MANUBAY AND MANUBAY AGRO-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP., INC. VS. HON. ERNESTO GARILAO

MANUBAY AND MANUBAY AGRO-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP., INC. VS. HON. ERNESTO GARILAO
GR No. 140717
April 16, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioners Annie, Anne Marie, James John, James Francis and Anne Margareth Manubay and Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation owned a 124-hectare land in Barrio Cadlan, Pili, Camarines Sur. In November 1994, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Pili issued a notice of coverage placing the property under the comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP). Petitioners did not protest the notice.

In Jul 1996, petitioners filed an application at the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for conversion of the property from agricultural to residential. On August 26, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pili passed a Resolution approving the Pili Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of 1996, reclassifying the subject property from agricultural to highly urbanized intended for mixed residential and commercial use. Thereafter, petitioners requested the DAR Regional Director to set aside the November 1994 notice of coverage, pointing out that the land had been reclassified and the property was no longer suitable for agricultural purposes. The request was denied, on the ground that petitioners had already been given notices of coverage which must have been lifted first either because of retention or exemption.

Respondent Ernesto Garilao, then DAR Secretary, denied petitioners’ application for conversion, considering that the property had already been placed under the CARP.

In April 1998, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the denial of their application for conversion, averring that respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion when he denied their application. According to them, the issuance of a mere notice of coverage placing agricultural land under the CARP was not a ground for the denial of such application.

The CA dismissed the petition, holding that since the issue raised by petitioners involved the administrative implementation of the CARP, the Office of the Prsident (OP) was more competent to rule on the issue. Moreover, by failing to bring the matter to the said office, petitioner did not exhaust all available administrative remedies before resorting to a petition for certiorari.


ISSUE: whether or not the act of a department secretary may be directly challenged in a petition for certiorari.


HELD:

Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, department secretaries are alter egos or assistants of the President and their acts are presumed to be those of the latter unless disapproved or reprobated by him. Thus, as a rule, an aggrieved party affected by the decision of a cabinet secretary need not appeal to the OP and may file a petition for certiorari directly in the Court of Appeals assailing the act of the said secretary.

Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, petitioner must show (1) the public respondent acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and (2) there is no appeal or a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.


In a petition for certiorari premised on grave abuse of discretion, it must be shown that public respondent patently and grossly abused his discretion and that such abuse amounted to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. In other words, the public respondent exercised his power arbitrarily and despotically by reason of passion or hostility.

Here, inasmuch as respondent had a valid ground to deny petitioners’ application, he did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Furthermore, DAR-AO No. 7, s. 1997 requires an appeal (of the denial of application of conversion) to the OP. It was the plain, speedy and adequate remedy contemplated by Section 1 of Rule 65.

Needless to state, elevating the matter to the OP was consistent with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. A party aggrieved by an order of an administrative official should first appeal to the higher administrative authority before seeking judicial relief. Otherwise, as in this case, the complaint will be dismissed for being premature or for having no cause of action.