A Constant Reminder: DESIDERATA

DESIDERATA

- written by Max Ehrmann in the 1920s --

Go placidly amid the noise and the haste,
and remember what peace there may be in silence.

As far as possible, without surrender,
be on good terms with all persons.
Speak your truth quietly and clearly;
and listen to others,
even to the dull and the ignorant;
they too have their story.
Avoid loud and aggressive persons;
they are vexatious to the spirit.

If you compare yourself with others,
you may become vain or bitter,
for always there will be greater and lesser persons than yourself.
Enjoy your achievements as well as your plans.
Keep interested in your own career, however humble;
it is a real possession in the changing fortunes of time.

Exercise caution in your business affairs,
for the world is full of trickery.
But let this not blind you to what virtue there is;
many persons strive for high ideals,
and everywhere life is full of heroism.
Be yourself. Especially do not feign affection.
Neither be cynical about love,
for in the face of all aridity and disenchantment,
it is as perennial as the grass.

Take kindly the counsel of the years,
gracefully surrendering the things of youth.
Nurture strength of spirit to shield you in sudden misfortune.
But do not distress yourself with dark imaginings.
Many fears are born of fatigue and loneliness.

Beyond a wholesome discipline,
be gentle with yourself.
You are a child of the universe
no less than the trees and the stars;
you have a right to be here.
And whether or not it is clear to you,
no doubt the universe is unfolding as it should.

Therefore be at peace with God,
whatever you conceive Him to be.
And whatever your labors and aspirations,
in the noisy confusion of life,
keep peace in your soul.

With all its sham, drudgery, and broken dreams,
it is still a beautiful world.
Be cheerful. Strive to be happy.

Back to the Basics

BACK TO THE BASICS

The Manila Law College turns 110. And as we brave the years onward, we are collectively compelled to revisit our glorious history, understand our reason for existence, gauge our present performance, and define our immediate tasks ahead. Only by doing this mandatory assessment shall we determine our place in the competitive arena of Philippine legal education. We must go back to the basics.

At the outset, we are wont to ask : Are we living up to the distinction of Escuela de Derecho de Manila as the first and oldest Filipino law school, where luminaries in all the branches of the government and the private sector had demonstrated brilliance and excellence in their study of law? Have we learned from their examples and do we take pride in their achievements? Are we proud to be students and graduates of the Manila Law College?

Our answers to these cursory questions can spell our success or failure not only as students of law but more importantly in our individual performance in the Bar examinations.

Don Felipe de Calderon, in establishing the Escuela, envisioned the school as the producer not only of great Filipino lawyers, but of men and women who would exhibit exemplary values in all human activities. The Escuela was founded on nationalism and the pursuit of excellence – where diligence, intelligence, and articulateness were the standard qualities of every student of Law. Our predecessors had put flesh to the ideals of the great Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes – to teach and study law in the grand manner. These vision and ideals are as poignant now as they were then.

Concededly, the Bar is the singular validator of a graduate’s fitness for the practice of law. The gruelling examinations put on probe, in similar albeit indirect fashion, the credibility of the institution, the faculty, and the quality of instruction that they provide. This conclusion is fairly based on the evident practice of taking credit by the school when its graduates pass and top the Bar. In the same manner, the trajectory is cast upon the school when its examinees fail.

At this stage of MLC’s history, we are impelled to ask: How did we perform in the two immediately preceding Bar exams? We must face this basic question and provide the honest answers if we are committed to pursue the vision and the ideals of our noble forebears. We must realistically recognize our present condition if we are avowed to prevent driving the institution into certain oblivion.

Where then do we go from here?

Most certainly, our standard response would be: in the pursuit of excellence – that is, to place the MLC in the Top Ten – to produce highly competitive, competent and virtuous lawyers.

We must satisfy some tests if we desire to be certain of our direction. For each student, the most important test would be: Do we have the knowledge, skills, diligence, dedication, and character to reach those ultimate goals? To the administrators and the faculty: Are we providing the necessary materials and facilities, utilizing the most effective teaching-testing methodologies, and instillling the proper values to bring out the best from the students?

Knowledge

Knowledge here pertains to the optimum amount of understanding of the laws, rules, jurisprudence and legal precepts. We had made the commitment to arm ourselves with the knowledge the very moment that we entered the law school. It would be a futile undertaking if this primordial task were not our top priority. In our global age of technology, there is no room for excuse as to where to find the knowledge that we are expected to possess. Each student is expected to have read and understood the codal provisions, the annotations and commentaries of authors, and the landmark cases.

Skills

This is synonymous with English communication skills. Thus, each applicant to the study of law is required to had completed at least eighteen (18) units of English in his/her pre-law course. This requirement is not borne out of whim or caprice dictated by our English-speaking colonizers – that is entirely besides the point. Our laws and other legal materials are written in the Standard English. It follows that the main tool used in our studies (be it in writing, speaking, reading and listening) is our facility of the English medium. It would not be pathetic to conclude that most failures of students and bar examinees can be attributed to the faulty English communication skills. Like any skill or hobby, proficiency in English is acquired through habitual use and the conscious effort to check the grammar, construction, usage and vocabulary. Lawyers are viewed as pedantic, bombastic and eloquent writers and speakers in English, and this should be so. Those skills were the product of constant practice. In the same manner, we must master the skills of active listening and reading. Given the pressure in which recitations and the Bar examinations are conducted, we must equip ourselves with active reading and listening skills so as to grasp the questions fast and correctly and corollarily provide the correct answers.

Diligence

Some people have the misconception that the legal profession is reserved only for the intelligent, gifted individuals. Lawyers, however, commonly agree that their success is the product of diligence. But what is our appreciation of diligence? Is it the opposite of negligence? That is a correct view in some respects. For example, a student who works nine hours a day, five days a week, enrolled in six subjects: the number of hours allotted for studying should be at least double the number of units per subject. conversely, for Persons and Family Relations which is a 4-unit subject, the minimum number of hours to be devoted to studying the subject should be not less than 8 hours in a week. Ergo, for a load of 18 units, there must be a minimum of 36 hours devoted to private reading in a week. The bottomline is careful time management. The task can be challenging, but will prove fun and rewarding once it becomes a habit. If it is impossible to meet this demand, then perhaps it would be better to lessen the loads to a manageable level; otherwise, be prepared for the consequences. As a wise judge would advise, “it is better to graduate and be a lawyer after long years of studying than graduate soon and fail the Bar early on.”

Dedication

As students of law, our focus should be to pass all subjects with flying colors, and become a competent lawyer soon. Hence, we must dedicate our time, energy and passion in mastering the laws. (Coincidentally, why not rename the degree Master of Laws?) Have you heard of the paradoxical line, “Lady Justice is a jealous mistress”? Ironically, why only regard Law as a mistress and not make her s spouse? That way, everything that we do and aim for would be glady and holistically committed to make our “significant other” happy and contented. That should be our attitude towards our study of law: glad and holistically committed. Indeed, it would not be excessive to set aside social activities for the time being. Sometimes, even immature relationships can be an obstacle in our paths.

Character

Of the five desirable – make that imperative – traits of students of law (students of law include lawyers since the study of law is a continuing process), character is of paramount importance. Character is manifested in what we do in our most private, unguarded moments. Character too is gauged by how we spend our time, power, and money. It involves honesty, integrity, nationalism, industry, courage, humility, faith, and justice – all the good virtues that make great men and women worthy of accolades and emulation even long after they are gone. Character must be the defining quality that sets the legal profession several notches higher than the other professions.

We must pass these tests if we are committed to achieve our vision. We must make the firm commitment to teach and study law in the grand manner – without excuses. Our commitment must begin here and now, before we are perished into oblivion.

(from the Manila Law Journal)

A Homage to MLC Alumni and Movers

The Manila Law College (or the former Escuela de Derecho de Manila) has a formidable list of alumni. We boast of producing a former President, twelve (12) Supreme Court Justices, officers of the Judiciary, and an array of Local Government executives, legislators, educators, businessmen, artists, and revolutionaries.

To begin with, Escuela de Derecho de Manila could not had been conceived without the visionary leadership of Don Felipe de Calderon, the father of the Malolos Constitution.

As we celebrate 110 glorious years, we pay tribute to our marvelous, exemplary alumni:

Jose P. Laurel – President of the Republic of the Philippines (1943-1945); Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (1935-1941),; obtained his Master of Laws from Escuela de Derecho de Manila in 1918

Manuel V. Moran – Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (1945-1966); the Father of Remedial Law, first Philippine ambassador to Spain and the Vatican, LlB 1913

Felix Angelo Bautista – Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (1950-1956), First Dean of the Manila Law College
Manuel Briones – Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
Norberto Romualdez – Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (1921-1932)
Anacleto Diaz – Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (1933-1941)
Antonio Horilleno – Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (1940-1945)
Carlos Imperial – Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (1931)
Guillermo Pablo – Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (1945-1955)
Luis Torres – Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (1949-1950); Secretary of Justice
Jose Gutierrez David – Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (1959-1961)
Felix Martinez – Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals
Domingo Laperal – Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals
Gloria Conti Paras – Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals
Concepcion Felix-Calderon – founder, Assocacion Feminista de Filipinas
Francisco Zulueta – Senator, 1931-1934
Jose Clarin – Senator, 1916-1935
Jose O. Vera – Senator, 1922-1935
Emiliano Trias Tirona – Senator, 1922-1928
Jose Imperial – Senator
Jose Altavas – Senator, 1916-1922
Mariano Jesus Cuenco – Senator, 1941-1965; Cebu Governor, 1931-1934
Vicente Rama – Senator, 1922-1935; Father of Cebu Charter
Pedro Canu Hernaez – Senator, 1941-1947; Father of Bacolod
Pablo Angeles David – Senator, 1947-1953; Pampanga Governor
Vicente Singson Encarnacion – Senator, 1916-1925
Teofisto Guingona, Sr. – Senator, 1919-1925
Jose Clemente Zulueta – Senator, 1951-1957
Vicente J. Francisco – Senator, 1946-1951
Antero Soriano – Senator; Cavite Governor
Eligio Lagman - Pampanga Governor
Pedro Magsalin – Congressman
Leonardo Festin – Congressman
Mauro Versoza – Congressman
Fernando Veloso – Congressman
Marcelino Veloso – Congressman
Pablo Ocampo – Congressman
Jose Roño – Cabinet Secretary
Adolfo Brillantes – Congressman; Bar topnotcher, 1920
Agapito Cruz – Regional Trial Court Judge
Leonardo Cruz – Regional Trial Court Judge
David Nitafan – Regional Trial Court Judge
Andres Borromeo – Judge
Leon Guinto Sr. - Senate Secretary; Manila Mayor
Quintin Salas – Colonel
Jose Corazon de Jesus – Nationalist writer
Teodoro M. Kalaw - Director of National Museum; Secretary of Interior
Jose Escaler - industrialist
Oscar Castelo - Judge; Secretary of National Defense
Marcelo Balatbat - Budget Commissioner
Enrique Altavas - Commissioner
Enrico Palomar - Postmaster General
Rafael Corpuz - Business Executive
Pedro Ocampo - BUsiness Executive
Alfonso Encarnacion - Business Executive
Jose Gatchalian - Business Executive
Benjamin Bautista - Business Executive
Angel dela Paz - Banker
Homer delos Reyes - Banker
Romeo Echauz - Insurance Bank Executive
Flavio Zaragosa Cano - Hiligaynon poet; Bicol Labor Leader (Law undergraduate)
Antonio Molina - National Artist (Law undergraduate)
Carlos Ronquillo - Revolutionary leader (Law undergraduate)
Sergio Canlas Navarro – Kapampangan writer (Law undergraduate
Michaelina Ramos Balasbas - Law firm partner

Roster of Deans:

01 – Dean Felipe G. Calderon
02 – Dean Rafael V. Palma
03 – Dean Teodoro M. Kalaw
04 – Dean Quintin Paredes
05 – Dean Emiliano Tria Tirona
06 – Dean Jose B. Abad Santos
07 – Dean Felix Angelo Bautista
08 – Dean Manuel Camus
09 – Dean Perfecto Laguio
10 – Dean Pablo Meer
11 – Dean Edgardo L. Paras
12 – Dean Enrique Galang
13 – Dean Porfirio V. Sison
14 – Dean Benjamin B. Domingo

EUGENIA MENDOZA vs. ATTY. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE

EUGENIA MENDOZA vs. ATTY. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE
A.C. No. 5338
February 23, 2009
en banc

**Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority for there is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law.


FACTS:

Complainant Augenia Mendoza, a mail sorter at the Central Post Office Manila, borrowed from Rodela Loans, Inc., through respondent Atty. Victor Deciembre, the amount of P20,000.00 payable in six months at 20% interest, secured by 12 blank checks, with numbers 47253, 47256 to 47266, drawn against the Postal Bank. Although she was unable to faithfully pay her obligations on their due dates, she made remittances, however, to respondent's Metrobank account from November 11, 1998 to March 15, 1999 in the total sum of P12,910.00. Claiming that the amounts remitted were not enough to cover the penalties, interests and other charges, respondent warned complainant that he would deposit Postal Check No. 47253 filled up by him on March 30, 1999 in the amount of P16,000.00. Afraid that respondent might sue her in court, complainant made good said check and respondent was able to encash the same on March 30, 1999. Thereafter, complainant made subsequent payments to the Metrobank account of respondent from April 13, 1999 to October 15, 1999, thereby paying respondent the total sum of P35,690.00.

Respondent filled up two of the postal checks she issued in blank, Check Nos. 47261 and 47262 with the amount of P50,000.00 each and with the dates January 15, 2000 and January 20, 2000 respectively, which respondent claims was in exchange for the P100,000.00 cash that complainant received on November 15, 1999. Complainant insisted however that she never borrowed P100,000.00 from respondent and that it was unlikely that respondent would lend her such amount. Complainant also claimed that respondent victimized other employees of the Postal Office by filling up, without authorization, blank checks issued to him as condition for loans.

Respondent averred that his dealings with complainant were done in his private capacity and not as a lawyer, and that when he filed a complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. Blg.) 22 against complainant, he was only vindicating his rights as a private citizen. He alleged further that: it was complainant who deliberately deceived him by not honoring her commitment to their November 15, 1999 transaction involving P100,000.00 and covered by two checks which bounced for the reason “account closed”; the October 13, 1999 transaction was a separate and distinct transaction; complainant filed the disbarment case against him to get even with him for filing the estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 case against the former; complainant's claim that respondent filled up the blank checks issued by complainant is a complete lie; the truth was that the checks referred to were already filled up when complainant affixed her signature thereto; it was unbelievable that complainant would issue blank checks, and that she was a mere low-salaried employee, since she was able to maintain several checking accounts; and if he really intended to defraud complainant, he would have written a higher amount on the checks instead of only P50,000.00.


ISSUE: whether or not Atty. Victor Deciembre is guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and should therefore be disbarred from the practice of law.


HELD:

The practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. A high sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is expected and required of members of the bar. They must conduct themselves with great propriety, and their behavior must be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times.

The fact that there is no attorney-client relationship in this case and the transactions entered into by respondent were done in his private capacity cannot shield respondent, as a lawyer, from liability.

A lawyer may be disciplined for acts committed even in his private capacity for acts which tend to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public. Indeed, there is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in a lawyer's private life or in his professional capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.

In this case, evidence abounds that respondent has failed to live up to the standards required of members of the legal profession. Specifically, respondent has transgressed provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

* CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the integrated bar.
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

As manifested [in the Olbes and Acosta] cases, respondent's offenses are manifold. First, he demands excessive payments from his borrowers; then he fills up his borrowers' blank checks with fictitious amounts, falsifying commercial documents for his material gain; and then he uses said checks as bases for filing unfounded criminal suits against his borrowers in order to harass them. Such acts manifest respondent's perversity of character, meriting his severance from the legal profession.

While the power to disbar is exercised with great caution and is withheld whenever a lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired, the seriousness of respondent's offense compels the Court to wield its supreme power of disbarment. Indeed, the Court will not hestitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it. This is because in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court, with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.

As respondent's misconduct brings intolerable dishonor to the legal profession, the severance of his privilege to practice law for life is in order.

MARIA ANGALAN, et al. vs. ATTY. LEONIDO C. DELANTE

MARIA ANGALAN, et al. vs. ATTY. LEONIDO C. DELANTE
AC No. 7181
February 6, 2009
en banc

FACTS:


In April 1971, herein complainants mortgaged 8.102 hectares of their property to the Eustaquio espouses in consideration of a loan in the amount of P15,000. The Eustaquios prepared a document and sked the complainants to sign it; but because complainants were illiterates, they affixed their marks instead. It turned out that the document was a deed of absolute sale and not a real estate mortgage. Hence, TCT No. 9926 was issued in the name of Navarro Eustaquio.

Complainants engaged the services of respondent Atty. Leonido Delante in November 1971 as shown in the receipt by respondent of P12,000 representing full payment of his professional fees from the complainants. Thereafter, an amicable settlement was entered into between complainants and the Eustaquios which stipulated that the complainants would repurchase the lot at P30,000. But since the complainants did not have the money, Atty. Delante advanced the money to complainants, possessed the property and gathered its produce.

When the complainants tried to repay the money and recover the property, Atty. Delante refused. Complainants learned that Delante transferred the title of the property to his name as evidenced by TCT No. T-57932.

On April 30, 2004, complainants filed with the RTC of Davao a complaint for (1) nullification of the deed of absolute sale, and (2) nullification of TCT No. T-57932; and on December 28, 2005 charged respondent with gross violation of the Code Professional Responsibilty. In April 2007, complainants filed with the Court a motion to withdraw the complaint for disbarment and an affidavit of desistance.


ISSUES:

(1.) whether or not a motion to withdraw the complaint for disbarment and an affidavit of desistance terminates the disbarment proceeding;

(2.) whether or not respondent committed grave violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he bought the property of his clients without their consent and against their will.

HELD:

1. A motion to withdraw the complaint for disbarment and an affidavit of desistance is immaterial. Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that, “No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same.”

2. Respondent violated Canons 16 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 16 states that lawyers shall hold in trust all properties of their clients that may come into their possession. Respondent should have held in trust TCT No. T-9926 and returned the property to complainants upon demand. Instead of holding in trust the property of complainants, respondent (1) transferred the title of the property to his name, (2) refused to return the property to complainants, and (3) referred to complainants’ charges as malicious and untruthful.

Canon 17 states that lawyers shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. Respondent should have been mindful of the trust and confidence complainants reposed in him. Complainants allege that they are illiterate and that the Spouses Eustaquio took advantage of them. Complainants engaged the services of respondent in the hope that he would help them recover their property. Instead of protecting the interests of complainants, respondent took advantage of complainants and transferred the title of the property to his name.

Considering the depravity of respondent’s offense, the Court finds the recommended penalty too light. Violation of Canons 16 and 17 constitutes gross misconduct. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Court for gross misconduct.

A person who takes the 8.102-hectare property of his illiterate clients and who is incapable of telling the truth is unfit to be a lawyer.

The Court finds Atty. Leonido C. Delante GUILTY of violating Canons 16 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

MANUBAY AND MANUBAY AGRO-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP., INC. VS. HON. ERNESTO GARILAO

MANUBAY AND MANUBAY AGRO-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP., INC. VS. HON. ERNESTO GARILAO
GR No. 140717
April 16, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioners Annie, Anne Marie, James John, James Francis and Anne Margareth Manubay and Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation owned a 124-hectare land in Barrio Cadlan, Pili, Camarines Sur. In November 1994, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Pili issued a notice of coverage placing the property under the comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP). Petitioners did not protest the notice.

In Jul 1996, petitioners filed an application at the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for conversion of the property from agricultural to residential. On August 26, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pili passed a Resolution approving the Pili Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of 1996, reclassifying the subject property from agricultural to highly urbanized intended for mixed residential and commercial use. Thereafter, petitioners requested the DAR Regional Director to set aside the November 1994 notice of coverage, pointing out that the land had been reclassified and the property was no longer suitable for agricultural purposes. The request was denied, on the ground that petitioners had already been given notices of coverage which must have been lifted first either because of retention or exemption.

Respondent Ernesto Garilao, then DAR Secretary, denied petitioners’ application for conversion, considering that the property had already been placed under the CARP.

In April 1998, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the denial of their application for conversion, averring that respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion when he denied their application. According to them, the issuance of a mere notice of coverage placing agricultural land under the CARP was not a ground for the denial of such application.

The CA dismissed the petition, holding that since the issue raised by petitioners involved the administrative implementation of the CARP, the Office of the Prsident (OP) was more competent to rule on the issue. Moreover, by failing to bring the matter to the said office, petitioner did not exhaust all available administrative remedies before resorting to a petition for certiorari.


ISSUE: whether or not the act of a department secretary may be directly challenged in a petition for certiorari.


HELD:

Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, department secretaries are alter egos or assistants of the President and their acts are presumed to be those of the latter unless disapproved or reprobated by him. Thus, as a rule, an aggrieved party affected by the decision of a cabinet secretary need not appeal to the OP and may file a petition for certiorari directly in the Court of Appeals assailing the act of the said secretary.

Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, petitioner must show (1) the public respondent acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and (2) there is no appeal or a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.


In a petition for certiorari premised on grave abuse of discretion, it must be shown that public respondent patently and grossly abused his discretion and that such abuse amounted to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. In other words, the public respondent exercised his power arbitrarily and despotically by reason of passion or hostility.

Here, inasmuch as respondent had a valid ground to deny petitioners’ application, he did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Furthermore, DAR-AO No. 7, s. 1997 requires an appeal (of the denial of application of conversion) to the OP. It was the plain, speedy and adequate remedy contemplated by Section 1 of Rule 65.

Needless to state, elevating the matter to the OP was consistent with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. A party aggrieved by an order of an administrative official should first appeal to the higher administrative authority before seeking judicial relief. Otherwise, as in this case, the complaint will be dismissed for being premature or for having no cause of action.

MACA-ANGCOS ALAWIYA, ET AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS

MACA-ANGCOS ALAWIYA, ET AL. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 164170
April 16, 2009

FACTS:

At about 10:00 in the morning of 11 September 2001, while petitioners were cruising on board a vehicle along United Nations Avenue, a blue Toyota Sedan bumped their vehicle from behind. When they went out of their vehicle to assess the damage, several armed men, herein respondents (Police officers Michael Angelo Martin, Allanjing Medina, Arnold Asis, Pedro Gutierrez, Ignacio De Paz and Antonio Berida, Jr., who were assigned at the Northern Police District) alighted from the Toyota Sedan, poked guns at petitioners, blindfolded, and forced them to ride in the car. Petitioners were brought to an office where P10,000,000 and two vehicles were demanded from them in exchange for their freedom. After haggling, the amount was reduced to P700,000 plus the two vehicles. The money and vehicles were delivered in the late evening of 11 September 2001; they were released in the early morning of 12 September 2001 in Quiapo after they handed the Deed of Sale and registration papers of the two vehicles.

The State Prosecutor conducted the preliminary investigation, and issued a Resolution dated 14 January 2002, recommending that the accused be indicted for the crime of kidnapping for ransom. The Resolution was endorsed for approval by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and approved by Chief State Prosecutor.

On 28 January 2002, the trial court, upon motion by the prosecution, issued a Hold Departure Order and on even date, issued a Warrant of Arrest against all the accused. Meanwhile, on 8 February 2002, the accused filed a petition for review of the Resolution of State Prosecutor with the Office of the Secretary of Justice. On 18 February 2002, the accused moved for the quashal of the Information on the ground that the officer who filed the Information has no authority do so.

In an Order dated 27 February 2002, the trial court denied the motion to quash on the ground that under the ruling in People v. Mapalao, an accused who is at large is not entitled to bail or other relief. The trial court also held that the jurisdiction and power of the Ombudsman under Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770 (RA 6770), as well as Administrative Order No. 8 of the Office of the Ombudsman, are not exclusive but shared or concurrent with the regular prosecutors. Thus, the authority of the Department of Justice to investigate, file the information and prosecute the case could no longer be questioned.

In a Resolution promulgated on 24 September 2002, then Secretary of Justice Perez reversed the ruling of State Prosecutor Velasco and ordered the latter to cause the withdrawal or dismissal of the Information for kidnapping for ransom. The Secretary of Justice ruled that there was no prior approval by the Office of the Ombudsman before the Information for kidnapping was filed with the trial court. He also found that the incident complained of was a bungled buy-bust operation, not kidnapping for ransom.


ISSUES:

(1.) Whether the prior approval by the Office of the Ombudsman for the Military is required for the investigation and prosecution of the instant case against the accused;

(2.) Whether the reversal by the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of State Prosecutor Velasco amounted to an “executive acquittal;”

(3.) Whether the accused policemen can seek any relief (via a motion to quash the information) from the trial court when they had not been arrested yet; and

(4.) Whether there was probable cause against the accused for the crime of kidnapping for ransom.


HELD:

On the prior approval by the Ombudsman for the investigation and prosecution of the case against the accused policemen

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), which is representing the Secretary of Justice, agrees with petitioners that prior approval by the Ombudsman is not required for the investigation and prosecution of the criminal case against the accused policemen. The OSG correctly cites the case of Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice, where the Court held that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government such as the provincial, city and state prosecutors. In view of the foregoing, both the Court of Appeals and the Secretary of Justice clearly erred in ruling that prior approval by the Ombudsman is required for the investigation and prosecution of the criminal case against the accused policemen.

On the reversal by the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of State Prosecutor

Settled is the rule that the Secretary of Justice retains the power to review resolutions of his subordinates even after the information has already been filed in court. In Marcelo v. Court of Appeals, reiterated in Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, this Court clarified that nothing in Crespo v. Mogul forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases despite an information already having been filed in court. The nature of the power of control of the Secretary of Justice over prosecutors was explained in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals in this wise:
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary of justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.

Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the Secretary of Justice’s reversal of the Resolution of State Prosecutor did not amount to “executive acquittal” because the Secretary of Justice was simply exercising his power to review, which included the power to reverse the ruling of the State Prosecutor. However, once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on the sound discretion of the court. Trial judges are not bound by the Secretary of Justice’s reversal of the prosecutor’s resolution finding probable cause. Trial judges are required to make their own assessment of the existence of probable cause, separately and independently of the evaluation by the Secretary of Justice.

On the motion to quash the information when the accused had not been arrested yet

People v. Mapalao correctly argued by the OSG, does not squarely apply to the present case. Furthermore, there is nothing in the Rules governing a motion to quash which requires that the accused should be under the custody of the law prior to the filing of a motion to quash on the ground that the officer filing the information had no authority to do so. Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail. However, while the accused are not yet under the custody of the law, any question on the jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when the accused invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.

At any rate, the accused’s motion to quash, on the ground of lack of authority of the filing officer, would have never prospered because as discussed earlier, the Ombudsman’s power to investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government.

On the existence or non-existence of probable cause

Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. However, in the following exceptional cases, this Court may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation.

• a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
• b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
• c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
• d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
• e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
• f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
• g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
• h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
• i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
• j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied; and
• k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners.

There is no clear showing that the present case falls under any of the recognized exceptions. Moreover, as stated earlier, once the information is filed with the trial court, any disposition of the information rests on the sound discretion of the court. The trial court is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the existence of probable cause and it may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice amounts to an abdication of the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine the existence of probable cause.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENJAMIN “KOKOY” ROMUALDEZ and SANDIGANBAYAN

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENJAMIN “KOKOY” ROMUALDEZ and SANDIGANBAYAN
GR No. 166510
April 29, 2009
en banc

FACTS:

Private respondent Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez was charged with violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed “on or about and during the period from 1976 to February 1986”. However, the subject criminal cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan only on 5 November 2001, following a preliminary investigation that commenced only on 4 June 2001. The Information alleged that from 1976 to February 1986, Romualdez, then the Provincial Governor of the Province of Leyte, using his influence with his brother-in-law, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, had himself appointed and/or assigned as Ambassador to foreign countries, particularly the People's Republic of China (Peking), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Jeddah), and United States of America (Washington D.C.), knowing fully well that such appointment and/or assignment is in violation of the existing laws as the Office of the Ambassador or Chief of Mission is incompatible with his position as Governor of the Province of Leyte, thereby enabling himself to collect dual compensation from both the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Provincial Government of Leyte to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount of P5,806,709.50.

ISSUE: whether or not the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription.


HELD:

The time span that elapsed from the alleged commission of the offense up to the filing of the subject cases is clearly beyond the fifteen (15) year prescriptive period provided under Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 3019.

The initial filing of the complaint in 1989 or the preliminary investigation by the PCGG that preceded it could not have interrupted the fifteen (15)-year prescription period under Rep. Act No. 3019. As held in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, the investigatory power of the PCGG extended only to alleged ill-gotten wealth cases, absent previous authority from the President for the PCGG to investigate such graft and corruption cases involving the Marcos cronies. Accordingly, the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG leading to the filing of the first information is void ab initio, and thus could not be considered as having tolled the fifteen (15)-year prescriptive period, notwithstanding the general rule that the commencement of preliminary investigation tolls the prescriptive period. After all, a void ab initio proceeding such as the first preliminary investigation by the PCGG could not be accorded any legal effect by this Court.

The rule is that for criminal violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, the prescriptive period is tolled only when the Office of the Ombudsman receives a complaint or otherwise initiates its investigation. As such preliminary investigation was commenced more than fifteen (15) years after the imputed acts were committed, the offense had already prescribed as of such time.

Further, the flaw was so fatal that the information could not have been cured or resurrected by mere amendment, as a new preliminary investigation had to be undertaken, and evidence had again to be adduced before a new information could be filed. The rule may well be that the amendment of a criminal complaint retroacts to the time of the filing of the original complaint. Yet such rule will not apply when the original information is void ab initio, thus incurable by amendment.

JAIME GOSIACO VS. LETICIA CHING AND EDWIN CASTA

JAIME GOSIACO VS. LETICIA CHING AND EDWIN CASTA
GR No. 173807
April 16, 2009

FACTS:

On 16 February 2000, petitioner Jaime Gosiaco (petitioner) invested P8,000,000.00 with ASB Holdings, Inc. (ASB) by way of loan. The money was loaned to ASB for a period of 48 days with interest at 10.5% which is equivalent to P112,000.00. In exchange, ASB through its Business Development Operation Group manager Ching, issued DBS checks no. 0009980577 and 0009980578 for P8,000,000.00 and P112,000.00 respectively. The checks, both signed by Ching, were drawn against DBS Bank Makati Head Office branch. ASB, through a letter dated 31 March 2000, acknowledged that it owed petitioner the abovementioned amounts.

Upon maturity of the ASB checks, petitioner went to the DBS Bank San Juan Branch to deposit the two (2) checks. However, upon presentment, the checks were dishonored and payments were refused because of a stop payment order and for insufficiency of funds. Petitioner informed respondents, through letters dated 6 and 10 April 2000, about the dishonor of the checks and demanded replacement checks or the return of the money placement but to no avail. Thus, petitioner filed a criminal complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan against the private respondents.

Ching denied liability and claimed that she was a mere employee of ASB. She asserted that she did not have knowledge as to how much money ASB had in the banks. Such responsibility, she claimed belonged to another department.

On 8 February 2001, the MTC acquitted Ching of criminal liability but it did not absolve her from civil liability. The MTC ruled that Ching, as a corporate officer of ASB, was civilly liable since she was a signatory to the checks.


ISSUES:

(1) whether or not a corporate officer who signed a bouncing check is civilly liable under B.P. Blg. 22;
(2) whether or not a corporation can be impleaded in a B.P. Blg. 22 case; and
(3) whether or not there is a basis to pierce the corporate veil of ASB.

HELD:

(1.)

Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law provides: "Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons, who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act."

When a corporate officer issues a worthless check in the corporate name he may be held personally liable for violating a penal statute. The statute imposes criminal penalties on anyone who with intent to defraud another of money or property, draws or issues a check on any bank with knowledge that he has no sufficient funds in such bank to meet the check on presentment. Moreover, the personal liability of the corporate officer is predicated on the principle that he cannot shield himself from liability from his own acts on the ground that it was a corporate act and not his personal act.

The general rule is that a corporate officer who issues a bouncing corporate check can only be held civilly liable when he is convicted. In the recent case of Bautista v. Auto Plus Traders Inc., the Court ruled decisively that the civil liability of a corporate officer in a B.P. Blg. 22 case is extinguished with the criminal liability. We are not inclined through this case to revisit so recent a precedent, and the rule of stare decisis precludes us to discharge Ching of any civil liability arising from the B.P. Blg. 22 case against her, on account of her acquittal in the criminal charge.


(2.)

We are unable to agree with petitioner that he is entitled to implead ASB in the B.P. Blg. 22 case, or any other corporation for that matter, even if the Rules require the joint trial of both the criminal and civil liability. Nowhere in B.P. Blg. 22 is it provided that a juridical person may be impleaded as an accused or defendant in the prosecution for violations of that law, even in the litigation of the civil aspect thereof.

Nonetheless, the substantive right of a creditor to recover due and demandable obligations against a debtor-corporation cannot be denied or diminished by a rule of procedure. Technically, nothing in Section 1(b) of Rule 11 prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action against the juridical person on whose behalf the check was issued. What the rules prohibit is the reservation of a separate civilaction against the natural person charged with violating B.P. Blg. 22, including such corporate officer who had signed the bounced check.


(3.)

In theory the B.P. Blg. 22 criminal liability of the person who issued the bouncing check in behalf of a corporation stands independent of the civil liability of the corporation itself, such civil liability arising from the Civil Code. B.P. Blg. 22 itself fused this criminal liability of the signer of the check in behalf of the corporation with the corresponding civil liability of the corporation itself by allowing the complainant to recover such civil liability not from the corporation, but from the person who signed the check in its behalf. Prior to the amendments to our rules on criminal procedure, it though clearly was permissible to pursue the criminal liability against the signatory, while going after the corporation itself for the civil liability.

However, with the insistence under the amended rules that the civil and criminal liability attaching to the bounced check be pursued jointly, the previous option to directly pursue the civil liability against the person who incurred the civil obligation–the corporation itself–is no longer that clear. In theory, the implied institution of the civil case into the criminal case for B.P. Blg. 22 should not affect the civil liability of the corporation for the same check, since such implied institution concerns the civil liability of the signatory, and not of the corporation.

B.P. Blg. 22 imposes a distinct civil liability on the signatory of the check which is distinct from the civil liability of the corporation for the amount represented from the check. The civil liability attaching to the signatory arises from the wrongful act of signing the check despite the insufficiency of funds in the account, while the civil liability attaching to the corporation is itself the very obligation covered by the check or the consideration for its execution. Yet these civil liabilities are mistaken to be indistinct. The confusion is traceable to the singularity of the amount of each.

If we conclude, as we should, that under the current Rules of Criminal Procedure, the civil action that is impliedly instituted in the B.P. Blg. 22 action is only the civil liability of the signatory, and not that of the corporation itself, the distinctness of the cause of action against the signatory and that against the corporation is rendered beyond dispute. It follows that the actions involving these liabilities should be adjudged according to their respective standards and merits. In the B.P. Blg. 22 case, what the trial court should determine whether or not the signatory had signed the check with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds or credit in the bank account, while in the civil case the trial court should ascertain whether or not the obligation itself is valid and demandable. The litigation of both questions could, in theory, proceed independently and simultaneously without being ultimately conclusive on one or the other.


Note:

The right to recover due and demandable pecuniary obligations incurred by juridical persons such as corporations cannot be impaired by procedural rules. Our rules of procedure governing the litigation of criminal actions for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) have given the appearance of impairing such substantive rights, and we take the opportunity herein to assert the necessary clarifications.

B.P. Blg. 22 was enacted to address the rampant issuance of bouncing checks as payment for pre-existing obligations. The circulation of bouncing checks adversely affected confidence in trade and commerce. The State criminalized such practice because it was deemed injurious to public interests and was found to be pernicious and inimical to public welfare. B.P. Blg. 22 punishes the act of making and issuing bouncing checks. It is the act itself of issuing the checks which is considered malum prohibitum. The law is an offense against public order and not an offense against property. It penalizes the issuance of a check without regard to its purpose. It covers all types of checks. Even checks that were issued as a form of deposit or guarantee were held to be within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.

THE CITY OF ILOILO vs. SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (SMART)

THE CITY OF ILOILO vs. SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (SMART)
GR No. 167260
February 27, 2009

FACTS:

SMART received a letter of assessment dated February 12, 2002 from petitioner requiring it to pay deficiency local franchise and business taxes, in the amount of P764,545.29, which it incurred for the years 1997 to 2001. SMART protested the assessment, claiming exemption from payment of local franchise and business taxes based on Section 9 of its legislative franchise under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7294 (SMART’s franchise). Under SMART’s franchise, it was required to pay a franchise tax equivalent to 3% of all gross receipts, which amount shall be in lieu of all taxes. SMART contends that the “in lieu of all taxes” clause covers local franchise and business taxes. SMART similarly invoked R.A. No. 7925 or the Public Telecommunications Policy Act (Public Telecoms Act) whose Section 23 declares that any existing privilege, incentive, advantage, or exemption granted under existing franchises shall ipso facto become part of previously granted-telecommunications franchise. SMART contends that by virtue of Section 23, tax exemptions granted by the legislature to other holders of telecommunications franchise may be extended to and availed of by SMART.

The petitioner posits that SMART’s claim for exemption under its franchise is not equivocal enough to prevail over the specific grant of power to local government units to exact taxes from businesses operating within its territorial jurisdiction under Section 137 in relation to Section 151 of the LGC. More importantly, it claimed that exemptions from taxation have already been removed by Section 193 of the LGC, which provides that tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or controlled corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under RA No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.


ISSUE: whether or not SMART is exempt from the payment of local franchise and business taxes under Section 9 of its franchise and Section 23 of the Public Telecoms Act.


HELD:

The basic principle in the construction of laws granting tax exemptions is he who claims an exemption from his share of the common burden of taxation must justify his claim by showing that the Legislature intended to exempt him by words too plain to be beyond doubt or mistake.

We have indeed ruled that by virtue of Section 193 of the LGC, all tax exemption privileges then enjoyed by all persons, save those expressly mentioned, have been withdrawn effective January 1, 1992 – the date of effectivity of the LGC. The first clause of Section 137 of the LGC states the same rule. However, the withdrawal of exemptions, whether under Section 193 or 137 of the LGC, pertains only to those already existing when the LGC was enacted. The intention of the legislature was to remove all tax exemptions or incentives granted prior to the LGC. As SMART’s franchise was made effective on March 27, 1992 – after the effectivity of the LGC – Section 193 will therefore not apply in this case.

But while Section 193 of the LGC will not affect the claimed tax exemption under SMART’s franchise, we fail to find a categorical and encompassing grant of tax exemption to SMART covering exemption from both national and local taxes:

R.A. No 7294 does not expressly provide what kind of taxes SMART is exempted from. It is not clear whether the “in lieu of all taxes” provision in the franchise of SMART would include exemption from local or national taxation. What is clear is that SMART shall pay franchise tax equivalent to three percent (3%) of all gross receipts of the business transacted under its franchise. But whether the franchise tax exemption would include exemption from exactions by both the local and the national government is not unequivocal.

The uncertainty in the “in lieu of all taxes” clause in R.A. No. 7294 on whether SMART is exempted from both local and national franchise tax must be construed strictly against SMART which claims the exemption.

SMART’s claim for exemption from local business and franchise taxes based on Section 9 of its franchise is therefore unfounded.

Whether Section 23 of the Public Telecoms Act extends tax exemptions granted by Congress to new franchise holders to existing ones has been answered in the negative in the case of PLDT v. City of Davao. The term “exemption” in Section 23 of the Public Telecoms Act does not mean tax exemption; rather, it refers to exemption from certain regulatory or reporting requirements imposed by government agencies such as the National Telecommunications Commission. The thrust of the Public Telecoms Act is to promote the gradual deregulation of entry, pricing, and operations of all public telecommunications entities, and thus to level the playing field in the telecommunications industry. The language of Section 23 and the proceedings of both Houses of Congress are bereft of anything that would signify the grant of tax exemptions to all telecommunications entities. Intent to grant tax exemption cannot therefore be discerned from the law; the term “exemption” is too general to include tax exemption and runs counter to the requirement that the grant of tax exemption should be stated in clear and unequivocal language too plain to be beyond doubt or mistake.

BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER VS. CUARESMA

BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER AND PROMOTION, INC. vs. SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA CUARESMA, WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC. and JAIME ORTIZ
GR No. 182978-79
SPOUSES SIMPLICIO AND MILA CUARESMA vs. WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC. and BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER, INC.
GR No. 184298-99
April 7, 2009

FACTS:

On January 6, 1997, Jasmin Cuaresma (Jasmin) was deployed by Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc. (Becmen) to serve as assistant nurse in Al-Birk Hospital in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), for a contract duration of three years, with a corresponding salary of US$247.00 per month. Over a year later, she died allegedly of poisoning. Jessie Fajardo, a co-worker of Jasmin, narrated that on June 21, 1998, Jasmin was found dead by a female cleaner lying on the floor inside her dormitory room with her mouth foaming and smelling of poison.

Based on the police report and the medical report of the examining physician of the Al-Birk Hospital, who conducted an autopsy of Jasmin’s body, the likely cause of her death was poisoning.

Jasmin’s body was repatriated to Manila on September 3, 1998. The following day, the City Health Officer of Cabanatuan City conducted an autopsy and the resulting medical report indicated that Jasmin died under violent circumstances, and not poisoning as originally found by the KSA examining physician. The toxicology report of the NBI, however, tested negative for non-volatile, metallic poison and insecticides.

Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma (the Cuaresmas), Jasmin’s parents and her surviving heirs, received from the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) the following amounts: P50,000.00 for death benefits; P50,000.00 for loss of life; P20,000.00 for funeral expenses; and P10,000.00 for medical reimbursement.

On November 22, 1999, the Cuaresmas filed a complaint against Becmen and its principal in the KSA, Rajab & Silsilah Company (Rajab), claiming death and insurance benefits, as well as moral and exemplary damages for Jasmin’s death, Jasmin’s death was work-related, having occurred at the employer’s premises; that under Jasmin’s contract with Becmen, she is entitled to “iqama insurance” coverage; that Jasmin is entitled to compensatory damages in the amount of US$103,740.00, which is the sum total of her monthly salary of US$247.00 per month under her employment contract, multiplied by 35 years (or the remaining years of her productive life had death not supervened at age 25, assuming that she lived and would have retired at age 60).

In their position paper, Becmen and Rajab insist that Jasmin committed suicide, citing a prior unsuccessful suicide attempt sometime in March or April 1998 and relying on the medical report of the examining physician of the Al-Birk Hospital. They likewise deny liability because the Cuaresmas already recovered death and other benefits totaling P130,000.00 from the OWWA. They insist that the Cuaresmas are not entitled to “iqama insurance” because this refers to the “issuance” – not insurance – of iqama, or residency/work permit required in the KSA. On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, they claim that the Cuaresmas are not entitled to the same because they have not acted with fraud, nor have they been in bad faith in handling Jasmin’s case.

While the case was pending, Becmen filed a manifestation and motion for substitution alleging that Rajab terminated their agency relationship and had appointed White Falcon Services, Inc. (White Falcon) as its new recruitment agent in the Philippines. Thus, White Falcon was impleaded as respondent as well, and it adopted and reiterated Becmen’s arguments in the position paper it subsequently filed.


ISSUES:

(1.) whether the Cuaresmas are entitled to monetary claims, by way of benefits and damages, for the death of their daughter Jasmin.
(2) whether or not Jasmin’s death be considered as work-connected and thus compensable even while she was not on duty;


HELD:

Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Article 21 of the Code states that any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. And, lastly, Article 24 requires that in all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.

Clearly, Rajab, Becmen and White Falcon’s acts and omissions are against public policy because they undermine and subvert the interest and general welfare of our OFWs abroad, who are entitled to full protection under the law. They set an awful example of how foreign employers and recruitment agencies should treat and act with respect to their distressed employees and workers abroad. Their shabby and callous treatment of Jasmin’s case; their uncaring attitude; their unjustified failure and refusal to assist in the determination of the true circumstances surrounding her mysterious death, and instead finding satisfaction in the unreasonable insistence that she committed suicide just so they can conveniently avoid pecuniary liability; placing their own corporate interests above of the welfare of their employee’s – all these are contrary to morals, good customs and public policy, and constitute taking advantage of the poor employee and her family’s ignorance, helplessness, indigence and lack of power and resources to seek the truth and obtain justice for the death of a loved one.

Giving in handily to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide, and adamantly insisting on it just to protect Rajab and Becmen’s material interest – despite evidence to the contrary – is against the moral law and runs contrary to the good custom of not denouncing one’s fellowmen for alleged grave wrongdoings that undermine their good name and honor.

Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers enjoy the protective mantle of Philippine labor and social legislation, contract stipulations to the contrary notwithstanding. This pronouncement is in keeping with the basic public policy of the State to afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. This ruling is likewise rendered imperative by Article 17 of the Civil Code which states that laws which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The relations between capital and labor are so impressed with public interest,and neither shall act oppressively against the other, or impair the interest or convenience of the public. In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.

The grant of moral damages to the employee by reason of misconduct on the part of the employer is sanctioned by Article 2219 (10) of the Civil Code, which allows recovery of such damages in actions referred to in Article 21.

Thus, in view of the foregoing, the Court holds that the Cuaresmas are entitled to moral damages, which Becmen and White Falcon are jointly and solidarily liable to pay, together with exemplary damages for wanton and oppressive behavior, and by way of example for the public good.

On the second issue:

While the “employer’s premises” may be defined very broadly not only to include premises owned by it, but also premises it leases, hires, supplies or uses, we are not prepared to rule that the dormitory wherein Jasmin stayed should constitute employer’s premises as would allow a finding that death or injury therein is considered to have been incurred or sustained in the course of or arose out of her employment. There are certainly exceptions, but they do not appear to apply here. Moreover, a complete determination would have to depend on the unique circumstances obtaining and the overall factual environment of the case, which are here lacking.

WHEREFORE, Rajab & Silsilah Company, White Falcon Services, Inc., Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc., and their corporate directors and officers are found jointly and solidarily liable and ORDERED to indemnify the heirs of Jasmin Cuaresma, spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma, the following amounts: (1) TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2,500,000.00) as moral damages; (2) TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2,500,000.00) as exemplary damages; (3)Attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award.

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 179987
April 29, 2009
en banc

FACTS:

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.” On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.


ISSUES:

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?

HELD:

The Pertition is denied.

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.

(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.