do not have malicious mischief through simple negligence or reckless imprudence because it requires deliberateness. Faller was charged with malicious mischief, but was convicted of damage to property through reckless imprudence. The Supreme Court pointed out that although the allegation in the information charged the accused with an intentional felony, yet the words feloniously and unlawfully, which are standard languages in an information, covers not only dolo but also culpa because culpa is just a mode of committing a felony.

In Quezon v. Justice of the Peace, Justice J.B.L. Reyes dissented and claimed that criminal negligence is a quasi-offense, and the correct designation should not be homicide through reckless imprudence, but reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The view of Justice Reyes is sound, but the problem is Article 3, which states that culpa is just a mode by which a felony may result.


Question & Answer

Is culpa or criminal negligence a crime?

First, point out Article 3. Under Article 3, it is beyond question that culpa or criminal negligence is just a mode by which a felony may arise; a felony may be committed or incurred through dolo or culpa.

However, Justice J.B.L. Reyes pointed out that criminal negligence is a quasi–offense. His reason is that if criminal negligence is not a quasi-offense, and only a modality, then it would have been absorbed in the commission of the felony and there would be no need for Article 365 as a separate article for criminal negligence. Therefore, criminal negligence, according to him, is not just a modality; it is a crime by itself, but only a quasi-offense.

However, in Samson v. CA, where a person who has been charged with falsification as an intentional felony, was found guilty of falsification through simple negligence. This means that means that culpa or criminal negligence is just a modality of committing a crime.

In some decisions on a complex crime resulting from criminal negligence, the Supreme Court pointed out that when crimes result from criminal negligence, they should not be made the subject of a different information. For instance, the offender was charged with simple negligence resulting in slight physical injuries, and another charge for simple negligence resulting in damage to property. The slight physical injuries which are the result of criminal negligence are under the jurisdiction of the inferior court. But damage to property, if the damage is more than P2,000.00, would be under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court because the imposable fine ranges up to three times the value of the damage.

In People v. Angeles, the prosecution filed an information against the accused in an inferior court for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence and filed also damage to property in the Regional Trial Court. The accused pleaded guilty to the charge of slight physical injuries. When he was arraigned before the Regional Trial Court, he invoked double jeopardy. He was claiming that he could not be prosecuted again for the same criminal negligence. The Supreme Court ruled that here is no double jeopardy because the crimes are two different crimes. Slight physical injuries and damage to property are two different crimes.

In so ruling that there is no double jeopardy, the Supreme Court did not look into the criminal negligence. The Supreme Court looked into the physical injuries and the damage to property as the felonies and not criminal negligence.

In several cases that followed, the Supreme Court ruled that where several consequences result from reckless imprudence or criminal negligence, the accused should be charged only in the Regional Trial Court although the reckless imprudence may result in slight physical injuries. The Supreme Court argued that since there was only one criminal negligence, it would be an error to split the same by prosecuting the accused in one court and prosecuting him again in another for the same criminal negligence. This is tantamount to splitting a cause of action in a civil case. For orderly procedure, the information should only be one. This however, also creates some doubts. As you know, when the information charges the accused for more than the crime, the information is defective unless the crime charged is a complex one or a special complex crime.


CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Since in Article 3, a felony is an act or omission punishable by law, particularly the Revised Penal Code, it follows that whoever commits a felony incurs criminal liability. In paragraph 1 of Article 4, the law uses the word “felony”, that whoever commits a felony incurs criminal liability. A felony may arise not only when it is intended, but also when it is the product of criminal negligence. What makes paragraph 1 of Article 4 confusing is the addition of the qualifier “although the wrongful act be different from what he intended.”


Questions & Answers

1. A man thought of committing suicide and went on top of a tall building. He jumped, landing on somebody else, who died instantly. Is he criminally liable?

Yes. A felony may result not only from dolo but also from culpa. If that fellow who was committing suicide acted negligently, he will be liable for criminal negligence resulting in the death of another.

2. A had been courting X for the last five years. X told A, “Let us just be friends. I want a lawyer for a husband and I have already found somebody whom I agreed to marry. Anyway there are still a lot of ladies around; you will still have your chance with another lady." A, trying to show that he is a sport, went down from the house of X, went inside his car, and stepped on the accelerator to the limit, closed his eyes, started the vehicle. The vehicle zoomed, running over all the pedestrians on the street. At the end, the car stopped at the fence. He was taken to the hospital, and he survived. Can he be held criminally liable for all those innocent people that he ran over, claiming that he was committing suicide?

He will be criminally liable, not for an intentional felony, but for culpable felony. This is so because, in paragraph 1 of Article 4, the term used is “felony”, and that term covers both dolo and culpa.

3. A pregnant woman thought of killing herself by climbing up a tall building and jumped down below. Instead of falling in the pavement, she fell on the owner of the building. An abortion resulted. Is she liable for an unintentional abortion? If not, what possible crime may be committed?

The relevant matter is whether the pregnant woman could commit unintentional abortion upon herself. The answer is no because the way the law defines unintentional abortion, it requires physical violence coming from a third party. When a pregnant woman does an act that would bring about abortion, it is always intentional. Unintentional abortion can only result when a third person employs physical violence upon a pregnant woman resulting to an unintended abortion.


In one case, a pregnant woman and man quarreled. The man could no longer bear the shouting of the woman, so he got his firearm and poked it into the mouth of the woman. The woman became hysterical, so she ran as fast as she could, which resulted in an abortion. The man was prosecuted for unintentional abortion. It was held that an unintentional abortion was not committed. However, drawing a weapon in the height of a quarrel is a crime of other light threats under Article 285. An unintentional abortion can only be committed out of physical violence, not from mere threat.